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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS NEED 
SUPPORT AT STATE LEVEL 
Rep. Scott Conklin 
Domestic violence is a problem that affects people from all 
walks of life. The abuse, both physical and emotional, creates a 
lasting burden on its victims, no matter their economic background, 
age, ethnicity or gender. 
Too often, this problem goes unchecked. We must correct 
this. Part of breaking the silence includes creating awareness for 
programs aimed at helping domestic abuse victims. 
In Pennsylvania there are a host of helpful places a victim can 
turn to: 24-hour hotlines, individual and group counseling, court and 
emergency room assistance, shelters and safe homes, and state 
assistance programs to help compensate victims financially with 
hospital costs and destruction of property as a result of domestic 
violence. 
I am thankful for these programs because many of them 
undoubtedly help domestic violence victims in Centre County. For 
some, that help is a lifeline and helping hand when there's nowhere 
else to turn. 
Victim assistance is just part of the solution. As a state 
lawmaker, I realize the need to be proactive, not reactive in the fight 
against domestic violence. 
The unfortunate victims of domestic violence need many 
advocates in state government. Since I was elected to serve, I have 
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been one of them. My record of support for victims of domestic 
violence is strong and consistent. During my tenure as a state 
legislator, I have sponsored a number of legislative initiatives to help 
women, particularly teens and young women, to recognize the early 
signs of abuse and become armed with the information they need to 
leave an unhealthy relationship. In addition, I am diligently working 
to expand protections for abuse victims who live in fear of being 
repeatedly victimized by their abuser. 
Domestic violence is most commonly associated with abuse 
inside a home. The definition of domestic violence is outlined as 
behaviors used by one person in a relationship to control the other. 
Domestic violence knows no boundaries; it can happen outside of 
four walls and a picket fence. Sadly, it does. It happens between 
partners married and not married, those living together, separated or 
dating. 
Shortly after being sworn in as a state legislator, I introduced 
a bill to curb sexual violence on the campuses of Pennsylvania's 
colleges and universities. The first few months of college are the 
most dangerous for new students due to the availability of drugs and 
alcohol, the absence of parental supervision and a lack of education 
and awareness about sexual assault. 
The bill was aimed to require colleges in Pennsylvania to 
establish educational programs to provide discussion on various 
topics relating to sexual violence, including educating students about 
consent, the relation between drugs, alcohol and sexual violence, and 
the possibility of pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases. 
The legislation was also designed to establish a cohesive 
support network for victims among members of campus security, 
local law enforcement, the campus health center, women's center, 
rape crisis center and counseling services. 
The statistics clearly show that the new freedom college 
provides students only months out of high school makes many far 
more susceptible to sexual violence, especially when one figures in 
the influence of alcohol and drugs. We need programs that will 
educate them about the warning signs so they can recognize when 
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something they are engaging in could lead to them becoming a victim 
and help them avoid an attack before it starts. 
It is likewise important to make it clear to students when their 
own interaction with another student may be approaching what is 
considered sexual violence. 
The programs proposed in my bill were designed to teach 
first-time students about the myths and truths concerning rape and 
sexual assault, to understand what constitutes rape or sexual assault, 
and create their own risk reduction strategy, as well as make students 
aware of options for individuals who are victimized. This initiative 
was well received by my colleagues, as it overwhelmingly passed the 
House of Representatives with a vast majority of state lawmakers 
voting in favor of the plan. 
In addition, I was the author of a bill aimed to curb teen 
dating violence that was named the "Demi Brae Cuccia Law" after a 
Monroeville teen who lost her life as a result of dating violence. 
Demi was a beautiful young lady, a high school cheerleader, a 
typical 16-year-old who idolized Jessica Simpson and one day 
planned on becoming a doctor or lawyer. On the day after her 16th 
birthday, Demi's ex-boyfriend, who had a reputation of being 
controlling and possessive, attacked Demi inside her home and fatally 
stabbed her. 
Unfortunately, Demi's picture is now one that serves as a 
symbol of the tragic consequences dating violence can have. 
Oftentimes violence doesn't begin until a relationship has ended. Too 
many teens have been victims, and sadly too many have unnecessarily 
lost their life. 
The statistics are alarming. In fact, teen girls face relationship 
violence three times more than adult women. That is why I 
introduced a bill that was designed to integrate teen dating violence 
education into middle and high school curriculums, by requiring 
school districts to develop an anti-dating violence policy that could 
be taught in health class, for example. 
 
2016 Conklin 4:2 
605 
Teens need to know that if someone is texting them 
constantly and it feels uncomfortable, it's wrong; if they're being 
yelled at or pushed or hit, it's wrong. The numbers are staggering 
when you hear of students as young as sixth-graders have reported 
being hit by a boyfriend or girlfriend. It was imperative to me to have 
the tools in place so when teens are looking to talk, there is someone 
there to listen. 
The Cuccia family joined me in my effort to pass this 
legislation to help raise awareness of teen dating violence issues. 
After it cleared the hurdle of the House, during one of the news 
conferences we held to call on the Senate to also pass the bill, Demi's 
father, Dr. Gary Cuccia, said: "My daughter was experiencing teen 
dating violence, we were all just unaware. Getting an education on 
the dangers of teen dating violence is the best defense we can offer 
our children. I stand with Representative Conklin to urge the state 
Senate to pass this bill so no other family has to go through the same 
agony mine has." 
After the bill passed overwhelmingly in the House, it stalled 
in the state Senate. However, part of it was amended into the 2010 
school code that passed alongside that year's state budget. 
The language adopted in the school code was scaled back 
from my original proposal to recommend schools take up a dating 
violence education and response program rather than mandating 
them to do it. The law also instructed the state's Education 
Department to develop a model dating-violence complaint form to 
be distributed to Pennsylvania's public schools. 
Even though I still think the dangers of teen dating violence 
and domestic violence are something that all young people need to be 
educated about, I am pleased that we were able to get to the point of 
passing a similar law. 
And while domestic violence isn't confined to the home, in a 
perfect world that is where the education and awareness should start. 
In that perfect world, every family would eat dinner together every 
night of the week and discuss the tough issues. But the reality of the 
situation is that we have kids whose parents are unable to be there for 
them, kids whose parents aren’t around to teach these things. These 
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things, like dating violence, don’t always get discussed. That is one of 
the main reasons why I am pleased to say that we took a step forward 
in raising awareness of this issue so we don't lose one more young life 
unnecessarily. 
I am continuing to fight against domestic violence by working 
to add protections to the current law for victims of abuse. 
I originally introduced such legislation during the 2013-14 
legislative session, and have reintroduced it in January, following the 
2013 murder of Centre County resident Traci Ann Raymond 
Miscavish. Two months prior to her death Traci was granted a 
protection from abuse order, commonly known as a PFA, from her 
husband. Traci had a PFA against her husband yet lived in fear of 
him. Sadly those fears were valid, as he violated the order, tracked her 
down at work and took her life and his own. 
My legislation would allow electronic GPS monitoring of an 
alleged abuser in certain domestic violence cases. Under the bill, 
courts could grant the monitoring in abuse cases while a PFA is in 
effect.  
A PFA bans a suspected abuser from harassing, stalking, 
threatening or further abusing a protected person. Under 
Pennsylvania law, abuse is defined as causing or attempting to cause 
bodily harm, stalking, sexual assault, false imprisonment, and physical 
or sexual abuse of a minor. 
Twenty-one other states, including neighboring Ohio, permit 
the use of electronic monitoring devices in domestic violence cases. 
We've got to get on board. We need to give domestic violence 
victims more peace of mind while expanding tools for law 
enforcement so they can get in front of abusers who try to break the 
law. 
If this bill had been law in 2013, Traci's death might have 
been prevented. What happened to her was a tragedy. Passing this bill 
would be in her honor and send a message to domestic violence 
victims that we are listening to their calls for protection. 
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As a member of the state legislature, I am proud to be part of 
a body that can make laws against domestic violence. Just as the 
victim assistance programs, my efforts are one more part of the 
solution. It's going to take more than legislation. It's going to take 
education and empowerment, and it's going to take all of us being 
proactive. We can be proactive by implementing programs in our 
schools, like the teen dating violence program, and in community 
centers and churches. Stopping an abusive relationship before it 
starts is the ultimate goal and I believe if we continue to work 
together we can achieve that. 
Throughout my legislative career, I have dedicated a good 
deal of time and effort to ensuring the safety and well-being of 
women – teens and adults alike - particularly the unfortunate victims 
of rape and domestic violence. I stand behind my accomplishments 
and will continue to place a high priority on this issue. 
 
Rep. Scott Conklin represents the 77th Legislative District within the 
Pennsylvania House of Representatives. He serves constituents within the Centre 
Region who reside in Philipsburg, State College borough, Huston and Rush 
townships, and portions of Ferguson and Patton townships. Rep. Conklin is 
currently serving his fifth term upon taking the oath of office on Jan. 6, 2015. 




Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2016 VOLUME 4 NO. 2 
*THE FORGOTTEN VICTIM: MEN AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE – ISSUES FOR 
THE I-360 PETITION 
Christine Grant, PhD* 
Immigrant men who have been sexually, physically, 
emotionally and/or financially abused by their US Citizen spouses 
present very special issues for the practitioner.  Common gender 
stereotypes, including perceptions of male roles and the belief that 
men are the typical aggressors can impede understanding of the male 
victim within a marital relationship.  These impediments – whether 
conscious or not – can derail a successful VAWA petition for an 
otherwise deserving client. 
Josef was a young man from the Ukraine who arrived in the USA on a 
J-1 visa.  A quiet, reserved and uneducated man, he found employment as a 
rolling chair operator on the Atlantic City Boardwalk.  Danielle was a vibrant, 
loud and gorgeous nightclub dancer who hailed his chair for a ride.  Intrigued by 
her flamboyance and flirtatiousness, Josef agreed to a date.  Within weeks, 
Danielle moved in with Josef and asked for $1000.00 to help her out of a “jam.”  
Josef got a second job at a restaurant and eventually a third buffing floors on a 
nightshift in a grocery store.  Josef fell in love and the couple married within the 
year.  Their son was born four months later.  However, their relationship was 
tumultuous, Danielle claimed to be working but never had any money to show for 
her job. Whenever Josef questioned her about the job she would barrage him with 
cursing and accusations of infidelity and then would physically attack him. Life 
fell apart when Josef finally decided to follow Danielle one morning. To his 
                                                
 
*   Dr. Grant has written affidavits and provided expert evaluations for the 
immigration law firm of Bagia & Associates, PC since 1997. 
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surprise, she unknowingly led him to a mental health clinic where she was in a 
methadone program for heroin addiction. 
The challenge here is to “sort out” the addiction issues from 
the domestic violence issues.  Careful interviewing of the client is 
required in order to determine the nature of the drug history of the 
abuser and to determine if drug use correlates to incidents of abuse.  
Too much attention to the drug addiction can deflect from the 
battering and can shift the focus away from the trauma the client has 
experienced.  The examiner must be careful not to shift the attention 
from the abuse to the drug addiction as the ill-informed USCIS 
adjudicator may attribute the abuse as “involuntary behavior” as a 
consequence of drug addiction.  In addition, too much focus on the 
addiction may result in an erroneous decision that the marriage was 
not bonafide, instead allowing one to conclude that the US Citizen 
married only to financially sustain their addiction. 
  Naresh was only five years old when his mother brought him to the 
USA from Trinidad.  Growing up in North Philadelphia he was unaware of his 
illegal status until the age of 21. In his early twenties, he fell in love and married 
a gorgeous African American woman, Nekeisha.  The couple organized a 
Caribbean honeymoon, but all their plans were thwarted when he realized he 
could not travel. Nekeisha lashed out at Naresh – physically and emotionally – 
and left him five days after the wedding.  The couple resolved their differences and 
reunited after 3 months at which time Nekeisha became pregnant.  She 
immediately asked for $500.00 and told Naresh she was getting an abortion.  
Naresh begged her to keep the pregnancy, but she refused.  Nekeisha escalated her 
physical and mental abuse towards Naresh throughout the year until she again 
pronounced that she was leaving him.  Nekeisha returned to Naresh a year later 
with a baby girl in tow and promises that she really did love him.  Naresh took 
them both in and raised the baby as his own.  Nekeisha abandoned Naresh and 
her baby when the little girl was two years old.  Nekeisha’s maternal grandmother 
petitioned the Family Court for the baby and Naresh had to give her up. 
 In this case, the difficulty confronting the practitioner is the 
fact that this man endured years of abuse – both emotional and 
physical – by a woman who, by all objective thinking, did not love 
him.  Infidelity and abandonment are very difficult to process and to 
acknowledge.  Men are expected to be able to ‘satisfy’ their partner, 
take a slap or a punch or a scratch, and control the situation.  Men 
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are tough.  Men believe the abuser will change.  Men believe that love 
will overcome the issues.  Men do not want to lose their children.  
Men feel guilty if they leave the relationship.  Men experience the 
same identical feelings that women experience in violent 
relationships.  Yet our American society has embraced the notion 
that men can and should “take it.”  The practitioner’s job is to dispel 
these myths and preconceptions and explain in vivid and accurate 
detail the violence endured by the client. 
Addison, from the Dominican Republic, was 37 years old when he 
married 27 year old Vicki who had three small children from three relationships.  
Addison also had three small girls from his first marriage in the DR. The couple 
married and within the year had a daughter together.  Vicki preferred to spend 
time in Lancaster, Pennsylvania with her aging father rather than with Addison 
in Queens where he had a fulltime job as a locksmith.  The couple met on the 
weekends. Their baby daughter was usually with Vicki.  Addison walked in on 
Vicki and a man in bed at her father’s house when he arrived early to surprise 
her.  The couple split up but got back together after rounds of tears and apologies.  
Their reunions never lasted long.  Over the next three years, the couple endured a 
vicious cycle of break ups and reunifications.  Vicki became increasingly abusive 
and demanded sex from Addison at least 4 to 5 times per weekend when they 
were together.  If Addison refused sex or failed to achieve an erection, she resorted 
to throwing water on him, ripping his clothing, locking him in the bedroom alone, 
and destroying his personal possessions – such as his cell phone, photo albums and 
his locksmith tools. 
Married men cannot be victims of sexual abuse.  Men cannot 
be raped by women.  Men don’t have to engage in sex if they don’t 
want to.  All of these statements are misconceptions and must be 
addressed by the practitioner in order to accurately assess and 
interview the client.  Understanding that men do experience 
involuntary erections and can be coerced into sexual relations is 
imperative when you accept cases involving abused men.  When men 
are forced into a sexual act that they do NOT consent to – then that 
is abuse.  Sexual intimacy is difficult to discuss and to inquire about 
forced sexual intimacy presents an incredible challenge.  The astute 
practitioner must be aware that men are reticent to offer a sexual 
history and therefore the practitioner must be comfortable with 
asking detailed questions and be ready to “hear” the answers.  Sexual 
violence is NOT uncommon within the confines of an abusive 
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relationship and must be addressed with your male clients.  Men can 
be embarrassed, ashamed and confused if they have been sexually 
violated by a woman.  They struggle to make sense of how it 
happened and why it happened.  Careful questioning can reveal a 
pattern of sexual abuse that can be essential to a successful VAWA 
case. 
 Onyedi came to the USA from Nigeria to study.  After failing his 
coursework, he took a job as a security guard for a parking garage.  The same 
woman parked in his lot every day.  They struck up a conversation and soon they 
were dating.  The couple married the following year.  After marriage, Amanda 
brought her four children to live with the couple.  Onyedi had no idea she had 
children and was so astonished by the fact that he did not know how to respond.  
Once the children, who ranged in age from 5 to 14, were settled and in school, 
Amanda moved out.  She refused to tell Onyedi where she was and only 
corresponded with him through text messages and emails. She would come by the 
house for food and clothes and to demand money from Onyedi.  If Onyedi 
hesitated she threatened to call immigration.  During one particularly angry 
interaction she pulled a knife on him.  Onyedi went to the ER and had to have 
six stitches in his forearm. 
Important to remember is that we should not excuse women 
for their violent behavior.  As practitioners we have to be careful not 
to minimize the threats a man receives by a woman and to carefully 
examine the facts.  The standard is that most people believe that men 
cannot really be physically hurt by a woman.  Compounding the 
problem is that men do not call the police to report abuse; they do 
not seek assistance and if they must seek medical intervention, they 
are not asked about domestic violence.  Men do not tell their co-
workers or friends about their abuse and it is rare that men give off 
signs that they are abused.  People just do not ask.  Men do not take 
photos of their injuries and do not document their abuse.  Men are 
not likely to leave an abuser.  They believe if they try harder they can 
solve the issues and if there are children, men are afraid they will be 
cut off from them. 
The bar to present a complete and convincing VAWA 
petition may be set higher for men.  It is the practitioner’s duty to 
directly confront the preconceived beliefs and issues in the VAWA 
submission.  First and foremost proof must be offered that the 
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couple entered into the marriage in good faith.  Second, battery or 
extreme cruelty – language used by USCIS must be delineated.  
Actual and threatened acts of violence must be clearly presented with 
corroborative documentation.  Abuse can include physical or mental 
injury; psychological or sexual abuse or exploitation, including rape, 
molestation, and forced prostitution.  The pattern of abuse needs 
clear definition and elaboration.  Domestic violence is a sum of the 
parts in context.  Separate isolated acts may not appear to the 
evaluator as abusive; so it is the practitioner’s job to demonstrate that 
those small acts comprise a larger whole. 
Our law firm has successfully filed hundreds of VAWA 
petitions.  Seldom has an I-360 petition been approved without a 
Request for Evidence (RFE).  This clinician has noted that every 
single RFE has contained the following language: 
Submit evidence to show that you or your 
children have been the subject of battery or 
extreme cruelty.  Submit one or more of the 
following as evidence: 
Reports and affidavits from: police, judges, 
court officials, medical personnel, counselors, 
social works or other social service agency 
personnel or school officials. 
Evidence that you have sought refuge in a 
shelter for the abused.  
Photographs of your injuries, and affidavits 
from witnesses, if possible. 
A statement in your own words describing the 
relationship with your abuser.  Be as specific 
and detailed as possible. 
  It is imperative that each item be addressed and it is best if all 
this information is included in the original submission.  If your client 
receives an RFE, then it is imperative that each item be thoroughly 
answered in-depth.  A second affidavit is always recommended.  The 
second one addresses the fact that the first affidavit was submitted 
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and this second submission provides supplemental information.  The 
practitioner needs to offer detailed descriptions of abusive events in 
the client’s own words and correlate these to important time periods 
in the relationship.  For example, if the abuse escalated during the 
time the abuser was over-spending money – perhaps on drugs – 
overdraft statements from the bank could be presented as evidence.  
Medical records that correlate to injuries could support the victim’s 
statements.  Sworn affidavits which include all contact information 
including cell phone numbers have proven essential.  Counselling 
notes, letters from therapists and professional evaluations all lend 
credibility to the client’s statements. 
Just as important are statements by the client as to WHY he 
cannot provide the requested evidence.  Shelters for men do not exist 
in most states.  Men do not call the police.  Men do not seek 
counseling.  Men do not seek out social services.  Embarrassment, 
lack of knowledge and financial limitations are just a few reasons men 
are left thinking they must resolve their abuse on their own. 
Asking men about their abusive experiences is a start.  
Advocating for their safety and their rights is a must. 
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ABUSED, ABANDONED, OR 
NEGLECTED: LEGAL OPTIONS FOR 
RECENT IMMIGRANT WOMEN AND 
GIRLS 
Meaghan Fitzpatrick and Leslye E. Orloff 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of immigrants living in the U.S. has steadily 
increased in the last fifteen years.  In 2014, over 42 million 
immigrants lived in the U.S. with women (51%) and children under 
the age of 18 (25%) representing a substantial proportion of the U.S. 
immigrant population.1  Of that population, 2.1 million children are 
foreign-born and 17.5 million children are living with at least one 
foreign-born parent.2 Many women and girls who have immigrated to 
the U.S. will have experienced gender based violence in their home 
countries and/or during their journey immigrating to the U.S..  
Recently arriving immigrant women and girls are highly susceptible to 
gender based crime victimization in the U.S. including child abuse, 
child sexual exploitation, incest, dating violence, domestic violence 
sexual assault, and human trafficking.3  U.S. immigration laws offer 
                                                
1   Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Frequently Requested Statistics on Immigrants 
and Immigration in the U.S., Migration Policy Institute (April 14, 2016), 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frequently-requested-statistics-
immigrants-and-immigration-united-states#Demographic, Educational, Linguistic. 
2   Id. 
3  Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Request for Unaccompanied 
Children and Related Matters: Hearing on S. 272 DHS Appropriations Bill before the S. 
Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2014) (statements of Jeh Johnson, Sec. of 
Dept. of Homeland Security, and Sen. Dick Durbin). 
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specific forms of immigration relief designed to offer humanitarian 
protections for immigrant children and youth who are victims of 
child abuse, abandonment, child neglect, sexual assault, or human 
trafficking perpetrated either in the U.S. or abroad.  As greater 
numbers of immigrant children and youth arrive in the U.S., state 
family courts are seeing an increase in the numbers of immigrant 
children coming before the court in custody, protection from abuse, 
child support, children in need of supervision, and child abuse and 
neglect proceedings. 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ) was created to benefit 
and protect children who had been abused, abandoned, or neglected, 
and ensures their continued safety in the U.S..  This article provides 
an overview of immigration relief available to help immigrant women 
and girls living in the U.S. and discusses how the process of applying 
for SIJ, in particular, requires involvement of both state family courts 
and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).  State courts play a vital role in SIJ 
applications.  To petition for SIJ status, eligible immigrant children 
must obtain state court orders containing specified findings about the 
custody and best interests of the juvenile.4 
This article discusses the legislative history and the social 
science research that supported both the creation of Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ) and the expansion of SIJ protections 
through the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 (VAWA) and the 
Trafficking Victim’s Protection and Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA).  The 2008 amendments to the Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status program required that all children seeking SIJ obtain a court 
order from a state court containing statutorily required findings.  SIJ 
applicants must submit state court orders as a mandatory part of the 
child’s SIJ application.  This article provides direction and analysis on 
the procedural and substantive legal questions arising in state family 
courts in cases involving SIJ eligible children.  Common issues that 
arise at the intersection of state court and immigration law, such as 
“ageing out,” and jurisdiction in state court will be discussed.  The 
                                                
4   IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 101(a)(27)(J) defines 
“Special Immigrant Juveniles”. This section was added by § 153 of the Immigration 
Act of 1990 and amended most recently by the William Wilberforce Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in 2008. 
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article will also chronicle the broad range of state family court cases 
that involve custody, placement, care and/or best interests of 
children in which courts should be asked to issue SIJ findings.  An 
overview of the forms of immigration relief offering protection from 
deportation and work authorization for immigrant children and youth 
will also be provided.  Finally, the article will highlight the need for 
continuous screening of immigrant youth for SIJ, U visa, T visa, and 
VAWA eligibility from arrival in the U.S., through placement with a 
family, and the need for monitoring of the child’s placement to 
screen for abuse that may occur in the U.S. following placement. 
Women and children seeking safe haven in the U.S. are often 
fleeing severe forms of violence that they have suffered in their home 
countries.5  In recent years, the increase of gang violence, gender 
based violence, and poverty in some Central American countries has 
caused an influx of immigrant victims crossing the border into the 
U.S..6  The geographical region known as the “Northern Triangle,” 
consisting of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, in particular has 
extremely high rates of violence against women and girls.7  El 
Salvador has the highest rate of femicide in the world, Guatemala the 
third highest, and Honduras the seventh.8  Women and girls living in 
countries with high levels of violence against women are more 
frequently attacked in public, including gang and intimate partner 
violence.9  Women and girls in these countries are also victims of 
physical and sexual assaults, child abuse, trafficking, economic 
crimes, and emotional violence, often with the local government 
unwilling or unable to help.10  This severe gender based violence has 
caused many women and children to flee their countries of origin 
seeking safe haven in the U.S..  The number of unaccompanied girls 
younger than 18 years old caught at the Mexican-American border 
                                                
5 U.N. High Comm. for Refugees Report, Children on the Run: 
Unaccompanied Children Leaving Central America and Mexico and the Need for International 
Protection (2014) [hereinafter UNHCR Report]. 
6  Id. at 45. 
7  Id. at 5. 
8  Mathias Nowak, Femicide: A Global Problem, SMALL ARMS SURVEY 3 
Figure 2 (2012). 
9   Id. at 4.   
10  UNHCR Report, supra note 3, at 30-38.  
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without documentation increased by 77% in 2014.11  Women and 
girls face disproportionate risks of sexual assault and trafficking 
during the course of their journey.  At least 60% of Central American 
women and girls crossing Mexico to get to the U.S. border are raped 
along the way.12  The assaults are so rampant many girls take 
contraceptives as a preventative measure.13 
Women and girls who survive the journey across the border 
and enter the U.S. without inspection are uniquely vulnerable.  They 
remain at an increased risk for crime victimization in the U.S. due to 
previous victimization, undocumented immigration status, language, 
cultural, and economic barriers. Undocumented immigrants living in 
the U.S. can be very vulnerable to become victims of sexual assault, 
domestic violence, child abuse, and trafficking.  Many immigrant 
women and girls suffer widespread sexual assault in route to the 
border and many are also likely to have suffered previous 
victimization in their country of origin.  Additionally, many are 
particularly vulnerable to be targeted for crime victimization as 
women and girls living undocumented in the U.S..  Immigrants who 
have been victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, 
child abandonment or child neglect or human trafficking in the U.S. 
and/or abroad may be eligible for Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), Trafficking Victims Protection Act and other humanitarian 
forms of immigration relief, including Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status (SIJ). 
It is important for government agencies, attorneys, advocates, 
and law enforcement to be aware of and understand the rates of 
victimization among recent immigrants and be knowledgeable about 
                                                
11   Jens Manuel Krogstad et al., At the Border, a Sharp Rise in Unaccompanied 
Girls Fleeing Honduras, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2014). 
12 Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLICATIONS 15 (2010) [hereinafter Amnesty International 
Report]; Erin Siegal McIntyre & Deborah Bonello, Is Rape the Price to Pay for Migrant 
Women Chasing the American Dream?, FUSION (Sept. 10, 2014, 5:51 PM), 
http://fusion.net/story/17321/is-rape-the-price-to-pay-for-migrant-women-
chasing-the-american-dream/; Jude Joffe Block, Fronteras, Women Crossing the U.S. 
Border Face Sexual Assault with Little Protection, PBS (Mar. 31, 2014, 1:49 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/facing-risk-rape-migrant-women-prepare-
birth-control/. 
13   See Amnesty International Report, supra note 12, at 17. 
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immigrant victims’ legal rights in the U.S..  Advocates and attorneys 
play a crucial role in informing abused immigrants about their legal 
rights, supporting them through the legal process, safety planning, 
and encouraging those at greatest risk to turn to the justice system for 
help.14  Research has found that establishing real working 
relationships between advocates,  police, and prosecutors working 
collaboratively on cases is the most effective approach  in 
encouraging immigrant victims to come  forward to seek immigration 
relief and pursue justice system protection.15  A significant proportion 
of the immigrant and undocumented crime victims who, with 
support from advocates and attorneys, file immigration cases and 
seek protection orders embark on a path in which they develop trust 
of the justice system that greatly increases their willingness to call 
police and turn to the justice system for help.16 
II. IMMIGRATION RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME AND CHILDREN 
Women and girls who have been a victim of crime may be 
eligible for special forms of immigration relief designed to help 
vulnerable immigrant crime victims and immigrant children.  
                                                
14   Mary Ann Dutton et al., Cosmos Corp., Use and Outcomes of Protection 
Orders by Battered Immigrant Women: REVISED FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS (2006); Nawal H. Ammar 
et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the U.S. and Protection Orders: An Exploratory 
Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337 (2012); Praxis International, Law Enforcement—
Patrol Response, in THE BLUEPRINT FOR SAFETY 43 (2007). 
15   Giselle Hass et al., Barriers and Successes in U Visas for Immigrant Victims: 
The Experiences of Legal Assistance for Victims Grantees, ARTS SOC.Social SCI. J. 14 
(2014); Giselle Hass et al., U-Visa Legal Advocacy: Overview of Effective Policies and 
Practices, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013); Rachel 
Rodriguez, Community Partnership Models Addressing Violence Against Migrant and 
Seasonal Farmworker Women, Rockville, MD: National Criminal Justice Reference 
Service. 
16 Leslye Orloff et al., U-Visa Victims and Lawful Permanent Residency, 
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2012); Krisztina E. Szabo 
et al., Early Access to Work Authorization For VAWA Self-Petitioners and U Visa 
Applicants, NATIONAL WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014); Krisztina E. Szabo & 
Leslye E. Orloff, The Central Role of Victim Advocacy for Victim Safety While Victims’ 
Immigration Cases Are Pending, National Women’s Advocacy Project (2014); Nawal 
H. Ammar et al., Calls to Police and Police Response: A Case Study of Latina Immigrant 
Women in the USA, I INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT 230, 240 (2005). 
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Immigration laws in the U.S. provide several specific protections for 
victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, child 
abandonment, child neglect, human trafficking, and other criminal 
activities.17  The main forms of relief that women and girls crossing 
the border should be screened for eligibility for are Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (SIJ), the U visa, the T visa, and eligibility for Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA) Self Petitioning.  In addition, Deferred 
Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) provides protection from 
deportation for immigrants who came to the U.S. as children.  
DACA is a form of temporary immigration relief not related to crime 
victimization. 
A. Immigration Relief for Victims of Crime 
1. VAWA Self Petitions. - Immigrant children who have been 
victims of child abuse, incest, or sexual assault perpetrated by the 
child’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident natural parent, 
adoptive parent or step-parent are eligible to VAWA self-petitions.18  
The approved self-petition allows the immigrant victim and any 
children the immigrant included in the self-petition to apply for 
lawful permanent residency.19 
To file for a self-petition, the abuse, defined as battering or 
extreme cruelty,20 must have been perpetrated by a U.S. citizen or 
                                                
17   See Section III (b). 
18   Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a). 
19   Spouses and children under 21 years of age of U.S. Citizens can 
adjust to LPR immediately and can file the application concurrently with the 
VAWA self-petition. See IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); Spouses and children under 21 years of age of LPRs 
and must wait for an immigrant visa to become available under the current wait list, 
the wait as of September 25, 2015 is 7 months. See Visa Bulletin: Immigrant Numbers 
For October 2015, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS 
(Sept. 25, 2015), 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/visas/Bulletins/visabulletin_October2015.pd
f. 
20   See generally Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battering and Extreme Cruelty: Drawing 
Examples from Civil Protection Order and Family Law Cases, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013). 
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lawful permanent resident parent or step-parent.21  When filing the 
VAWA self-petition, the abused immigrant child must be under 21 
years of age22 and unmarried.23  Married immigrant youth who are 
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by their U.S. citizen or lawful 
permanent resident spouses or former spouses also qualify for 
VAWA self-petitioning.24  Formerly married immigrant youth must 
file marriage based self-petitions within two years of the termination 
of the marriage.25 The survivor must reside or have resided at some 
time in the past (including periods of visitation) with the abusive U.S. 
citizen or lawful permanent resident.  The applicant must also prove 
that they have good moral character which includes evidence about 
any criminal history the victim might have.26 
The self-petition allows spouses, parents, children, and step-
children abused by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident 
parents to apply for permanent residence confidentially without 
needing the abuser to file an immigration petition on their behalf.  
Within three months of filing a VAWA self-petition, victims will 
receive a prima facie determination making the applicant and any 
children included in the victim’s application eligible for post-
secondary educational grants and loans, public and assisted housing, 
health care insurance and some other state and federal public 
                                                
21   Policy Memorandum: Eligibility to Self-Petition as a Battered or Abused Parent 
of a U.S. Citizen; Revisions to Adjudicator’s Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21.15 (AFM 
Update AD 06-32), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (Aug. 30, 2001), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2011/Augu
st/VAWA-Elder-Abuse.pdf. 
22  Leslye Orloff et al., Battered Immigrants and Immigration Relief, in Breaking 
Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights and Resources for Battered Immigrants, 
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013). 
23 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1154. 
24 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc), 8 
U.S.C. § 1154. 
25 Immigration and Nationality Act § 204(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(ccc), 8 
U.S.C. § 1154; Michael A. Pearson, Memorandum for Regional Directors: Eligibility to Self-
Petition as a Battered Spouse of a U.S. Citizen or Lawful Permanent Resident Within Two 
Years of Divorce, U.S. Department of Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(Jan. 2, 2002), 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/pressrelease/VAWADv_pub.pdf. 
26   8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(1)(i)(F)(2007) 
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benefits.27  If granted, VAWA Self-Petitioners receive legal 
immigration status, access to certain public benefits, and work 
authorization.28 
The VAWA self-petition primarily helps immigrant children 
abused in the U.S..  However, immigrant children abused abroad by a 
parent, step-parent, spouse or former spouse who is a U.S. citizen or 
lawful permanent resident employee of the U.S. government or 
member of the uniformed services also qualify to file VAWA self-
petitions.29 
2. The U Visa. - The U visa is available to victims of qualifying 
criminal activity who have suffered substantial physical or mental 
abuse as a result of the criminal activity and who are willing to be 
helpful to law enforcement, prosecutors, courts, child abuse 
investigators, labor enforcement agencies or other government 
agencies30 in detection, reporting, investigation, prosecution, 
conviction or sentencing.31 
Criminal activities perpetrated against immigrant children and 
adult victims that qualify for U visa protection include the following: 
abduction, abusive sexual contact, blackmail, domestic violence, 
extortion, false imprisonment, female genital mutilation, felonious 
assault, fraud in foreign labor contracting, hostage, incest, involuntary 
                                                
 
 
28   See Moira Fisher Preda et al., Preparing the VAWA Self-petition and 
Applying for Residence, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 
(2013). 
29   Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 204(a)(1)(A)(v), 204(a)(1)(B)(iv). 
30   The government agencies eligible to sign certifications include 
agencies with investigative authority that in the course of their work uncover or 
detect facts about criminal activities perpetrated against the survivor. See New 
Classification for Victims of Criminal Activity; Eligibility for ‘‘U’’ Nonimmigrant Status, 72 




31   For a full discussion on the U Visa see Leslye Orloff et al., U Visas: 
Victims of Criminal Activity, in Breaking Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights and 
Resources for Battered Immigrants, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY 
PROJECT (2013). 
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servitude, kidnapping, manslaughter, murder, obstruction of justice, 
peonage, perjury, prostitution, rape, sexual assault, sexual 
exploitation, slave trade, stalking, torture, trafficking, witness 
tampering, unlawful criminal restraint, and other related crimes, and 
include attempts, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit any of the 
above and other related criminal activities.32  The U visa qualifying 
criminal activity must have occurred in the U.S. or violate U.S. law.33  
Once the U visa case is approved, the applicant receives legal work 
authorization and access to health care insurance and may apply for 
legal permanent residence after four years. 
Immigrant youth who are victims of U visa listed criminal 
activities committed against them in the U.S. may be eligible for a U 
visa.34  When the criminal activity the child suffered would under 
state law be defined as abuse, abandonment or neglect the child may 
also qualify for SJIS.35  The U visa may be an important avenue to 
attain legal immigration status for children and youth suffering dating 
violence, extortion, felonious assault and other U visa listed criminal 
activities that would not make the child SIJ eligible. 
3. The T Visa and Continued Presence. - The T visa and 
Continued Presence are two separate forms of immigration relief 
available to protect victims of severe forms of human trafficking 
perpetrated in or being prosecuted in the U.S.  Government officials 
investigating or prosecuting a human trafficking case may file 
requests asking DHS to grant the trafficking victims they are working 
with continued presence.  Continued presence allows immigrant 
                                                
32   U and T Visa Law Enforcement Resource Guide for Federal, State, 
Local, Tribal and Territorial Law Enforcement, Prosecutprs, Judges, and Other 
Government Agencies, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (2015). available at 
https://www.dhs.gov/publication/u-visa-law-enforcement-certification-resource-
guide 
33 In some cases, crimes committed outside of the U.S. may qualify under 
extraterritorial application of American Criminal Law; see generally Charles Doyle, 
Extraterritorial Application of American Criminal Law, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (2012). 
34  Joanne Lin and Colleen O’Brien, Immigration Relief for Child Sexual 
Assault Survivors, in Empowering Survivors: Legal Rights of Immigrant Victims of Sexual 
Assault, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 4 (2013). 
35   Id. 
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trafficking victims to stay temporarily in the U.S. with work 
authorization and access to federal and state public benefits.36 
The T visa allows immigrant victims who have suffered 
severe forms of human trafficking to remain in the U.S. for four 
years.37  Trafficking victims can file t for a T visa whether or not a 
government official sought continued presence for that victim.38  
Victims awarded T visa status receive protection from deportation, 
work authorization, and access to state and federal public benefits.39  
Both continued presence and the T visa are available to victims of 
severe forms of human trafficking who are physically present in the 
U.S. on account of the trafficking.  Victims applying for and receiving 
T visas are required to comply with reasonable requests for assistance 
from law enforcement and prosecution officials with an investigation 
or prosecution of the traffickers.40  To be awarded a T visa a victim 
will also need to prove that they would suffer extreme hardship 
involving unusual and severe harm if removed from the U.S.41 
Human trafficking, often referred to as “contemporary 
slavery,” may take the form of labor or sexual exploitation.  Victims 
of severe forms of trafficking are eligible to receive either or both 
continued presence or T visas.  Eligibility includes adults compelled 
to engage in “sex acts” through the use of force, fraud, or coercion.  
Children less than 18 years of age involved in the commercial sex 
trade or prostitution as a matter of law are victims of trafficking.  For 
minors, no proof of force, fraud, or coercion is required.  
Additionally, both adult and child immigrants who are forced or 
fraudulently recruited, harbored, or transported for labor or services 
                                                
36   TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3). 
37   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(T).  
38   TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3); The award of 
continued presence does not guarantee an approval of a T-visa, there are separate 
statutory requirements for a T-visa. . 
39   TVPA 2000 §107(c)(3), 22 U.S.C. §7105(c)(3). 
40  Carol Angel and Leslye Orloff, Human Trafficking and the T-Visa, 
NATIONAL WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 8 (2015).  
41   Id. at 10. 
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that subject them to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or 
slavery are also victims of severe forms of human trafficking.42 
Immigrant youth who are victims of human trafficking may 
qualify for several different types of immigration relief.  These 
include the forms of relief discussed above: the T visa, continued 
presence, the U visa and, in a limited number of cases, VAWA self-
petitioning.  Immigrant child trafficking victims may also qualify for 
the two forms of immigration relief discussed below: Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status and Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals (DACA).  Which remedy an immigrant child qualifies for 
and which they will be able to successfully pursue will depend on the 
facts of each individual child’s case.  Factors will include: whether the 
perpetrator was a parent or step-parent, whether the parent or step-
parent is a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident; how long the 
child has been in the U.S.; whether the child is a minor under state 
law; or whether an immigrant child is married or unmarried.43  
Additionally, some of these remedies can be pursued sequentially.  A 
child who has been in the U.S. since 2007 may decide to first pursue 
DACA which will give the child protection from deportation and 
work authorization.  Immigrant children who have been victims of 
human trafficking may also pursue either a U or T visa case 
depending on which evidentiary requirements the child can best 
meet.  Which form of immigration relief is the best alternative for an 
immigrant child who has been a victim of trafficking will also be 
affected by the benefits a child can receive through the type of 
immigration case filed.  T visa and continued presence have the most 
access to federal and state public benefits and the U visa has the least.  
Work authorization can be more quickly obtained through DACA 
and continued presence than other forms of immigration relief. 
                                                
42   See Laura Simich, Out of the Shadows: A Tool for the Identification of 
Victims of Human Trafficking, THE VERA INSTITUTE (2014). 
43   See Leslye E. Orloff et al., Comparing Forms of Immigration Relief for 
Immigrant Victims of Crime, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT 
(2013).  
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B. Immigration Relief for Vulnerable Immigrant Children 
1. Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. - Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (SIJ) is a unique form of immigration relief available 
for youth who have been abused, abandoned, or neglected.  SIJ can 
be especially important for recent young immigrants because the 
abuse, abandonment, or neglect by at least one of the child’s parents 
need not have taken place in the U.S..  It is available to immigrant 
youth who were abused, abandoned or neglected by the child’s parent 
or parents in the child’s home country.  Abused, abandoned, and 
neglected immigrant children are among the most vulnerable 
individuals in the U.S. and as such, are very susceptible to domestic 
violence, sexual assault, and other crimes and victimization.  For this 
reason, SIJ is also available to immigrant victims who experienced 
child abuse, incest, child exploitation, abandonment, or neglect by a 
parent, step-parent, or adopted parent in the U.S.. 
SIJ is only available to unmarried youths who have been 
abused, abandoned, or neglected by either one or both parents.  
Applicants for SIJ must reside in the U.S. at the time the SIJ 
application is filed.  The SIJ application must include an order from a 
state court judge containing findings on abuse, abandonment or 
neglect, on the viability of reunification with the parent who 
committed the abuse, abandonment or neglect and on the best 
interests of the child to not be removed to the child’s home 
country.44  The state court issuing this order must have jurisdiction 
under state law to make judicial determinations about the care, 
custody, dependency, or placement of children.45  It is important that 
advocates and attorneys working with immigrant women and 
children screen recent immigrants and all children involved in state 
family court proceedings for SIJ eligibility unless the child is a U.S. 
citizen or lawful permanent resident.  Early and ongoing screening to 
identify abuse suffered after arrival in the U.S. is essential to ensuring 
that children eligible for SIJ are identified and provided the 
opportunity to obtain state court orders needed to apply for SIJ 
status before the child reaches the age of majority under state law.  
                                                
44   Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(i)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 
45   Id. 
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This helps children gain lawful presence in the U.S. and avoid some 
of the dangers of re-victimization. 
2. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals - Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) is a prosecutorial discretion program 
that provides temporary relief from deportation and work 
authorization for certain undocumented immigrants living in the 
U.S..46  DACA may be available for women and girls physically 
present in the U.S. who have been continuously residing in the U.S. 
since June 15, 2007.47 Deferred action provides qualifying individuals 
protection from deportation for a period of two years with the 
potential for renewal.  DACA recipients are also authorized to work 
in the U.S., and will not accrue unlawful presence during the period 
deferred action is in effect.  While it may be renewed after two years, 
deferred action is not immigration status, does not provide a path 
towards permanent residence or citizenship, and does not extend to 
family members. 
Deferred action is a useful tool for immigrant women and 
girls who have been victims of a crime and may be eligible for longer 
term immigration relief.  Individuals coming forward for DACA may 
also have been victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, human 
trafficking, and other crimes that would make them eligible for 
permanent legal immigration status as a result of having been crime 
victims.  Survivors applying for DACA can apply prior to, 
concurrently with, or while waiting for approval of crime victim-
related immigration remedies.48  This benefits immigrant women and 
girls particularly, because it allows for faster access to work 
authorization so they can begin rebuilding their lives and allows them 
to feel secure and not fear deportation.  Individuals can apply for 
longer term immigration relief and deferred action at the same time, 
as long as they are not currently in lawful status, and were under the 
                                                
46  USCIS guidelines can be found on their website. See Consideration of 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVICES, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca#top (last visited APR. 20, 2016). 
47   Id. 
48   Orloff et. al. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: How is it helpful for 
Immigrant Crime and Violence Survivors?, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2012).  
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age of thirty-one as of June 15, 2012.  As soon as VAWA, U, T, or 
SIJ is granted, however, the individual no longer needs deferred 
action.  Deferred action is also an important tool for undocumented 
immigrants who are ineligible for other forms of immigration relief 
or their eligibility has lapsed due to timing restraints. 
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SPECIAL IMMIGRANT JUVENILE 
STATUS 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status was originally introduced as 
part of the Immigration Nationality Act (INA) of 1990.49  SIJ was 
created to aid and provide stability for undocumented youth living in 
foster care.50  Congress originally created SIJ to help undocumented 
youth gain lawful permanent residency when the state juvenile court 
system has taken jurisdiction over an immigrant child and is 
responsible for insuring their safety, without regard to the child’s 
immigration status.51  Undocumented youth living in foster care in 
the U.S. had no parents they could rely upon, states bore the costs of 
the immigrant children’s’ care, and the children had no path to self-
sufficiency.  In 1990, the federal government was exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion by not seeking to deport unaccompanied 
youths because “of their age and the impracticality of deportation” as 
well as the fact many of them were victims of child abuse.52  At its 
inception, to be granted SIJ only required proof that an 
undocumented child was living in the U.S., was in foster care, and 
                                                
49   See Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 
(allocating a certain number of immigrant visas for “special immigrants”); 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) 
 (defining Special Immigrant Juveniles). 
50  See Angela Lloyd, Regulating Consent: Protecting Undocumented Immigrant  
Children From Their (Evil) Step-Uncle Sam, or How to Ameliorate the Impact of the 1997 
Amendments to the SIJ Law, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237, 237-38 (2006). 
51   Special Immigrant Status for Alien Foster Children: Joint Hearings on S. 358, 
H.R. 672, H.R. 2448, H.R. 2646, and H.R. 4165 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Refugees and International Law of the House Committee of the Judiciary, and the Immigration 
Task Force of the House Education and Labor Committee, 101st Cong. 614 (1990) 
(statement of Mark Tajima, Legislative Analyst, Chief Administrator Officer, 
County of Los Angeles, CA). 
52   Id.  
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that reunification with the child’s biological parents was not viable.53  
As the number of children eligible for SIJ grew, Congress made 
several amendments in furtherance of the law’s original intent. 
In response to a growing concern that the law as originally 
written might encourage immigrant parents to give up their parental 
rights so that their minor children could acquire Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status, in 1997, Congress modified the INA’s SIJ provisions 
to limit SIJ immigration relief to immigrant children who had been 
abused, abandoned, or neglected.54  The 1997 amendments also 
added the stipulation that the state court orders containing the 
findings of dependency and abuse, abandonment, or neglect were not 
sought for the sole purpose receiving immigration relief through 
SIJ.55  The court order needed to fulfill a state law purpose of 
remedying the abuse, abandonment, or neglect by providing for the 
care or needs of an immigrant child.  Congress made these 
amendments to further the original intent of SIJ, which was to 
protect undocumented children from abuse, abandonment, and 
neglect.56 
The next significant amendment to SIJ was included in the 
2005 Reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA).57  Prior to VAWA 2005 when a child applied for Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status, the government officials adjudicating the 
child’s case would as part of their adjudication contact the child’s 
abusive parent or parents directly as part of the investigation of the 
case.58  The practice of government officials contacting or requiring 
                                                
53  Leslye Orloff et. al. Comparison Chart of Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA) Self-Petition, U Visa, and Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015). 
54  See House Committee on Appropriations, Making Appropriations for The 
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for  the Fiscal 
Year Ending September 30, 1998, and for Other Purposes, H.R. REP. NO. 105-405, at 22-
23, 130 (1997) (Conf. Rep.).  
55   Id. 
56   Id.  
57   Violence Against Women Act, Department of Justice Reauthorization 
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 826, 119 Stat. 2960, 3065-66. (Rule 12.4(a), (c), 
(e) pgs. 116-17).   
58  Immigration and Nationality Act Section 287(i) VAWA 2005 
amendment reads as follows: ‘‘(i) An alien described in section 101(a)(27)(J) of the 
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the child to contact their abusive parent was not considered to pose 
grave danger for immigrant children applying for SIJ.  The harm that 
this contact could cause to abused children was well understood in 
the domestic violence and child abuse fields and by members of 
Congress involved in drafting the Violence Against Women Act.59  
To bring an end to this dangerous practice, VAWA 2005 amended § 
287 of the INA to bar government officials from contacting or 
compelling an immigrant child applicant for SIJ to contact the child’s 
parent who is alleged to have abused, abandoned or neglected the 
child.60  This no-contact requirement also barred contact with family 
members of the alleged abusive parent.61  These restrictions were an 
important part of the VAWA 2005 legislative package in which 
Congress created special protections for victims of 
domestic violence against disclosure of information to 
their abusers and the use of information provided by 
abusers. . . These provisions are designed to ensure 
that abusers and criminals cannot use the immigration 
system against their victims.  Examples include 
abusers using DHS to obtain information about their 
victims, including the existence of a VAWA 
immigration petition, interfering with or undermining 
their victims’ immigration cases, and encouraging 
immigration enforcement officers to pursue removal 
                                                
Immigration and Nationality Act who has been battered, abused, neglected, or 
abandoned, shall not be compelled to contact the alleged abuser (or family member 
of the alleged abuser) at any stage of applying for special immigrant juvenile status, 
including after a request for the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security 
under section 101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I) of such Act.” In implementing these provisions 
DHS directed its officers “Under no circumstances can an SIJ petitioner, at any 
stage of the SIJ process, be required to contact the individual (or family members 
of the individual) who allegedly abused, abandoned or neglected the juvenile. This 
provision was added by the Violence Against Women Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-
162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) and is incorporated at section 287(h) of the INA.” 
Donald Neufeld and Pearl Chang, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions (March 24, 2009). 
59   Katrina Castillo et al., Legislative History of VAWA (94, 00, 05), T and 
U-Visas, Battered Spouse Waiver, and VAWA Confidentiality, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015).  
60   Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(h), 8 U.S.C. 1357(h) 
61   Id. 
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actions against their victims.  This Committee wants 
to ensure that immigration enforcement agents and 
government officials covered by this section do not 
initiate contact with abusers, call abusers as witnesses 
or relying on information furnished by or derived 
from abusers to apprehend, detain and attempt to 
remove victims. . .62 
In discussing how these immigration law protections were 
applied by VAWA 2005 to Special Immigrant Juvenile Statue 
immigration relief, Congress provided: 
that in the case of an alien applying for relief as a 
special immigrant juvenile who has been abused, 
neglected, or abandoned, the government may not 
contact the alleged abuser.63 
In the DHS policies implementing this VAWA 2005 statutory 
amendment to SIJ, DHS directed its officers not to question SIJ 
applicant children applying for SIJ status about the details of the 
abuse because these matters have been addressed by state family 
courts experienced in working sensitively with traumatized children.64 
The most significant change to SIJ came in 2008 with the 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008 (TVPRA).65  The TVPRA expanded eligibility for SIJ in 
significant ways.  Until 2008, in order to qualify for SIJ the applicant 
must have been deemed eligible for long term foster care by a 
                                                
62   146 Cong. Rec. H9046 (2000), at 126, H.R. REP. NO. 109-233 (2000). 
63   Id. 
64  Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Acting Associate Director of 
Domestic Operations, & Pearl Chang, Acting Chief of Office of Policy and 
Strategy, to Field Leadership, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security (March 24, 2009) 
(“During an interview, an officer should focus on eligibility for adjustment of status 
and should avoid questioning a child about the details of the abuse, abandonment 
or neglect suffered, as those matters were handled by the juvenile court, applying 
state law.”). 
65  See generally William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); See 
generally William Wilberforce Trafficking Victim’s Protection Act of 2007, H.R. REP. 
NO. 110-430, Pt. 1 (2007). 
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juvenile court and must therefore have been adjudicated dependent 
on the state.66  This approach had the effect of barring access to SIJ 
for large numbers of immigrant children who had suffered abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect.  These immigrant children needed and 
deserved to receive access to the SIJ immigration remedy which 
provides the stability and protection from deportation SIJ children 
need to be able to heal, to overcome the impact of the abuse, and to 
move beyond the abuse to become productive well-adjusted adults. 
Congress recognized that many abused, abandoned, or 
neglected children whose lives could benefit dramatically from access 
to SIJ relief were living with one non-abusive protective parent.67  In 
domestic violence cases the protective parent may have been a victim 
of domestic violence perpetrated by the parent who also abused, 
abandoned, or neglected the immigrant child.  Prior to the TVPRA 
2008 amendments to SIJ, abused immigrant children living with a 
protective parent in a family relationship in which the child was 
healing and thriving, could only qualify for SIJ if the child was taken 
from the protective parent and placed in long-term foster care.  This 
placed immigrant children and their protective parents in the 
untenable position of having to choose between two outcomes 
neither of which furthered the immigrant child’s best interests.  The 
child would have to sever their relationship with their protective 
parent so that the child could receive legal immigration status 
through SIJ so the child could remain with their protective parent.  
Alternatively, the child would continue living with their protective 
parent and by doing so forfeit access to legal immigration status that 
would otherwise be available to the immigrant child victim. 
This approach was inconsistent with best practices and 
research on the needs of abused children and children who had 
witnessed domestic violence in their homes.  State family laws 
prohibit or discourage placement of a child in the custody of 
perpetrators of domestic violence and instead encourage courts to 
                                                
66   William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008, §235 (d)(1)(A); 22 USC 7101. available at http://library.niwap.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/IMM-Lghst-PublicLaw110.457TVPRA08-12.23.08.pdf 
67   The expansion of SIJ eligibility to include “one or both parents” 
reflects the recognition of the strong relationship between domestic violence and 
child abuse.  
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
632 
award custody to the non-abusive protective parent.68  As a result, 
judges in domestic violence cases issue court orders granting custody 
to the non-abusive parent in a broad range of family court 
proceedings.  The types of family court proceedings in which custody 
or care of abused children and children witnessing domestic violence 
are addressed include: protection order, guardianship, juvenile, abuse, 
neglect, custody, divorce, paternity, child support, probate or other 
state court proceedings in which rulings concerning the placement, 
custody and care of children are determined.  State family courts 
recognize that the best interests of children who have suffered or 
witnessed abuse in the home is best served by placing the child in the 
care of a protective non-abusive parent rather than placing the child 
in foster care.69 
                                                
68   Men who perpetrate domestic violence against their intimate partners 
who are the mothers of their children parent differently from non-abusive men. 
Jeffrey L. Edelson,  Children’s Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence, 14 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, 839 (1999); Behind Closed Doors: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence on Children, U.N. CHILDREN’S FUND (2006); PETER G. JAFFE, DAVID A. 
WOLFE, & SUSAN KAYE WILSON, CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN, (1990), cited 
with approval in Rashida Manjoo, Violence Against Women in the U.S. and the State’s 
Obligation to Protect: Civil Society briefing papers on community, military and custody submitted 
to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Rashida Manjoo in 
advance of her Mission to the U.S. of America January 24 – February 7, 2011 (2011), 
https://www.gallaudet.edu/Documents/AF/EOP/vaw.pdf. Perpetrators of 
domestic violence are less involved with their children and use parenting practices 
that are harmful to their children including spanking, shaming and displays of 
anger. George W. Holden & Kathy L.Ritchie, Linking Extreme Marital Discord, Child 
Rearing, and Child Behavior Problems: Evidence from Battered Women, 62  CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT, 311, 321 (1991); George W. Holden, Joshua D. Stein, Kathy L. 
Ritchie, Susan D. Harris & Earnest N. Juries, Parenting Behaviors and Beliefs of Battered 
Women, CHILDREN EXPOSED TO MARITAL VIOLENCE: THEORY, RESEARCH AND 
APPLIED ISSUES, 185 (George GW. Holden, Robert Geffner & Earnest N. Juries 
eds., 1998), cited with approval in Manjoo. Abusive men do not serve as role models 
for healthy relationships and conflict resolution in relationships. R. LUNDY 
BANCROFT & JAY G.  SILVERMAN, THE BATTERER AS PARENT: ADDRESSING THE 
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON FAMILY DYNAMICS (2002); Levendosky, 
A.A. & S.A. Graham-Bergmann, Mothers’ Perceptions of the Impact of Abuse on their 
Parenting, 6 (3) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 247-271 (2000).  
69   H. Lien Bragg, Child Protection in Families Experiencing Domestic 
Violence,.U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for 
Children and Families (2003), 
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/domesticviolence.pdf (issuing guiding 
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TVPRA 2008 made significant changes to Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status eligibility designed to promote healing for abused, 
abandoned, or neglected immigrant children by allowing immigrant 
children to apply for SIJ immigration relief and to allow the child to 
continue living with a protective non-abusive parent.70  The approach 
furthered the goal of keeping non-abusive one parent headed 
households together.  After enactment of TVPRA 2008 a non-
abusive battered immigrant mother whose child was also abused 
could leave the abuser and her child would be eligible to pursue SIJ 
protection while living in the care and custody of the child’s non-
abusive battered immigrant parent.71 
                                                
principles for child protective services workers that recognize that offering 
protection to domestic violence victims, enhances protection for children and has 
the benefit in domestic violence cases of keeping children with their non-abusive 
parent. “The following guiding principles can serve as a foundation for child 
protection practice with families when domestic violence has been confirmed. The 
safety of abused children often is linked to the safety of the adult victims. By 
helping victims of domestic violence secure protection, the well-being of the 
children also is enhanced. Perpetrators of domestic violence who abuse their 
partner also emotionally or psychologically harm their children, even if the children 
are not physically or sexually harmed. Identifying and assessing domestic violence 
at all stages of the child protection process is critical in reducing risks to children. It 
is important to understand potential effects of domestic violence to children 
beyond those that are physical in nature. If the family’s circumstances are clear and 
it is appropriate, every effort should be made to keep the children in the care of the 
non-offending parent. Supportive, non-coercive, and empowering interventions 
that promote the safety of victims and their children should be incorporated in 
child protection efforts. Once domestic violence has been substantiated, the 
perpetrators must be held solely responsible for the violence while receiving 
interventions that address their abusive behaviors. CPS must collaborate with 
domestic violence programs and other community service providers to establish a 
system that holds abusers accountable for their actions.”). 
70   See Memorandum from Donald Neufeld, Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE,(March 25, 2009). (stating that 
“previously, the juvenile court needed to deem a juvenile eligible for long term 
foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment. . .” while “. . .under the TVPRA 
2008 modifications, the juvenile court must find that the juvenile’s reunification 
with one or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law”) available at 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files
_Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf. 
71   Id.  
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TVPRA 2008 made two significant changes to Special 
Immigrant Juvenile Status.  First, it opened up SIJ eligibility to 
include immigrant children receiving state court orders placing them 
in the custody of an individual or an agency which includes the 
child’s other non-abusive parent.  Secondly, the amendments 
broadened SIJ eligibility to include immigrant children who suffered 
abuse, abandonment or neglect by one parent ending the requirement 
that both parents have been involved in the child’s abuse, 
abandonment or neglect. 
The TVPRA of 2008 included amendments of SIJ to include 
any child who has been placed under the custody of an individual or entity 
appointed by a State or juvenile court as eligible to apply for SIJ.72  This 
allowed children in the custody of a protective parent, relative or 
appointed a guardian by the court the opportunity to apply for SIJ.  
This change illustrated a Congressional recognition of the important 
role played in state family court proceedings of kinship care.  The 
amendments reinforce the importance child placements based on a 
child’s best interests by removing obstacles in immigration law that 
punished immigrant children whom courts had not placed in foster 
care. 
Placement with an individual, as opposed to placement with 
an agency, allows for the child to remain in a familiar, stable 
environment with a non-abusive parent, another family member, 
guardian or other state court ordered kinship care arrangement.  This 
TVPRA 2008 change removes the requirements in SIJ immigration 
laws that were directly contrary to social science research, state laws, 
and court rulings.  The 2008 amendments follow best practices in the 
field that aim to promote placement with of children family members 
or other care providers who could provide the best care for children 
and youth traumatized by their experiences of abuse, abandonment 
or neglect perpetrated by one or both of their parents.73  Children 
who are able to remain with family members and familiar custodians 
are better able to adjust to their settings and are less likely to face 
                                                
72   Id.  
73  See Stepping Up for Kids: What Government and Communities Should Do to 
Support Kinship Families, THE ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION (2012) (reporting that 
“extended family members and close family friends care for more than 2.7 million 
children in this country, an increase of almost 18% over the past decade”). 
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behavioral problems.74  This amendment was intended to allow 
children the stability and safety of custody and guardianship 
placements with protective parents, guardians or other family 
members while retaining the opportunity to gain legal immigration 
status through SIJ.  By deleting the long-term foster care 
requirement, an undocumented immigrant child now has the option 
to remain with kin including the protective, non-abusive parent and 
still receive SIJ benefits. 
The second major amendment in the TVPRA 2008 altered 
the requisite findings a state court with jurisdiction over a minor must 
make as part of the SIJ application.  The state family court is no 
longer required to find the child eligible for long term foster care 
based on abuse, abandonment, or neglect, but instead must find that 
the juvenile’s reunification with one or both of his or her parents is not viable 
due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law.75  
In amending SIJ, TVPRA 2008 explicitly deleted the long term foster 
care requirement from the law, and replaced it with a statutory 
provision that authorizes SIJ eligibility for immigrant children who 
were abused, abandoned, or neglected by one parent and who reside 
with a non-offending parent.76  As a result of the TVPRA 2008 
amendments, if a child has one abusive parent and one protective 
parent, the court may find that reunification of the abusive parent 
and the child is not viable due to abuse.  The state court order placing 
the child with the child’s protective battered immigrant or other non-
                                                
74   Id.  
75  In light of the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 amendments, 
which directs that neither immigration officials nor the SIJ child applicant 
communicate with the parent who has battered, abused, neglected or abandoned 
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(h)), and the statutory language under 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(i) “or similar basis found under 
State law,”  “extreme cruelty” may be the basis for SIJ findings in state court.  
Extreme cruelty has been defined by the Department of Homeland Security in 
other contexts and is among the behaviors that would constitute abuse or neglect 
for the purposes of SIJ status. The term has a long history in state court family law, 
and the final regulations should clarify that “extreme cruelty” can form a basis for 
SIJ status.  Leslye Orloff et al., supra note 20, (describing behaviors of power and 
control and coercive control that constitutes battering or extreme cruelty). 
76   See Special Immigrant Juvenile Petitions,76 Fed Reg. 54978 (proposed 
Sept. 6, 2011). 
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abusive parent would no longer cut off vulnerable immigrant children 
from SIJ eligibility. 
These changes in SIJ eligibility updated immigration law to be 
consistent with changes occurring in the family courts and child 
protective services systems, which had been moving in recent years 
away from the foster care system and toward alternate placement for 
children designed to be less harmful and  more nurturing, stable, and 
healing for children who had suffered trauma.  Under the new 
approach, immigrant children who have  experienced abuse, neglect, 
abandonment or other harm that under state law can receive the 
protection they need under state law and obtain the findings they 
need from state courts to qualify for SIJ.  Examples of children who 
were to benefit from the TVPRA 2008 amendments include: 
• children living with parents who have also been 
abused; 
• children being returned from state custody to live 
with an abused protective parent; and 
• children who benefit from the family court equivalent 
of “alternatives to detention” where courts and child 
protective services agencies placed an abused, 
abandoned or neglected child with a family member, 
school teacher, kinship care or other placement 
designed to be better for the child and more in line 
with the child’s best interests than foster care. 
A cornerstone of recent evolution of the U.S. child abuse and 
neglect system has been family reunification.  As state courts and 
state child protection agencies have gained experience on the 
intersection of child abuse and intimate partner violence, they have 
come to understand the impact that protecting the abused parent has 
on protecting the child from ongoing child abuse.  Research among 
immigrant domestic violence victims found that protecting immigrant 
mothers through protection orders and access to legal immigration 
status had the effect of reducing the co-occurrence of child abuse and 
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domestic violence in immigrant families.77  Offering protection for 
the child’s non-abusive parent, results in less child abuse and neglect 
of children in immigrant families that experience domestic violence. 
The strong relationship between child abuse and domestic 
violence is well documented,78  with co-occurrence rates ranging 
from 30 to 60%.79 Children living in houses where there was 
battering are twice as likely to be abused compared to those where 
there was no battering.80  Further, 45-75% of women in shelters 
report that their children experienced one or more forms of 
maltreatment.81  Research among immigrant women has found 
similar domestic violence and child abuse co-occurrence rates among 
immigrants (40-44%).82  However, among immigrant women there 
was a significant difference in child abuse co-occurrence rates 
between battered immigrant women who had sought help from a 
service provider (e.g. shelter, protection orders, immigration relief) 
with a co-occurrence rate of 23%83 compared to battered immigrants 
                                                
77 		See generally Nawal Ammar et al., Children of Battered Immigrant 
Women: An Assessment of the Cumulative Effects of Violence, Access to Services 
and Immigrant Status, Presentation before the International Family Violence 
Conference (Sept. 19-25, 2004). 
78   Joy D. Osofsky, Prevalence of Children’s Exposure to Domestic Violence and 
Child Maltreatment: Implications for Prevention and Intervention, CLINICAL CHILD & 
FAMILY PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 161-170 (2003); Christine E. Cox et al., A 
longitudinal Study of Modifying Influences in the Relationship Between Domestic Violence and 
Child Maltreatment, JOURNAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 5-17 (2003); Alissa C. Huth-
Bocks et al., The Direct and Indirect Effects of Domestic Violence on Young Children’s 
Intellectual Functioning, JOURNAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 269-90 (2001); Bonnie E. 
Carlson, Children Exposed to Intimate Partner Violence: Research Findings and Implications 
for Intervention, TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 321-42 (2000); Melissa  Jonson-Reid, 
Youth Violence and Exposure to Violence in Childhood: An Ecological Review, AGGRESSION 
AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 159-79 (1998).  
79   Jeffrey Edleson, The Overlap Between Child Maltreatment and Woman 
Battering, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (1999).   
80  MURRAY A. STRAUS & RICHARD J. GELLES, PHYSICAL VIOLENCE IN 
AMERICAN FAMILIES (Christine Smith ed. 1989). 
81  Mary M. McKay, The Link Between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: 
Assessment and Treatment Considerations, CHILD WELFARE, 29-29 (1994).  
82  Nawal Ammar et al., Presentation at the International Family Violence 
Conference, Children of Battered Immigrant Women: An Assessment of the 
Cumulative Effects of Violence, Access to Services and Immigrant Status (Sept. 19-
25, 2004). 
83  Id. 
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who had never sought help regarding domestic violence where co-
occurrence rates rose to 77%.84  Children of help-seeking battered 
women were 20% less likely to have the abuser threaten the child and 
were one third less likely that the abuser would threaten to take the 
child away from his or her mother.85 
Historically many states had practices of removing children 
from abused parents and placing them in foster care.  After years of 
litigation, advocates for battered women secured court rulings that  
removals of children from the non-abusive battered parent’s care was 
unconstitutional.86 As a result of these decisions, the failures of the 
foster care system, and the benefits for children of remaining in the 
care and custody of their non-abusive parent, courts today generally 
place children with the non-abusive parent including when she has 
been a victim of domestic violence.  Courts issue protection orders 
and other orders in custody, child abuse and neglect and other family 
court cases that offer protection to abused mothers, abused children, 
and other children in families in which domestic violence is 
occurring.  The changes in SIJ immigration laws removing the 
requirement that a child have been placed in foster care, broadening 
the types of family court matters in which SIJ orders can be issued, 
and providing access to SIJ for children who suffered abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect by one parent are a federal SIJ parallel to 
this evolution in the law.  Congress, in amending INA Section 
101(a)(27)(J), accomplished several changes in Special Immigrant 
Juvenile law with the goal of improving consistency with state family 
laws and state court procedures regarding jurisdiction under state law 
to make determinations about the custody and care of children.87 
                                                
84  Id.  
85  Id.  
86  See generally Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 
2002); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v. 
Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004). See also David Lansner, The Nicholson 
Decisions New York’s Response to ‘Failure to Protect’ Allegations, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (2008), 
https://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/cdv_enewsletter_home/vo
l12_expert1.html. 
87   Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(27)(j), 
66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(j)), (amended by 
William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, 
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Additionally, TVPRA of 2008 amended SIJ laws to clarify 
“age out” protections for SIJ applicants.  For applications filed on or 
after December 23, 2008, if an SIJ petitioner was a “child” on the 
date on which an SIJ petition was properly filed, USCIS will not deny 
SIJ based on the petitioner’s age at the time of adjudication, so long 
as the petitioner was under 21 years of age on the date their SIJ 
application was filed.88  Congress created this “age out” protection to 
provide immigration relief that includes protection from deportation, 
work authorization and a path to lawful permanent residency that are 
essential to promoting the best interests and long term stability to 
immigrant children who have been victims of abuse, abandonment or 
neglect by one or both of their parents.89  Through the creation of SIJ 
and the amendments added in VAWA and the TVPRA Congress has 
demonstrated a clear intent to protect not only children dependent 
on the state, but all immigrant children who have been abused, 
abandoned, or neglected as well as victims of domestic violence who 
are mothers of immigrant children experiencing child abuse or 
witnessing domestic violence. 
IV. SCREENING FOR IMMIGRATION RELIEF ELIGIBILITY: 
FACILITATING ACCESS TO HEALING FOR CHILD TRAUMA SURVIVORS 
AND REDUCING VULNERABILITY TO ABUSE 
Immigrant women and girls who immigrate to the U.S. are 
very likely to have suffered crime victimization in their home 
countries, to have been abused or sexually assaulted during their 
                                                
Pub. L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §1232 
(2008))). 
88 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, § 235(d)(6), 122 Stat. 5044 (2008); see also Memorandum from Dept. 
of Homeland Security on Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 
2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions (May 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static_Files_
Memoranda/2009/TVPRA_SIJ.pdf.  
89   Policy Memorandum: Updated Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile 
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journey to the U.S. and are very vulnerable to crime victimization 
following their arrival in the U.S..  Every immigrant’s experience will 
be different.  Some will arrive in the U.S. already meeting the criteria 
of eligibility for the special forms of immigration relief designed to 
help immigrant children who have been abused, abandoned or 
neglected, because they came to the U.S. fleeing domestic violence, 
sexual assault, persecution, or because they are victims of human 
trafficking.  Others may arrive not having suffered traumas that 
would make them eligible upon entry for immigration relief and 
during their time in the U.S. become eligible for crime victim or child 
related immigration remedies because of harms they suffer here.  
Many immigrants who suffer these traumatic life experiences will be 
eligible for humanitarian forms of immigration relief including relief 
designed specifically to help immigrant children and immigrant crime 
victims, but most children and victims do not know that they qualify 
for protections under U.S. immigration laws. 
Throughout their journey of resettlement, acculturation, and 
adaptation to their new life in the U.S., immigrant children, women 
and crime victims will encounter many professionals along the way 
who can play a key role in their healing.  Healthcare providers, 
teachers, counselors, therapists, social workers, attorneys, advocates, 
police, prosecutors, judges, child abuse agency staff, foster care 
workers and staff at community based, immigrant and faith based 
organizations all encounter immigrant women and children in their 
work.  These professionals can play a crucial role in screening for 
trauma history, identifying immigration relief eligibility, and 
supporting victims and children in in the process of applying for 
immigration relief and seeking other justice and social services 
assistance available to assist them in overcoming trauma and crime 
victimization.  It is crucial to screen immigrant women and children 
for immigration relief at every encounter possible. As their stories 
develop over time, because of abuse or crime victimization they 
suffer while in the U.S., immigrants may become eligible for 
immigration relief and child abuse or crime victim related services 
they were not previously able to apply for. 
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A. Vulnerability of Immigrant Girls and Need for Facilitating Access 
to Protection and Humanitarian Relief 
Growing numbers of immigrant women and girls who 
immigrate to the U.S. have experienced domestic violence, sexual 
assault, or human trafficking in their home countries or in the 
process of their immigration to the U.S..90  In addition, immigrant 
women and girls are at a significant risk of crime victimization after 
their arrival in the U.S., particularly as victims of domestic violence, 
sexual assault, and human trafficking.91 
Rates of domestic violence among immigrant women are high 
due in part to the perpetrators’ ability to use immigration related 
abuse and threats of deportation as an effective coercive control tool 
that locks victims in abusive relationships and cuts them off from 
available help.92  As a result, immigrant domestic violence victims stay 
longer in abusive relationships, have fewer resources and options, 
and sustain more severe physical and emotional consequences of 
abuse.93 
When immigrant women and girls immigrate to the U.S. they 
often reconnect with parents and other extended family members.  
This reunification results in a restructuring of immigrant families and 
introduction of young immigrant children into families that include 
step-parents, step-siblings and extended family members who are 
relatives of either the child’s original family or the child’s new step 
parent’s family.  Recently arriving immigrant children living in homes 
with step-fathers, step brothers, grandfathers, uncles, cousins, and/or 
the child’s mother’s new boyfriend or in-laws are at greater risk of 
                                                
90  Review of the President’s Emergency Supplemental Funding Request for 
Unaccompanied Children and Related Matters: Hearing Before the Senate Appropriations 
Comm. on Dept. of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, 113th Cong. (2014) (statements 
of Jeh Johnson, Sec’y of Dept. of Homeland Security, and Sen. Dick Durbin). 
91  Id.   
92  Leslye E. Orloff & Olivia Garcia, Dynamics of Domestic Violence 
Experienced by Immigrant Victims, in Breaking Barriers: A Complete Guide to Legal Rights 
and Resources for Battered Immigrants, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY 
PROJECT (2013).  
93   Giselle Aguila Hass et al., Battered Immigrants and U.S. Citizen Spouses, 
Washington, DC: Legal Momentum, Immigrant Women Program, LEGAL MOMENTUM, 
(2006).  
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child abuse, sexual assault and incest.94  Undocumented, limited 
English proficient, girls may also be targeted for sexual assault  by 
predators in their life outside of their new families at school, church, 
or in the new community in which they settle. 
For newly arrived immigrant women and children, limited 
English proficiency, undocumented immigration status, the process 
of acculturation and the lack of knowledge about laws and services 
available to offer protection from family violence and sexual assault 
result in vulnerability to being targeted by abusers and sexual 
predators.95  This explains, in part, why research has found that 
foreign born girls are twice as likely as U.S. born girls to have 
suffered multiple incidents of sexual assault by the time they reach 
high school.96 
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status was created to offer help 
and an opportunity for healing for immigrant children harmed by 
child abuse, child sexual assault, abandonment, or neglect.  Many 
state laws recognize that witnessing domestic violence in the home 
falls within the behaviors that under state law constitute child abuse 
or neglect.97  Theses state laws were developed based on recognition 
about the effect that experiences of child abuse, sexual abuse and 
witnessing domestic violence perpetrated against a parent have on 
children are significant.  Children in homes where domestic violence 
is present are impacted by the trauma in a number of ways, leading to 
obesity, heart disease, bed-wetting or nightmares, headaches, flu, as 
well as long term psychological effects that include depression, post-
traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse  and an increased 
likelihood to become victims of family violence themselves.”98 
                                                
94   Michele R. Decker et al., Sexual Violence Against Adolescent Girls: 
Influences of Immigration and Acculturation, 13 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 498, 
503 (2007). 
95   Jessica Mindlin et al., Dynamics of Sexual Assault and the Implications for 
Immigrant Women, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013). 
96   See Decker et al.  
97   Varies by state, check local statute.   
98  The Facts on Children and Domestic Violence, FUTURES WITHOUT 
VIOLENCE (2008). 
2016 Fitzpatrick & Orloff 4:2 
643 
It is important to note that best practices in cases of children 
witnessing domestic violence is for the state to bring charges of child 
abuse or neglect against the parent perpetrating the abuse.  Best 
practices promote placement of the children with the battered non-
abusive parent with protection orders, custody and child support and 
other supports in place to help the battered mother and her children 
heal from the effects of the abuse.  Cases have overturned court 
findings of abuse against battered mothers for failure to protect their 
children from the perpetrator’s abuse.99  U.S. immigration laws 
contain waivers for battered immigrant mothers charged with or 
convicted of failure to protect in states that continue to bring such 
cases against battered mothers, despite best practices and research 
findings to the contrary.100 
For immigrant women and girls, the domestic violence or 
sexual assault they experience in the U.S. may trigger memories of 
prior victimization or dislocation occurring in their home country or 
on their journey to the U.S..101  Many immigrant children who 
immigrate to the U.S. have been the direct victims of violence 
including child abuse and sexual abuse in the child’s home country.  
An estimated 21% of the children from Mexico, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras who have crossed the border and are 
living in the U.S. reported direct victimization in their homes as a 
reason for immigrating to the U.S..102  In each country, these reports 
were primarily made by girls who reported sexual assaults by step-
fathers, boyfriends, and physical abuse from other relatives if they 
attempted to get help.103  Young girls immigrating to the U.S. from 
the four most common countries of origin, Mexico, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and Honduras, all reported an express fear of sexual 
violence at the hands of gangs in their home country.104  El 
Salvadorian youth reported the highest percentage of gang related 
criminal activity, with 63% of the children self-reporting gang 
                                                
99   See Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F.Supp.2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003); Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 3 
N.Y.3d 357, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004). 
100   Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. 1227. 
101   Decker, supra note 68 at 2. 
102   UNHCR Report, supra note 3, at 28-29.  
103   Id. at 35. 
104   Id.  
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violence as the direct reason for immigrating to the U.S..105  Girls 
reported death threats against themselves and their families if they 
refused gang members sexual advances.106  These high rates of 
violence in their home counties drive immigrant women and children 
to flee and risk the dangerous journey to the U.S.. 
The journey from the home country to the U.S. exposes 
young girls and women to rampant sexual assault.  Traveling alone, 
relying on guides for direction and sustenance, with no access to 
government authorities to report crimes, immigrant women and girls 
fall prey to sexual assault perpetrated by fellow travelers, by coyotes, 
and by other men they encounter along their route to the U.S.. 107  
Many women and girls have report being instructed to purchase birth 
control before they begin their journey to the U.S., engaging in the 
journey to help protect them against pregnancy as a result of rape.108 
Immigrant girls and women who suffered domestic violence, 
sexual assault, human trafficking, child abuse, child abandonment, or 
child neglect either in their home country or in the U.S. may qualify 
for Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and/or other forms of 
immigration relief designed to offer humanitarian protection for 
immigrant victims of crime.  Some children will qualify for several 
forms of immigration relief due to abuse, abandonment, neglect or 
other forms of crime victimization.  Some immigrant children may 
not qualify for immigration relief when they first enter the U.S. 
because they may not have suffered harm in their home country that 
would make them eligible for SIJ or  other immigration relief.  
However, these children may suffer harms subsequent to their arrival 
in the U.S. that make them eligible for SIJ, the U visa, the T visa, 
VAWA self-petitioning or VAWA cancellation of removal.  Some of 
the most common circumstances or experiences occurring to 
children after their arrival in the U.S. that would make them eligible 
for immigration relief include, but are not limited to: 
                                                
105   Id. at 32. 
106   Id. 
107  Steve Inskeep, The Rarely Told Stories of Sexual Assault Among Female 
Migrants, NPR (Mar. 23, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/23/293449153/the-
rarely-told-stories-of-sexual-assault-against-female-migrants. 
108   Id. 
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• Being held hostage by coyotes after crossing the 
border 
• Being raped in the U.S. when the child is in the 
process of immigration to the U.S. 
• Being subjected to human trafficking in the U.S. 
• Experiencing child abuse, sexual assault, or incest 
perpetrated by a parent or extended family members 
in the household in which the child is living in the 
U.S. 
• Becoming a victim of sexual assault at school, 
university, or at work in the U.S. 
• Becoming a victim of dating violence in the U.S. 
Depending on which side of the border a child’s victimization 
occurred, children may qualify for different forms of immigration 
relief.  Screening and the dissemination of information about legal 
rights in the U.S. is essential so that victims who may be eligible for 
immigration relief learn about their eligibility.  Too often, cases go 
unreported due to threats, fear, and the high number of victims 
detained at the border, who are not fully screened for the full range 
of immigration relief children may qualify to receive.  As a result 
children and young women can be deported before they are able to 
learn of their eligibility.  Courts, advocates, and attorneys should 
distribute DHS produced brochures on immigration relief for crime 
victims and on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status at courthouses and 
other locations that immigrant children and women frequent in the 
community.109 
Advocates and attorneys should screen immigrant girls and 
young women for crime victimization early in their relationship with 
                                                
109   See Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, https://www.uscis.gov/green-card/special-immigrant-
juveniles/special-immigrant-juveniles-sij-status (last visited March 22, 2016); see also 
Emily McCabe & Leslye E. Orloff, Pathways to Immigration Relief for Students, 
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014). 
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the client.  Screening could include screening for trauma history 
through which the advocate or attorney may detect additional crime 
victimization, abuse, abandonment or neglect that may not have 
initially been apparent.  Knowing the full history of trauma, abuse, 
and crime victimization may help attorneys and advocates identify the 
full range of forms of immigration relief the immigrant child is 
eligible to receive.  The forms of immigration relief available for 
immigrant crime victims and immigrant children vary with regard to a 
variety of factors.  All immigration case types developed to offer help 
for immigrant children and crime victims offer protection from 
deportation.  The remedies vary however in some significant ways110 
that include: 
• The length of time an applicant must wait to receive 
legal work authorization; 
• Whether the form of immigration relief the child 
qualifies for includes a path to lawful permanent 
residency 
• When a child can receive a driver’s license or a state 
issued ID; 
• Whether the applicant is eligible for federal or state 
public benefits; 
• Whether the child can receive health care through the 
federal or state funded exchanges and whether the 
child qualifies for state or federal subsidies for health 
care 
• If the child can qualify for food stamps, and 
                                                
110   The National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project, under a grant 
from the Department of Justice, Office on Violence Against Women, developed 
several comparison charts illustrating the different eligibility factors, benefits, 
processes, and access to state and federal services and public benefits for various 
victim based immigration relief. See generally Krisztina E. Szabo & Leslye E. Orloff, 
Comparison Chart of U visa, Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJ), and Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014). 
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• Whether the child qualifies for post-secondary 
educational grants or loans through FAFSA (spell 
out) or through state funded educational grants or 
loan programs. 
Since immigrant children may have suffered abuse in their 
home countries and others may at a later time suffer abuse in the 
U.S., it is important that advocates, attorneys, school teachers, 
counselors, community programs working with immigrant youth and 
faith based programs be cognizant of signs of abuse and screen 
children at regular intervals for abuse.  Ongoing screening for 
domestic violence, child abuse, witnessing domestic violence in the 
home, sexual assault, human trafficking and other U visa listed crimes 
is important to ensure that children eligible for relief are identified as 
early as possible. 
This helps assure that children receive the help they need as 
soon as possible.  More importantly, ongoing screening is critical, 
because it assures the immigrant children meet filing deadlines and do 
not “age out” of immigration protections that they are eligible to 
receive.  There are age deadlines by which children must file 
applications for SJIS,111 VAWA self-petitions,112 and DACA.113  Age 
limitations also apply to a child’s ability to benefit from their 
                                                
111   8 CFR § 204.11(c)(1). 
112   Children who suffer battery or extreme cruelty before the age of 21 
that is perpetrated by a U.S. citizen of lawful permanent resident parent or step-
parent are able to file a VAWA self-petition up until the date of which they turn 
age 25. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 204 (a)(1)(A)(iv), 204 (a)(1)(B)(iii), 8 
U.S.C. 1154; see also USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0048, on Continued Eligibility to 
File for Child VAWA Self-Petitioners After Attaining Age 21; Revisions to Adjudicator’s 
Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21.14 (AFM Update AD07-02), U.S. Citizenship and 




113   The current DACA eligibility criteria require that applicants were 
under 31 years of age on June 15, 2012, however, under the new guidelines in 
President Obama’s Executive Action of November 14, 2014 this age restriction 
was lifted. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-
arrivals-daca (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
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immigrant parent’s immigration case.  Children who are under the 
age of 21 can be included in the immigration applications of their 
immigrant parents who are victims of domestic violence, human 
trafficking, or crime victims filing for VAWA, or T or U visa 
immigration benefits. 
In order for immigrant crime victims to be able to access the 
immigration and justice system relief available under VAWA and 
state laws access to help from lawyers and advocates is essential.  
Research has found that when advocates and attorneys offer 
immigrant victims safety planning, legal rights information, and 
support, greater numbers of undocumented immigrant victims are 
willing to come forward and seek help offered by state civil 
protection order laws114 and U.S. immigration laws.115  Furthermore, 
immigrant women receive the support they need to file a crime victim 
based immigration case and become more willing the call the police 
for help and avail themselves of justice system protections including 
protection orders, custody and participation in criminal cases.116  
Access to legal services plays an important role in the ability of 
immigrant victims of domestic violence and child abuse to file for 
immigration relief and access justice system help.  Based on this 
understanding, Congress in VAWA 2005 amended the immigration 
restrictions on Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funded agencies to 
represent immigrant victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, 
human trafficking, or U visa qualifying crimes on a wide range of 
legal matters related to the abuse or crime victimization.117 
In 2006, LSC issued program guidance to LSC funded legal 
services agencies directing that under VAWA 2005 immigrant victims 
could be represented by LSC funded agencies.118  LSC in 2014 
                                                
114   Dutton et al., supra note 14.  
115   Ammar et al., supra note 14. 
116   Szabo, supra note 16. 





118  Letter from Helaine M. Barnett, President of Legal Services Corporation on 
Violence Against Women Act 2006 Amendments (Feb. 21, 2006) [hereinafter LSC 
Program Letter], http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/cultural-
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amended its regulations119 and issued a program letter120 creating a 
new path to legal representation by LSC funded agencies for 
immigrant victims covered by the Violence Against Women Act’s 
(VAWA) and the Trafficking Victim Protection Act’s (TVPA) anti-
abuse laws.  These new regulations and policies offer protection for 
vulnerable immigrant women and children expanding the scope of 
representation at LSC funded agencies to include immigrant women 
and girls fleeing violence including when the abuse happened in the 
victim’s home country or in the process of the immigration to the 
U.S..121  The representation can be offered for in any case that is 
directly related to escaping abuse, ameliorating the effects of the 
abuse, or preventing future abuse.122 Abused children and other 
victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, human trafficking or 
other U visa listed criminal activities occurring inside or outside of 
the U.S. can receive assistance from LSC funded attorneys without 
regard to whether the victim qualifies for or will be pursuing 
immigration relief.123  These LSC regulations, implementing that 
change, create two avenues an immigrant can pursue to attain 
assistance from any LSC funded program.  These two paths to 
representation are representation under anti-abuse laws or 
representation based on immigration status.  Children who have been 
abused in their home countries or in the U.S. qualify for LSC 
representation.124  LSC funded agencies may also be able to represent 
immigrant children whose abandonment or neglect by a parent was 
tantamount to child abuse in the facts of the specific case considering 
                                                
competency/access-to-legal-
services/CULTCOMP_LSCPgmLetter_2.21.06.pdf/view. 
119   Restrictions on Legal Assistance to Aliens, 79 Fed. Reg. 21861 (Apr. 
18, 2014), codified at 45 C.F.R. 1626 [hereinafter 45 C.F.R. 1626]. 
120   LSC Program Letter, supra note 118.  
121   Id.  
122   45 C.F.R. 1626, supra note 119. 
123  See generally Leslye E. Orloff & Benish Anver, And Legal Services Access 
for All: Implementing the Violence Against Women Act of 2005’s New Path to Legal Services 
Corporation Funded Representation for Immigrant Survivors of Domestic Violence, Sexual 
Assault, Human Trafficking, and Other Crimes, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2014) [hereinafter Access for All]. 
124  LSC Program Letter, supra note 118.  
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the parent’s actions and the impact of the abandonment or neglect on 
the child.125 
B. Need For Screening of Children in Immigration Enforcement and 
Detention for All Forms of Immigration Relief Including U Visa 
and SIJ 
For these reasons, it is also extremely important that 
immigration officials be required to screen immigrant women and 
children they encounter for the full range of humanitarian 
immigration relief that immigrant women and children might be 
eligible to receive.  Screening should not be limited to the very 
important credible fear interviews conducted to screen new 
immigrants for asylum eligibility.  Over the past two decades, 
numerous additional forms of humanitarian immigration relief have 
been created by Congress specifically designed for immigrant 
children and crime victims.  DHS officials working for Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE),Customs and Border Patrol 
(CBP),Department of Health and Human Services, and Office of 
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) should be required to routinely screen 
immigrants who are detained and immigrants who become the 
subjects of enforcement actions to identify immigrants who may 
qualify for: 
• T visas, continued presence or U visas as victims of 
human trafficking; 
• Violence Against Women Act self-petitioning or 
cancellation of removal as victims of spouse abuse or 
child abuse (battering or extreme cruelty) perpetrated 
by the immigrant’s U.S. citizen or lawful permanent 
resident family member; 
• U visas as crime victims who suffered criminal 
activities committed in the U.S. including domestic 
                                                
125  Id.; see also, Access for All, supra note 123.  
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violence, sexual assault, kidnapping, felonious assault, 
and other crimes listed in the U visa;126 and 
• Special Immigrant Juvenile Status for children who 
have suffered abuse, abandonment, or neglect by at 
least one of their parents. 
Screening for VAWA, T and U visas, and SIJ is appropriate 
and necessary at each new interaction and after every change in 
location or custody.127  Federal agency officials, such as CBP and 
ICE, are often the first encounter for undocumented women and 
girls who either turn themselves in or are apprehended in the process 
of crossing the border.  The Department of Homeland Security 
issued a brochure that briefly describes crime victim based forms of 
immigration relief under the VAWA, T visa, and U visa programs. 128  
This brochure should be distributed and be available on display in 
multiple languages next to customs forms at ports of entry into the 
U.S. and should be distributed to all immigrants who are detained or 
subject to immigration enforcement.  Additionally, DHS brochures 
on SIJ and DACA should be distributed to immigrant children and 
the organizations and professionals who work with and encounter 
immigrant children.129  The DHS issued a specific brochure on SIJ 
which gives victims, law enforcement and advocates detailed 
information on the eligibility requirements for SIJ.130  These tools can 
be used at every level of interaction with immigrant crime victims. 
                                                
126   See U visas: Victims of Criminal Activity, supra note 30.  
127   Leslye E. Orloff et al., Comparing Forms of Immigrant Relief for Immigrant 
Victims of Crime, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015). 
128   Immigration Options for Victims of Crimes, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-options-victims-
crimes (Sep. 12, 2015).   
129   See generally Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109; 
Consideration of Deferre Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
130   U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Immigration Relief for 
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In addition to the change of fact and circumstance 
necessitating continuous screening as immigrant women and girls 
move from the country of origin through the immigration system, 
continuous screening is important because of the cultural, 
psychological, and emotional factors involved in disclosing personal 
and traumatic information particularly information about child abuse, 
rape, sexual assault and domestic violence.  Individuals will feel more 
comfortable with different screening agents; healthcare professionals, 
health outreach workers, and immigrant women community based 
victim advocates are particularly trusted by victims and are often well 
versed in screening immigrant women for crime victimization.131 
C. How Trauma Informed Screening Can Help Advocates and 
Attorneys Best Serve Clients Surviving Trauma 
Advocates and attorneys should engage in comprehensive 
screening for immigration relief while being conscious of and 
sensitive to the trauma a victim may have suffered.  It is crucial for 
attorneys and advocates to build a relationship that will help their 
clients feel safe enough to divulge traumatic information.  As trust 
builds victims who have suffered trauma will be more willing and 
able to respond to questions that elicit the information necessary to 
build the victim’s immigration case.  In order to achieve this, 
attorneys and advocates have found it useful to use a trauma 
informed approach to interviewing clients. 
A team of family and immigration attorneys and national 
experts on trauma informed care developed an approach to 
developing a victim’s immigration case that simultaneously helps 
immigrant victims heal from trauma.  What has been learned from 
evidence based research on healing from trauma is that the process 
working with a trauma survivor to write her own story is an effective 
approach to healing and overcoming the impact that trauma has had 
                                                
131   To find programs with expertise working with immigrant crime 
victims and children who are knowledgeable about the forms of immigration relief 
discussed in this article see the National Immigrant Women’s Advocacy Project’s 
national service provider directory. Directory of Service Providers, NATIONAL 
IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT, http://www.niwap.org/directory 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
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on a victim’s life.  This approach uses an evidence based, research 
tested, story writing intervention approach that therapists and 
psychologists have been using with trauma survivors to identify 
trauma experienced over a lifetime that helps victims heal. 
In immigration cases all victims applying for immigration 
relief are required to write an affidavit.  This affidavit tells the victim’s 
story and is one of the key pieces of evidence a victim submits to 
DHS as part of their SIJ, VAWA, U, and T visa applications.  
Victim’s affidavit provides an opportunity for Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) adjudicators to hear directly from the 
survivor, in her or his own voice.  When reading the survivor’s story, 
the reader – ultimately, the DHS adjudicator – should be able to 
know and feel what the survivor felt after being subjected to abuse or 
crime victimization.  The fact that the victim has to write their story 
for their immigration case provides an opportunity for the victim to 
go through the story writing process in a manner that parallel’s the 
approach therapists use to treat trauma survivors.132 
The story writing intervention includes the following 
components.  First the advocate, attorney, or therapist invites the 
survivor to write her story, uninterrupted.  The person working with 
the victim’s role during the story writing is to empathically listen, be 
aware of trigger points, and be ready to help should a survivor have 
difficulty during the process.133  During the second stage of the story 
writing intervention process there will be an opportunity during the 
structured interview session to ask follow-up questions in order to 
gather more details.  Some survivors may be comfortable with 
                                                
132   Krisztina Szabo et al., Advocate’s and Attorneys Tool for Developing a 
Survivor’s Story: Trauma Informed Approach, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013); see also Leslye E Orloff & Meaghan Fitzpatrick, How to 
Prepare Your Case Through a Trauma Informed Approach: Tips on Using the Trauma 
Informed Structured Interview Questionaire for Family Court Cases, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN’S ADVOCACY PROJECT (2015). 
133   The story writing process can be emotionally difficult and the 
advocate, attorney or other professional should not send the client to write the 
story on their own.  Sometimes the process of writing and retelling the story can 
trigger the client to relive the trauma and go into crisis.  When this occurs, the 
advocate or attorney should intervene using crisis intervention techniques. See 
Training for Advocates and Attorneys on Trauma-Informed Work with Immigrant women, 
YouTube (Apr. 23, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=05Z95q1bkG4. 
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speaking freely about their experiences and others may not.  For 
those that are not, we may want to guide them along this process by 
asking open-ended questions that prompt an open dialogue.  The 
second stage of the trauma informed approach is an interview in 
which the advocate or attorney leads the victim through a second 
interview using a Structured Interview Questionnaire (SIQI) which 
obtains greater detail about the survivor’s trauma history.  The third 
part of the trauma informed story writing intervention involves the 
survivor reading back her final story to the advocate/attorney.  This 
assists attorneys and advocates working with survivors of trauma to 
facilitate meaningful information gathering with your client and to 
help prepare her for interactions with the justice system.  This 
approach produces stronger more quickly approvable immigration 
cases and better more robust evidence for any family law case that 
will be filed on the child or immigrant victim’s behalf.  At the same 
time this approach helps survivors heal. 
The SIQI is designed to encourage trauma survivors to 
disclose in-depth information.  Some of the questions prompt 
responses that will help build a stronger case, while others may be 
helpful details to include as evidence.  The SIQI establishes a series 
of questions to ask that are designed to facilitate the client’s healing 
and to strengthen the client’s immigration application or family law 
case by uncovering important details of the story.  The SIQI helps 
advocates and attorneys working with immigrant women and 
children who have suffered trauma uncover additional incidents of 
abuse.  The SIQI also identifies experiences and emotional harms 
that contribute to extreme cruelty, provide evidence of substantial 
mental or physical abuse, contribute evidence that will support a 
court in rulings regarding the best interests of a child and the viability 
of reunification with their abuser.134  The more detail an application 
for immigration relief can provide the more likely it is to be approved 
and the approval is likely to come more swiftly reducing the need for 
requests that the attorney representing the immigrant child or victim 
submit to additional evidence to support the immigration case.  
Similarly, the more the detailed evidence provided in the family court 
                                                
134  Mary Ann Dutton et al., Trauma Informed Structured Interview 
Questionnaires for Immigration Cases (SIQI), NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S 
ADVOCACY PROJECT (2013). 
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case about the trauma and abuse the more likely a victim will be to 
win custody of her children or a protection order and the more 
detailed the court orders and findings will be supporting a child’s 
application for SIJ. 
V. SPECIAL ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT 
JUVENILE CASES135 
SIJ was created to protect a class of especially vulnerable 
immigrant children from further upheaval in their lives and offer 
them a path forward with greater stability that attaining lawful 
permanent residency provides.  SIJ offers abused, abandoned, or 
neglected immigrant children a path to lawful permanent residency 
and protection from deportation.  SIJ involves a bifurcated system 
with proscribed roles for the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Office of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and 
state courts with jurisdiction over the immigrant children.136  USCIS 
relies on the state court, as experts on child welfare issues, children’s 
best interests, and state law.  State courts issue findings applying state 
laws to the facts of the SIJ child applicant’s case.  The state court 
findings are not an adjudication of the child’s immigration case.  They 
provide evidence as to some of the factors that an immigrant child 
must prove if their SIJ case is to be approved.  USCIS receives these 
findings as required evidence to prove abuse, abandonment or 
neglect in the SIJ case together with the totality of evidence in the 
case and adjudicates whether to grant an immigrant child applicant 
SIJ status or lawful permanent residency. 
Congress chose to statutorily rely on state court adjudications 
relying on the expertise of state courts that are responsible for 
insuring children’s safety and well-being regardless of the child’s 
immigration status. The TVPRA 2008 amendments recognized the 
                                                
135  State courts also have a role in U visa certification and T visa 
endorsement. See Leslye E. Orloff et al., U Visa Certification Toolkit for Federal, State, 
and Local Judges and Magistrates, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT WOMEN’S ADVOCACY 
PROJECT (2014).  
136   8 C.F.R. § 204.11(a). 
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“presumptive competence”137 of the state court in child welfare 
matters.  Federal immigration law does not define abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect.138  Instead, federal law relies on state courts 
to make factual findings describing in each case how the treatment 
the child has suffered meets the statutory definitions of abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect under the laws of the state in which the 
court is presiding.  Federal law requires this finding be made in a 
court proceeding in which the court is exercising its jurisdiction 
under state law to issue orders involving care, custody or placement 
of the child.139 
State family law courts have deep expertise and experience in 
assessing the needs of children and issuing court orders that promote 
the healing, well-being, and best interests of children.  State court 
judges issue orders involving children on a daily basis in a wide 
variety of cases.  Congress chose to rely on state courts’ expertise in 
crafting court orders that promote child development, best interests 
and child welfare in making amendments to SIJ statutes.  Congress 
required that state court judges be the finders of fact as to the abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect the child suffered, the viability of 
reunification with the abusive parent and the child’s best interests.  
Receiving specific types of state court findings are a prerequisite to an 
immigrant child’s ability to file an application for SIJ immigration 
benefits.  Children applying for SIJ must prove to USCIS that they:140 
• Are under the age of majority as set by state law at the 
time the SIJ findings are issued by the court and on 
the date the SIJ application is filed (the maximum 
allowable age is 21); 
• Are unmarried both at time of filing and at time of 
adjudication; 
                                                
   137      Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548 (1999) at 556, citing Holmes Fin. Assocs. v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 561, 565 (6th Cir. 1994).   
138   TVPRA 2008 § 235(d). 
139   See Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Information for Juvenile Courts, U.S. 
CITIZEN AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Car
d%20Through%20a%20Job/Information_for_Juvenile_Courts_-FINAL.pdf. 
140   8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J). 
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• Present in the U.S.; and 
• Have a state court order finding that: 
o The court has declared the juvenile dependent 
on the court, or  has legally committed the 
juvenile to, or placed the juvenile under the 
custody of, an agency or dept. of a state or an 
individual or entity appointment by the state or 
a juvenile court located in the U.S.; 
o Reunification with one or both parents is not 
viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment 
or a similar basis found under state law; 
o It is not in the best interest of the juvenile to 
be returned to the juvenile’s or parent’s 
previous country of nationality or country of 
last habitual origin. 
The child must receive the state court order from a state 
court that under state law has jurisdiction over the child’s care, 
custody or placement at the time the order is issued.141  State court 
jurisdiction is determined under the jurisdictional rules that apply to 
the type of proceeding the court is being asked to issue SIJ findings 
in.  For example, in a custody case it may be difficult for a child who 
recently crossed the border to meet the traditional home state 
jurisdiction requirement that applies to interstate custody cases.  For 
children who have recently crossed the border, family court custody 
jurisdiction can be difficult to establish.  Under the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), mere 
presence in the state is not sufficient for a state court to have 
jurisdiction over child in custody a custody case.  The child must be 
present in the state for six months for the court to be considered the 
child’s home state under the UCCJEA.  Until that time the previous 
                                                
141   Policy Memorandum: Updated Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile 




2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
658 
domicile in which the child lived for a period of six is considered the 
child’s home state in which the custody action should be initiated.  
Under the UCCJEA foreign countries constitute and are treated like 
home states for custody jurisdiction purposes.  If a child is living in a 
state and there are extenuating circumstances that require the court to 
exercise emergency jurisdiction the UCCJEA typically allows 
temporary emergency jurisdiction of that child which can ripen into 
continuous jurisdiction in some states.  Cases that involve child abuse 
or neglect or domestic violence are the most common examples of 
when state courts will exercise emergency jurisdiction under the 
UCCJEA. 
The child must receive state court orders before the child 
reaches the age at which the state court loses jurisdiction over the 
child.  Under many state laws the point at which the state court loses 
jurisdiction over the child will be the age of majority in the state.  
There are some family law matters in which the court could continue 
to have jurisdiction over a child after the child reaches the age of 
majority under state law including, for example, cases involving child 
support obligations and enforcement and care for older disabled 
children.142  For example, some states allow child support to extend 
beyond the age of majority if the child is in college. In this scenario, a 
court may have the power to adjudicate the child support and 
simultaneously recognize the placement or responsibility of the care 
of the child in order to make the requisite SIJ findings.  
Under USCIS policies once a child receives an order from a 
court with jurisdiction over the child under state statutes, the child is 
no longer required to file their SIJ application before turning the age 
of majority under state law.143  The fact that the child aged out of the 
state court’s jurisdiction after receiving the state court order will not 
                                                
142   E.g, child support, over 18 year olds who have not yet graduated 
high school, children with disabilities; varies by state, be sure to consult local 
statutes.  
143 See Perez-Olano, et al. v. Holder, et al., 2:05-cv-03604-DDP (C.D. 
Cal..); see also Settlement Agreement in Perez-Olano, et al. v. Holder, et al., Case No. CV 05-
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preclude the child from filing for SIJ status.144  The policies issued by 
USCIS in June of 2015 offer important clarification they state that an 
SIJ “applicant who is otherwise eligible will remain eligible will 
remain eligible even if he or she: 
• Turns 21 years of age after filing the SIJ petition. . . but 
prior to USCIS’ decision on the SIJ petition. 
• Ages out of the juvenile’s court jurisdiction prior to filing 
the SIJ petition. . .”145 
The SIJ policies issued in June 2015 confirm that applicants 
for SIJ face two important age related deadlines: 146 
• They must obtain a state court order containing 
SIJ findings before the child turns the age of 
majority under state law or before the state court 
otherwise loses jurisdiction over the child; and 
• The child must file for SIJ status before the child 
turns 21 years of age. 
Finally, once a child has filed an application for SIJ that meets 
these age related filing requirements, the fact that the child turns 21 
before their SIJ case has been adjudicated by USCIS will not affect 
the approval of their SIJ application.  It will also not preclude the 
child from filing for and receiving lawful permanent residency based 
on the child’s timely filed SIJ application.147 Similarly, if the state 
court’s jurisdiction over a child issued SIJ findings comes to a natural 
conclusion prior to the child aging out of state court jurisdiction and 
USCIS adjudication of the child’s SIJ case or lawful permanent 
residency based on an approved SIJ application, USCIS will not 
                                                
144   Id. 
145   USCIS Policy Memorandum PM-602-0117, Updated 
Implementation of the Special Immigrant Juvenile Perez-Olano Settlement 
Agreement at 3 (June 25, 2015), reprinted in 92 Interpreter Releases 1165 (July 6, 
2015) available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2015/2015-
0625_Perez-Olano_Settlement_Agreement_PM_APPROVED.pdf. 
146   Id at 3. 
147   Id at 1. 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
660 
penalize the child.  For example, in an adoption proceeding, the case 
comes to its natural conclusion when the adoption is finalized and 
the child no longer needs the help of the state court.  While USCIS 
prefers that the child be under the continuous jurisdiction of the 
court throughout the USCIS adjudication, USCIS will often accept 
orders in cases that have concluded if the placement for the child is 
permanent. 
A. State Courts With Authority Under Federal Immigration Laws to 
Issue SIJ Required Findings 
Prior to the TVPRA 2008 amendments only juvenile courts 
hearing foster care related child welfare cases could make SIJ 
findings. When it is said the state court must have jurisdiction over 
the juvenile, it does not mean that the only court that can make the 
necessary findings are traditionally “juvenile” courts that have 
jurisdiction.  Although federal SIJ statute continues to use the term 
“juvenile” court, it is clear that the TVPRA 2008 statutory 
amendments contemplate broadly opening up the types of state court 
cases in which judges can issue SIJ findings.  The amendments made 
by TVPRA 2008 authorize any state family or juvenile court located 
in the U.S. with jurisdiction over the care, custody, placement, or 
dependency of a child to make SIJ findings.148  As a result of these 
amendments, an SIJ applicant must either be dependent on the state 
court or the court must have the jurisdiction to place the juvenile 
under the custody of an agency or department of state, or an 
individual or entity appointed by a state court.149  Court awards of 
custody, guardianship, or placement150 of a child with an individual 
                                                
148   8 C.F.R. 204.11(a); See also Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra 
note 80. 
149   USCIS defines juvenile court as: a court in the U.S. that has 
jurisdiction under state law to make judicial determinations about the custody and 
care of children. Examples include: juvenile, family, orphans, dependency, 
guardianship, probate and delinquency courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); See also 
Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109. 
150   Placement can include court orders recognizing or sanctioning an 
already existing placement.  This could occur, for example, in the context of court 
issuing a declaratory judgment the recognizes the placement of a 17 year old child 
with an adult (e.g. parent, next friend, school teacher) who has been caring for the 
child with the recognition of the child’s resident with the caretaking adult providing 
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could include a parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, other relative, next 
friend or other caretaker or guardian.  A wide range of state courts 
hearing cases involving children that are authorized under federal 
immigration laws to make SIJ findings include:151 
• Adoption 
• Child abuse 
• Child neglect 
• Children in need of supervision 






• Legal Separation 
• Motions for declaratory judgement 
• Protection order 
• Paternity 
• Termination of Parent Rights 
                                                
documentation the child needs to maintain enrollment in school or gain access to 
health care or other benefits. 
151   See Special Immigrant Juveniles (SIJ) Status, supra note 109. 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
662 
B. The Court Must Make a Determination Regarding the Care or 
Custody of the Juvenile 
  There are a wide range of circumstances in which a state 
court could, under state law, enter orders that address the custody, 
placement, or dependency or orders that provide for the care, well-
being, and/or the best interests of children.  State family courts 
regularly encounter children in a range of judicial proceedings and 
court dockets.  Any proceeding involving a foreign born child who 
has not already become a citizen or lawful permanent resident could 
be a court case in which an immigrant could appropriately request 
and receive SIJ findings. 
Many of the youth crossing the border are between the ages 
of 15 and 17.152 It can take many months for a recent immigrant child 
to make their way to family court.  For children who are detained 
after crossing the border by immigration enforcement officials the 
process from that point forward is as follows.  After the child is 
apprehended, immigration enforcement officials have 48 hours to 
screen the child for immigration relief eligibility that includes 
screening for political asylum eligibility and recently began including 
screening for human trafficking.  As of this writing immigration 
enforcement officials at Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) and Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) are not routinely 
screening children for eligibility for other forms of humanitarian 
relief including SIJ and the U visa.  After 48 hours in immigration 
enforcement detention, the unaccompanied minor child is transferred 
to the custody of the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).  ORR is responsible 
for seeking a safe placement for immigrant children placed in their 
custody.  The length of a child’s stay in ORR custody is usually one 
month.  During that time ORR identifies a parent, a family member, 
or other person willing to take custody and responsibility for the 
child.  Once a potential custodian is identified, ORR screens them to 
determine whether the placement is safe for the child.  ORR seeks 
agreement from the persons in whom they place custody of the child 
                                                
152   Frequently Asked Questions: Unaccompanied Immigrant Children on the 
Southern U.S. Border, NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CENTER, 
http://www.immigrantjustice.org/frequently-asked-questions-unaccompanied-
immigrant-children-southern-us-border#.VgxVi_lVhBc (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
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to provide for care of the child and bring the child to immigration 
court proceedings.  Placement with of the child with family members 
or other sponsors is accomplished without inquiry into and without 
regard to the immigration status of the adult family member in whose 
custody the child is placed.  Through this process most 
unaccompanied minor children are released from government 
custody and placed with family members or other sponsors in the 
community while the child goes through the process applying for 
immigration relief the child qualifies to receive and appearing before 
the immigration court in removal proceedings. 
Only after placement with a family member or other 
custodian would the child need to turn to the state court for orders 
regarding custody.  In some states the adult in whose custody the 
child was placed would need to obtain a state court order in a 
guardianship case so that the adult custodian can enroll the child in 
school.  Additionally, children for whom ORR is unable to locate a 
safe placement will remain in federal HHS custody.  For children 
placed in ORR custody either the agency given custody of the child 
or the child with their own attorney may come to court seeking 
orders that include SIJ findings.  Courts can issue family orders 
regarding the care and recognizing the custody of a children in ORR 
custody with consent of HHS only required if the state court would 
be modifying the custody placement.  This process  is largely 
responsible for why courts may see  adolescents coming to state 
court to receive court orders  mere days before immigrant child 
reaches the age of majority seeking a custody, confirmation of 
placement, or other court orders regarding the child’s care and 
additionally  requesting SIJ findings.  While it may be unusual for 
courts to see custody matters involving children ages 16 or 17, so 
long as the state court has jurisdiction under state laws to issue orders 
that benefit children courts can sign SIJ orders.   
The TVPRA 2008 also modified the “express consent” 
requirement to state that, “the Secretary of Homeland Security 
(Secretary) must consent to the grant of special immigrant juvenile 
status.”153  Through policy memos, USCIS has interpreted this to 
mean that the SIJ petition must be “bona fide” and was not “sought 
                                                
153 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J)(iii) 
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primarily for the purpose of obtaining the status…rather than for the 
purpose of obtaining relief from abuse or neglect or 
abandonment.”154  There are many ways in which state court orders 
regarding care or custody benefit older adolescent children serve 
legitimate purposes under state family laws.  The following are 
examples of orders that have a legitimate purpose under state law 
beyond immigration relief.  An adolescent may seek state court 
orders needed to ensure that the child can remain a dependent on 
their custodian’s health insurance.  The adolescent may need the state 
court order to stay enrolled in high school, to enroll in a vocational 
school or to receive state funded post-secondary educational grants 
or loans.  An older child may need a custody order that allows a child 
to continue living with their non-abusive battered immigrant parent.  
Providing an adolescent with stability as they enter adulthood is a 
valid purpose for a juvenile court order that goes beyond the need for 
immigration relief.  Even if the order will only be valid for a short 
time, state family courts have seen the benefits for a child’s 
development and protection of issuing orders that implement, 
recognize and validate support systems for the child that as a 
practical matter will continue beyond the date a child turns the state 
law age of majority.  Such court sanctioned arrangements do not in 
practice terminate on the date the child reaches the state law age of 
majority solely because the court’s jurisdiction over the juvenile does.  
The Department of Homeland Security CIS Ombudsman recognized 
the need for increased guidance on the current interpretation of the 
consent function, arguing “(r)ather than retain the elements of 
‘express consent’ derived from the 1997 amendments, a proper 
implementation of the TVPRA language requires that USCIS verify 
whether State court orders contain the necessary factual findings and 
whether the State court has articulated the foundation for such 
findings.”155  The Ombudsman further advises that securing relief 
from abuse and seeking immigration benefits are mutually beneficial 
rather than exclusive, noting the current interpretation of primary 
purpose “relies on a false dichotomy that suggests it is possible that a 
                                                
154 USCIS Memorandum, HQOPS 70/8.5 “Trafficking Victims Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2008: Special Immigrant Juvenile Status Provisions” (Mar. 
24, 2009) citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-405, at 130 (1997). 
155 Recommendations from Maria Odom, Esnsuring Process Efficiency and Legal 
Sufficiency in Special Immigrant Juvenile Adjudications,  DEPT.  OF HOMELAND SECURITY  
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES OMBUDSMAN 7 (December 11, 2015).  
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State court action may only focus on either protections against future 
harm or securing immigration benefits, when almost always, the court 
protections inevitably provide both in tandem.”156 
As state courts receive training on the important role of state 
family courts in Special Immigrant Juvenile Status courts will likely be 
able to identify immigrant children who may benefit from the SIJ 
program.  In potential cases in which a child may be SIJ eligible, 
courts can ask counsel for the child to explore the issue directing 
counsel to USCIS produced materials on SIJ status. For example, if 
an immigrant minor is before the court without a parent or guardian 
present and child does not have a birth certificate, the court may take 
notice of potential SIJ eligibility and direct counsel to brief the court 
on SIJ.  When courts issue SIJ orders for children at younger ages, 
this will reduce then number of children coming into court with 
urgent cases seeking court orders containing SIJ findings before the 
child turns the age of majority under state law.   
C. Reunification Is Not Viable With At Least One Parent Based on 
the Abuse, Abandonment, or Neglect by That Parent As Defined 
by State Law 
Once the court has exercised jurisdiction over an immigrant 
child and made rulings regarding the care or custody of the child, the 
court can include in its court order the findings SIJ statutorily 
requires as a prerequisite to a child filing an SIJ petition.  These 
findings address two matters.  The first finding articulates facts of the 
child’s case documenting that the child was abused, abandoned, or 
neglected by at least one of the child’s parents and that reunification 
with that parent is not viable.  This finding will be discussed in detail 
in this section.  The second finding discussing facts that demonstrate 
why the court finds it is not the child’s best interests to be returned 
to their home country will be discussed in the next section. 
When SIJ was created, federal deportation priorities did not 
seek to deport unaccompanied youths because “of their age and the 
impracticality of deportation” as well as the fact many of them were 
                                                
156 Id. at 8 
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victims of child abuse, abandonment or neglect.157  Congress decided 
that state courts were best suited to determine whether a child 
suffered abuse, abandonment, or neglect as defined by state family 
laws.  Determinations as to whether a child has been abused, 
abandoned or neglected by a parent are made on a daily basis in child 
abuse and neglect, civil protection order, custody, adoption, 
delinquency, guardianship and other family court proceedings.  State 
family courts are well versed in the state law definitions of “abuse,” 
“abandonment,” and “neglect” and are well positioned to make 
findings as to whether the facts of the case before the court involving 
a Special Immigrant Juvenile constitutes abuse, abandonment or 
neglect as defined by state law.  Cases brought to court for SIJ 
findings will include acts of abuse, abandonment or neglect that were 
perpetrated by an immigrant child’s parent or parents either inside or 
outside of the U.S.. 
In determining whether the child has been subjected to abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect by one or both of their parents, state courts 
apply the state law definitions of abuse, abandonment, or neglect 
without regard to where the abuse, abandonment, or neglect 
occurred.  If the actions or inactions regarding the child would be 
considered abuse, abandonment, or neglect under the laws of the 
state, the court is authorized to enter SIJ findings including in cases 
in which all of the abuse, abandonment, or neglect occurred outside 
of the U.S.. 
1. Findings Must be Based on Relevant State Law Definitions of 
Abuse, Abandonment, or Neglect. - In entering SIJ findings courts must 
apply the state law definitions of abuse, abandonment, neglect or 
another similar act against a child under state law to the facts of the 
immigrant child’s case that the court is adjudicating.  There is no 
federal definition of abused, abandoned, or neglected in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).  Therefore courts should 
include citations to the state law definitions of these offenses against 
a child in the court order and make findings that detail how the facts 
of the specific case before the court constitute abuse, abandonment, 
                                                
157   Special Immigrant Status for Alien Foster Children: Joint Hearings on S. 358, 
H.R. 672, H.R. 2448, H.R. 2646, and H.R. 4165 Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, 
Refugees and International Law of the House Committee of the Judiciary, and the Immigration 
Task Force of the House Education and Labor Committee, supra note 51.  
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neglect or other similar harm to a child under state law.   It is legally 
incorrect for state court orders to find that abuse, abandonment, or 
neglect took place under the under the sections of the INA that 
define Special Immigrant Juvenile Status.  If a court cites to the INA 
for the definitions of abuse, abandonment or neglect rather than state 
law the court order will likely  be insufficient to support an award of 
SIJ to the immigrant child by USCIS.  When seeking court orders to 
submit with an SIJ application attorneys and courts should avoid 
citing to the INA and cite instead to the relevant state code section 
that the court is relying upon to make its abuse, abandonment or 
neglect findings.  Just as the court order needs to include factual 
details that are the basis for the court’s the abuse, abandonment or 
neglect findings, court orders should include a factual basis for the 
findings that parental reunification is not viable.  The order should 
state the child cannot be reunited with the offending parent 
discussing the evidence of abuse, abandonment, or neglect and that 
reunificationis not viable. The SIJ statute only requires a state court 
to find reunification is not viable with the offending parent; the 
statute does not necessitate a termination of parental rights.  
Therefore, a child may have contact or visitation with the offending 
parent but formal reunification of the parent and child remains not 
viable. . 
While the definitions of abuse, abandonment, and neglect 
vary by state, most state statues recognize neglect, maltreatment, 
physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.  Every state has a civil and 
criminal statute for child abuse and neglect.  In delegating the 
determination that the child has suffered abuse, abandonment or 
neglect to state courts under state laws, the federal statue gave the 
state courts the flexibility to make SIJ findings under any definitions 
of abuse, abandonment or neglect contained in state law including 
but not limited to definitions contained in civil, criminal, protection 
order and jurisdictional statutes.  This discussion will generally 
reference civil statutes, as USCIS does not require the state court to 
prosecute the party accused of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, and 
does not require the evidence meet the criminal standard or statutory 
definition.  Most states either include abandonment in their definition 
of abuse or neglect.  In other states abandonment is defined as a 
separate offense. 
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a. State definitions158 of abuse will include emotional abuse, sexual 
abuse, physical abuse, and sometimes parental substance abuse and omission of 
parental responsibility. - The term “abuse” of a child can encompass a 
large array of abusive behaviors.  Almost every state defines physical, 
emotional, and sexual abuse as part of their child abuse statutes.159 
The specific acts that constitute these types of abuse vary by statute.  
Generally “non-accidental” injuries to a child are considered physical 
child abuse.  Common examples include intentional physical acts to 
induce pain, such as burning, kicking, or hitting.  Other states include 
acts of omission that result in injury as part of their definition of 
physical abuse, such as a not bringing the child to the doctor.  In 38 
states behavior that threatens a child with harm or creates a 
substantial risk of harm is deemed physical abuse.160  In Hawaii, 
Illinois, Louisiana, and North Carolina the definition of physical 
abuse includes human trafficking.  This can be particularly important 
because in these states SIJ could provide an additional avenue for 
immigration protection for victims of trafficking who are young 
immigrant girls when one of the child’s parents was involved in the 
trafficking.  Some child trafficking victims may seek SIJ relief because 
accessing continued presence or a T visa may be more difficult if the 
trafficking is not being locally or federally investigated or prosecuted.  
Immigrant women and girls face high rates of sexual assault and are 
often trafficked as part of that pattern of abuse, in either sex 
trafficking or labor trafficking rings.  In the states identified, if the 
facts amount to human trafficking and the victim’s parent or step-
parent had a role in the trafficking, if she is otherwise eligible, she 
may be able to apply for SIJ as a result. 
Parental substance abuse is included in the state law 
definitions of either child abuse or neglect by 24 states.161  Possible 
types of behavior that may qualify as child abuse under state law 
include: 
                                                
158 See state statute for individual definitions. 
159 Georgia and Wisconsin do not include emotional abuse in their 
definitions of abuse or neglect. 
160 See Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE 
INFORMATION GATEWAY (June 2014).  
161 Id. 
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• Prenatal exposure of a child to illegal drugs162; 
• Manufacturing controlled substances in the 
presence of a child163; 
• Allowing a child to be present where the 
chemicals or tools to manufacture illegal drugs are 
kept164; 
• Furnishing a child with drugs or alcohol165; and 
• Using controlled substances that impair a 
caregiver’s ability to provide proper care to their 
child.166 
Attorneys and advocates working with immigrant children 
should be aware in states where certain forms of substance abuse 
related activities are considered child abuse or neglect, that these 
actions or activities can be the basis for findings of child abuse for 
SIJ purposes.  Immigrant children with parents who have a history of 
substance abuse should be screened for parental substance abuse 
related offenses. 
Sexual abuse and/or exploitation of a child is included as part 
of the definition of abuse in every state.  Additionally, seven states 
identify sex trafficking in their definition of sexual abuse.167  For 
purposes of SIJ, the abuse must have been committed by either a 
parent or step-parent to qualify for immigration relief.  Sexual 
exploitation is included in most of the definitions of sexual abuse; 
typically it includes behaviors such as allowing or encouraging a 
                                                
162 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin. Id. 
163 Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Id. 
164 Arizona, Arkansas, and Washington. Id. 
165 Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio, and Texas. Id. 
166 California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, and Texas. Id. 
167 Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, North 
Carolina, and Texas. Id. 
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minor to engage in prostitution or child pornography.  For SIJ 
purposes, the qualifying abuse, abandonment, or neglect may have 
taken place either in the U.S. or abroad, so long as the behavior 
described would violate the state statutes in the state in which the 
child is seeking the order.  USCIS will adjudicate the totality of the 
facts, history, and evidence provided in the immigrant child’s 
application.  The state court in entering its SIJ findings need only 
determine if the abuse the applicant is alleging that the court credits 
as having occurred would be a violation of that state’s statutes.  A 
young immigrant girl who fled her home country because her step-
father was sexually abusing her can go to court in any state in the 
U.S. and that court can issue an order factually stating that the facts 
of what occurred to the child constitutes sexual abuse as defined by 
the state law. 
Emotional abuse is defined as part of the definition of abuse 
or neglect in 33 states and the District of Columbia.  Examples of 
common statutory language include “injury to the psychological 
capacity or emotional stability of the child as evidenced by an 
observable or substantial change in behavior, emotional response, or 
cognition” and injury as evidenced by “anxiety, depression, 
withdrawal, or aggressive behavior.”  When discussing cases of 
domestic violence, this can include behavioral patterns of coercive 
control, witnessing domestic violence perpetrated by one parent on 
the other parent, or extreme cruelty.168  The state statutes vary 
significantly as to what constitutes emotional abuse, some states 
include allowing others to emotionally abuse the child, mental injury 
resulting from sexual abuse, and incidents resulting in impairment of 
the child’s normal range of behavior. 
b. Obtaining SIJ orders based on neglect. - Neglect is typically 
defined as the failure to provide a basic need for a child.  State law 
definitions of what constitutes need differ, but most include failure to 
provide a child with food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or 
supervision substantially affecting the child’s health, safety, or well-
being.  Neglect statutes differ more from state to state in comparison 
to abuse statutes that contain more consistent definitions.  Some state 
neglect statutes include forms of abuse, or the fact the child was 
                                                
168   Leslye Orloff et al., supra note 18. 
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abused as evidence of neglect.  Other states have adopted very broad 
definitions of neglect and include homelessness as a means of 
neglect, regardless of willfulness of the parent.  It is therefore very 
important and best practice for courts to include in the court order a 
neglected immigrant child will be using to file for SIJ relief the 
following: 
• A quote and citation to the state law definition of 
child neglect; 
• Specific factual findings detailing the facts that the 
court determined constitutes child neglect; and 
• An articulation of the basis for the court’s 
conclusion that applying the state law definition 
of child abuse to the facts of the case before the 
court, the court concludes as a matter of law that 
the immigrant child before the court was 
neglected by the child’s parent or parent(s). 
This detailed approach is best practice for state court orders 
in SIJ cases and is particularly important for neglected immigrant 
children.  The state definition of neglect, for purposes of special 
finding needed for the SIJ application, may apply to events that 
occurred outside of the U.S..  If an immigrant child was made 
homeless by her caretaker parent in her home country, that evidence 
is enough for a state court finding of neglect in certain states.169 
Other types of neglect some states have adopted in statute are 
failure to educate.  Failure to educate as required by law is recognized 
in state statutes as neglect by 29 states and territories.170 Every state 
has different mandatory education requirements.  In states that 
consider failure to educate neglect, a parent’s failure to comply with 
                                                
169   Colorado, Connecticut, South Dakota, American Samoa. Definitions of 
Child Abuse and Neglect, supra note 155. 
170   Failure to educate as required by law is statutorily recognized as 
neglect by Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming, District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Virgin Islands. Id. 
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minimum educational requirements for children is sufficient for a 
finding of neglect.  Fifteen states and territories include variations of 
failure to provide certain types of medical care as child neglect under 
state law.  This includes the withholding of medical treatment or 
nutrition from infants with life-threatening conditions and failure to 
provide special medical or mental health treatment that the child 
needs as a form of neglect. 
Nationwide, neglect statutes include many nuanced forms of 
abuse, control, and lack of parental accountability and responsibility.  
It is important for attorneys and advocates working with special 
immigrant youth to become familiar with the child neglect laws of the 
state in which the immigrant child seeking SIJ is living.  Knowledge 
of state neglect laws will help advocates and attorneys detect 
conditions, events, and the treatment by a parent in the child’s home 
country that would constitute a form of child neglect under the state 
laws of the state in which the court is being asked to provide SIJ 
findings.  Close analysis of the relevant state statute combined with 
detailed questions and focused interviewing of immigrant youth is 
necessary to fully evaluate if an immigrant child may be eligible for 
SIJ based on neglect by at least one parent. 
c. Abandonment. - Abandonment is defined in two distinct 
state statutes.  First, the majority of states and territories define 
abandonment within the state child protection code where address 
abuse and neglect is addressed.  Thirty-nine states and territories 
either include abandonment as part of the definition of abuse or 
neglect or define it separately.  State courts can find abandonment 
took place by one parent in a variety of family court and juvenile 
proceedings.  States have generally defined abandonment to include: 
• Failure to retain contact with 
• Failure support a child; 
• The fact that the child lacks knowledge as to the 
identity of a parent; 
• An articulated intent to forego parental 
responsibility; and 
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• The physical act of leaving the child.171 
The second place that the term “abandonment” is defined is 
in the family law jurisdictional statute governing custody cases.  The 
governing jurisdictional statute in custody cases in virtually every 
state172 is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement 
Act (UCCJEA) in which abandonment is defined and used as a 
means for asserting jurisdiction over the child in custody cases.  
Abandonment can be based on either state law definition.  Both 
definitions can serve as the governing law used by the court to make 
its SIJ findings.  Abandonment, as defined under state law, is a valid 
ground for SIJ findings in any state court proceeding in which the 
court has jurisdiction over the child.  . 
The federal law does not define abandonment and instead for 
SIJ purposes relies on state law definitions.  USCIS has addressed the 
fact that children who entered the U.S. unlawfully to join his/her 
parent may be considered “abandoned” by the other parent for SIJ 
purposes.173  So long as the individual facts of a case support a 
finding of abandonment  based on state law, a judicial officer can 
make that finding and USCIS can favorable adjudicate an the 
immigrant child’s  application for SIJ. 
The UCCJEA was adopted to ensure stability and full faith 
and credit in custody and visitation proceedings.  It has been adopted 
by almost all of the states and territories and provides guidance on 
how and when states should assert jurisdiction over a child based on 
factors other than mere presence of the child in the jurisdiction.  One 
factor included in UCCJEA determinations of abandonment of a 
child by a parent.  Typically, under the UCCJEA, a child must be 
present in the state for at least six months before the court can exert 
the preferred home state jurisdiction to adjudicate matters involving 
the care and custody of a child 
                                                
171   Id. 
172  Adopted by every state except Massachusetts, which still uses the 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) instead of the more recent 
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Id. 
173  ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases at 11 (citing Amy S. Paulick, 
Assistant Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, DHS Line, In the 
Matter of [Redacted]). 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
674 
An exception to this rule, which almost every state adopted, 
is emergency jurisdiction based on abandonment.  If a child has been 
abandoned and is physically present in the state the court may assert 
emergency jurisdiction over a child who has been in the jurisdiction 
for less than six months.  The UCCJEA defines abandonment as 
“left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or 
supervision.”174 Every state has adopted this definition of “abandon” 
except Ohio, where “abandoned” means the parents of a child have 
failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than 90 
days, regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child 
after that 90-day period.”175  It is not necessary that the abandonment 
be occur at the time of the assertion of jurisdiction.  The 
abandonment requirement is met when the child is without proper 
care from a parent.  It is not an assertion of jurisdiction based on 
abandonment that can only be made when the child is in imminent 
need of protection because of the abandonment.  Many children have 
been abandoned by parents as babies or young children and do not 
come to family court seeking assistance until they have entered the 
U.S. and found stability with their other parent or a family member.  
They come to court seeking to legal recognition of that stability in a 
guardianship, custody, or child support proceeding.  If the child has 
just re-settled in a new household with a parent, relative, or guardian 
and this home life has not been in place for the 6 months to establish 
home state jurisdiction for purposes of UCCJEA, the family can 
assert emergency jurisdiction based on the child’s presence and 
abandonment.  The state UCCJEA definition of abandonment can be 
applied to the facts and findings of the case, and the court’s findings 
would support an application for SIJ. 
2. One or Both Parent Requirement. - When seeking SIJ orders, 
the qualifying offense need only be committed by one of the 
immigrant child’s parents and this finding accompanied by a finding 
that reunification with that offending parent is not a viable option 
would be sufficient to for SIJ purposes.  The child’s other non-
offending parent may be the custodian of the child without affecting 
the child’s eligibility for SIJ.  SIJ was initially created to assist children 
living in long term foster care, Congress decided in 2008 to amend 
                                                
174   UCCJEA art. 1, § 102(1). 
175   47 Ohio Jur. 3d Family Law § 1109. 
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that statute in order to provide equal treatment and protection for 
children who have been provided a nurturing relationship with the 
child’s other non-offending parent. 
Although the SIJ statute was amended in 2008 to greatly 
expand the SIJ protections to a larger group of immigrant children, 
the federal regulations governing the SIJ program have not been 
amended to reflect the changes in the new law.  Many provisions of 
the prior federal regulations governing SIJ were overruled by the 
2008 statutory amendments.176  USCIS acknowledges that the law and 
the regulation are inconsistent and advises courts to “be familiar with 
current immigration law.”  Where federal regulations are inconsistent 
with and/or have been explicitly overruled by subsequent federal 
statutes, courts should apply the most up to date federal laws. 
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 101(a) 
(27) (J) establishes the definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile.  
This definition was last amended by Congress in the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008.177 The TVPRA 
statutory changes supersede portions of the Code of Federal 
Regulations relating to SIJ cases.178  USCIS has made it abundantly 
clear through policy, memos, and practice that the federal law only 
requires findings of abuse abandonment, or neglect by perpetrated by 
one parent, not both.179 When identifying SIJ eligible children, USCIS 
                                                
176   The Proposed Rule was issued in September 2011, the Final Rule is 
expected in the next year. Proposed Rules, Federal Register (Sept. 6, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2011/09/15/fr06sept11.p
df. 
177   Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008). 
178   8 CFR 204.11 has been amended by statue to redefine eligibility 
therefore sections overruled include but are not limited to the following: 
§204.11(a), (c)(3), (c)(4), c(5), (d)(2)(i), and (d)(2)(ii). 
179   See Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: Information for Juvenile Courts, U.S. 
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Card
%20Through%20a%20Job/Information_for_Juvenile_Courts_-FINAL.pdf 
(stating an eligible child must be abused, abandoned, or neglected by a parent); See 
Immigrant Relief for Abused Children, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Green%20Card/Green%20Card
%20Through%20a%20Job/Immigration_Relief_for_Abused_Children-FINAL.pdf 
(stating an eligible child may be living with the non-abusive parent). 
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lists children living with the non-abusive parent, foster parent, or 
legal guardian as part of a non-exhaustive list of eligible family 
scenarios in which an SIJ eligible child may be living. 
The legal inconsistency between the SIJ statutory 
requirements and incorrect information contained in the regulations 
that were overruled by the statute amendments in 2008 has led to 
confusion among courts and attorneys who have struggled to 
understand how to obtain SIJ findings when only parent has abused, 
abandoned, or neglected the child.  Nebraska and New Jersey have 
issued published judicial opinions incorrectly that rely on the 
overruled regulations and interpreted  the amended statute to require 
court findings that  both parents must have been at fault for abuse, 
abandonment, or neglect in order for state court judges to issue 
special findings to be used in SIJ applications.180 
Both cases relied on the fact the reunification was possible 
with one of the biological parents and therefore the refused to issue 
an SIJ finding to the child based abuse, abandonment or neglect by 
the child’s other parent.  The New Jersey case held the “‘1 or both’ 
phrase to require that reunification with neither parent is viable 
because of abuse, neglect or abandonment of the juvenile.”181 Both 
courts also looked to the pre TVPRA 2008 legislative history and the 
pre TVPRA 2008 administrative history of the SIJ statute, despite the 
plain meaning of the statutory language.  The New Jersey court 
acknowledged that the legislative history supported the fact the 
amended statutory language required one parent but went on to 
justify if failure to follow the requirements of the federal statute by 
imposing the court’s own view on what is articulated it sees as  the  
“competing goals” of protecting the non-abusive parent and 
protecting against immigration abuse.  The New Jersey court created 
its own interpretation of the SIJ legislative and regulatory histories to 
fit the court’s stated goals.182  There is no legislative history to 
support the assertion that Congress intended to preclude children 
reunification with the non-abusive parent from SIJ protections.  To 
the contrary, the statute was amended and the legislative history 
                                                
180   In re Interest of Erick M., 820 NW 2d. 639 (Neb. 2012); H.S.P. v. 
J.K., 87 A.3d 255 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013). 
181   H.S.P. v. J.K., 87 A.3d at 266. 
182   Id.  
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provide  evidence that Congress explicitly  intended to protect the 
immigrant SIJ eligible child’s relationship with the child’s  non-
abusive parent.  The plain meaning of the statute should suffice when 
courts are interpreting the “one or both” parent requirement.  If the 
federal statues was interpreted to mean that “one or both” means 
both, the phrase “or both” would be superfluous in the statute.183 
The Immigrant Legal Resource Center explains, “Congress 
used the disjunctive to indicate that SIJ findings could be made when 
reunification is not viable with just one parent, and also could be 
made when reunification is not viable with both parents.”184  Further, 
if the statute omitted the words “or both” and simply read, 
“reunification is not viable with one of the immigrant’s parents,” the 
plain meaning of that phraseology would render immigrant youth for 
whom reunification was not viable with both parents ineligible for 
SIJ.  This would clearly be at odds with the purpose of SIJ, which is 
to protect vulnerable immigrant children.  Lastly, the court’s decision 
“did not consider the federal agencies’ interpretation of the SIJ 
statute.”185 
There are currently four published state court opinions that 
interpret the one or both parent requirement consistently with USCIS 
published statements and with federal guidance.186 In addition to 
statements and brochures clearly identifying the requirement that 
only one parent is abusive, USCIS has proposed revisions to the 
application for SIJ to reflect USCIS agreement that immigrant 
children are eligible for SIJ relief if the one of their parents abused, 
abandoned, or neglected the child.  The form change would allow an 
applicant to check that he or she is eligible based on a non-viability 
                                                
183  Special Immigrant Juvenile Status: A Primer for One Parent Cases, 
IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER (2014) [hereinafter ILRC, Primer for One 
Parent Cases]. 
184   Id. at 6. 
185   Id. at 5. 
186   Matter of Mario S., 954 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2012); 
Marcelina M.-G. v. Israel S., 112 A.D.3d 100, 973 N.Y.S.2d 714 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
2013); In re Israel O. (2015), 233 Cal. App. 4th 279; Eddie E. v. Superior Court, 183 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 773 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
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with one parent or check a box for both parents, establishing a clear 
distinction.187 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement filed a brief in 
Baltimore Immigration Court stating “[C]ounsel for USCIS has 
confirmed that a child who enters the U.S. illegally to join his/her 
parent in the U.S. may be considered “abandoned” for the purposes 
of an I-360.  However, a child who enters the U.S. illegally to join 
both parents may not be considered abandoned.”188  An I-360 is the 
immigration form used to file an application for SIJ.  The important 
distinction made is that if the child is rejoining both parents and is 
living together with their parents, then the child has not been 
abandoned by either parent.  If, however, the child has been 
abandoned by one parents and the child is living with the other 
parent, the child may file for SIJ. 
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has 
stated on two separate occasions that the one or both requirement 
incorporated into the SIJ statue in the TVPRA 2008 amendments 
means at least one parent, not both.  In January 2014, in a publication 
about SIJ rules, EOIR clarified the intent of the TVPRA 
amendments that “it is only reunification with one parent that must 
not be viable, the alien child could potentially be living with one 
parent and still qualify for SIJ status.”189  EOIR made it very clear the 
one or both, means at least one.  The court stated in its opinion, “the 
respondent demonstrated that reunification was not viable with one 
of his parents, thus, satisfying the requirements of the statute.”190 
This EIOR approach is consistent with USCIS practice since the 
TVPRA amendments in 2008 became law, USCIS regularly accepts 
and grants petitions for SIJ based on only one parent abusing, 
abandoning, or neglecting the immigrant child applying for SIJ 
                                                
187   See AILA InfoNet, USCIS Comment Request on Form I-360, p. 9, 
Part 8, Question 3.A, available at 
http://www.aila.org/content/fileviewer.aspx?docid=50482&linkid=281819. 
188   ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases, supra note 139. 
189  Laura E. Ploeg, Special Immigrant Juveniles: All the Special Rules, 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, Jan. 2014, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/ILA. 
190   ILRC, Primer for One Parent Cases, supra note 179. 
2016 Fitzpatrick & Orloff 4:2 
679 
All of the federal agencies responsible for implementing SIJ 
statute and regulations, the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Department of Justice and each of their components,  have 
published policy memoranda regarding their consistent  statutory 
interpretation  of the 2008 TVPRA amendments to the definition of 
which immigrant children qualify for Special Immigrant Juvenile 
Status.  State courts are there obliged to defer to the federal 
interpretations of these federal agencies.191 
D. Best Interest of The Child 
The final required finding in SIJ cases is the finding that it is 
not in the immigrant child’s best interests to return to the child’s 
home country.192 The best interest of the child standard to be applied 
by state courts in SIJ cases is the same best interest of the child 
factors that courts routinely apply in the child custody and child 
abuse and neglect proceedings that the state courts adjudicate.  The 
best interest of the child standard strives to achieve a safe and 
comfortable environment so that every child can develop and 
flourish.  State best interest of the child laws list number of factors 
that courts are to consider when making best interest of the child 
determinations.  The state best interest of the child statutes include a 
non-exclusive list of factor the courts must consider in making best 
interests of the child determinations.  Courts can also consider other 
evidence and factors that arise based on the specific facts of the case 
before the court.  Common factors listed in state best interests of the 
child statutes that courts are required to consider include: 
• The wishes of the child as to which parent should 
be the child’s custodian; 
• The interaction and interrelationship of the child 
with their  parent or parents, their siblings, and 
any other person who may significantly affect the 
child’s best interest; 
                                                
191   See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984). 
192   Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(27)(J). 
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• The child’s adjustment to their  home, school, and 
community; 
• The mental and physical health of all individuals 
involved; 
• The capacity of parents to provide for the child; 
and 
• The presence or history of domestic violence in 
the home. 
SIJ cases are unusual in family law cases because they require 
judges to make a best interest determination that is not in the child’s 
best interest to return to the home country.193  This type of 
comparison of legal protections and services available in the U.S. 
with those available in the child’s country of origin has precedents in 
U.S. immigration law.  One relevant example is the extreme hardship 
determination that immigration judges are required to make when 
adjudicating Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) cancellation of 
removal applications filed by immigrant spouses and children who 
have been subject to battering or extreme cruelty be their U.S. citizen 
or lawful permanent resident spouses or parents.  Some of the factors 
immigration judges consider in deciding whether an abused 
immigrant child’s or spouse’s removal will cause extreme hardship to 
the immigrant applicant spouse or child include: 194 
                                                
193   The primary types of cases coming before family courts in which the 
courts may be called upon to make similar comparisons are international child 
custody cases including those that implicate the Hague Convention – The 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, held at the 
Hague on October 25, 1980 (the Hague Convention), and its US implementing 
legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA) 42 USC 
§§11601-11610.; see also Nunez-Escudero v Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 
1995) (holding that a child should not be sent back to Mexico due to grave risk to 
the child).  
194   8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.20(c) and 1240.58(c); See also INS Memorandum 
from Paul W. Virtue, INS General Counsel, to Terrance M. O’Reilly, Director of 
INS Administrative Appeals Office on Extreme Hardship and Documentary 
Requirements Involving Battered Spouses and Children (October 16, 1998), 
available at http://niwaplibrary.wcl.american.edu/pubs/extreme-hardship-and-
documentary-requirements/.   
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• The nature and extent of the physical and 
psychological consequences of the battering or 
extreme cruelty; 
• The impact of the loss of access to the U.S. courts 
and criminal justice system (including, but not 
limited to, the ability to obtain and enforce orders 
of protection, criminal investigations and 
prosecutions, and family law proceedings or court 
orders regarding child support, alimony, 
maintenance, child custody, and visitation); 
• The applicant’s or applicant’s child’s need for 
social, medical, mental health, or other supportive 
services, particularly those related to the abuse or 
surviving the abuse, which would not be available 
or reasonably accessible in the foreign country; 
• The existence of laws, social practices, or customs 
in the foreign country that would penalize or 
ostracize the applicant or applicant’s child for 
leaving an abusive situation, or for taking action 
to stop the abuse; 
• The abuser’s ability or lack thereof to travel to the 
foreign country, and the ability, willingness, or 
lack thereof of foreign government authorities to 
protect the applicant and/or the applicant’s child 
from future abuse; and 
• The likelihood that the abuser’s family, friends, or 
others acting on the abuser’s behalf in the foreign 
country would physically or psychologically harm 
the applicant or the applicant’s children if they 
were deported. 
These factors illustrate some of the types on considerations 
courts might entertain in making best interest of the child 
determinations in addition to the best interest of the child factors 
listed in the state best interest of the child statue.  Other factors the 
court could consider are the traditional factors that immigration 
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courts apply in all cancellation of removal cases including those cases 
filed by battered immigrant spouses and children.  These factors are 
include, but are not limited to:195 
• The age (youth/old age) of the applicant; 
• The children’s ability to speak the native language 
of the foreign country and the children’s ability to 
adjust to life there; 
• Serious illness of the person or her child that 
necessitates medical attention not adequately 
available in the foreign country; 
• A person’s inability to obtain adequate 
employment abroad; 
• The child’s length of residence in the U.S.; 
• Existence of other family members residing 
legally in the U.S. and lack of family in the home 
country; 
• Irreparable harm arising from a disruption of 
educational opportunities; 
• The adverse psychological impact of removal; 
• The impact of separation that could be caused by 
removal on both mother and child; 
• The extent to which deportation would interfere 
with court custody, visitation, and child support 
awards; and 
• The extent to which the child applicant is an asset 
to or involved with their community in the U.S. 
(i.e., involvement in church/temple/mosque, 
                                                
195   61 Fed. Reg. 13,067 (Mar. 29, 1996) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 
103, 204, 205, and 216).   
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children’s school, community, other service 
programs). 
Courts are required under federal immigration laws to apply 
state best interest of the child factors to make SJIS findings regarding 
whether it is in the child’s best interests to not return to the child’s 
home country.  The state law family court judges apply to this 
determination is the same law that courts routinely apply in custody 
and child abuse and neglect cases.  SIJ findings do not require that 
courts apply these factors in a direct comparison of risks, options, 
and the child’s ability to thrive in the child’s home country and in the 
U.S.. Courts may consider country conditions in making this 
determination but it is not necessary. It is sufficient to state that it is 
not in the child’s best interest to return to the country of origin 
because it is in the child’s best interest to be placed in the care or 
custody of the petitioner in the state court case.  For example, if SIJ 
findings are requested in a guardianship case, the state court could 
correctly state in the SIJ order, it is in not in the best interest for child 
to return to the country of origin because child is in the care of 
guardian, which is in child’s best interest.   Attorneys representing 
immigrant children seeking SIJ determinations  may present evidence 
in the state court proceedings regarding the services, support, and 
educational opportunities the child is receiving in the U.S..   This 
evidence and evidence of the abuse, abandonment or neglect that the 
child suffered can be presented through testimony of the child, 
testimony of the child’s guardians, counselors, therapists, teachers, 
health care providers and others who can attest to the child’s 
adjustment to and investment in their life in the U.S..  Several of 
these witnesses may also be able to attest to the support system the 
child has and needs in the U.S. to overcome the impact that the 
abuse, abandonment or neglect the child suffered has had on the 
child.  Attorneys representing immigrant children may also choose to 
introduce testimony of the child, witnesses, or other evidence 
regarding country conditions in the child’s home country and the 
treatment, risks, dangers and options for the child if the child were to 
be returned to their country of origin. 
In making best interest of the child findings courts may 
include in their orders information about the unique facts of the 
child’s case that played a role in the court’s ruling that returning the 
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child to their country of origin would not be in the child’s best 
interests.  Like the finding of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, this 
factors that courts must consider in making the best interest of the 
child determination are to be based on state laws applied to facts of 
the case.  Some of the facts that the court is considering and ruling 
on in SIJ cases are U.S. based fact and some will be facts that took 
place abroad or conditions that exist abroad that would affect the 
child if the child was returned to their home country.  USCIS 
recognizes that state juvenile courts are the most appropriate 
determiners of fact as they have the most experience making 
adjudications that affect the care and custody of children based on 
state law including best interest of the child determinations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Congress’s growing support of kinship care and the removal 
of the long-term foster care requirement from the statute show a 
desire to keep the immigrant child, when possible, with family 
members, friends, and other individuals who are in the best position 
to nurture the child applying for SIJ immigration protections.  All SIJ 
eligible children have suffered trauma as a result of being abused, 
abandoned or neglected by at least one of their parents.  Both the 
family court orders in which state court judges enter orders regarding 
the care or custody of the immigrant children including SIJ findings 
and the grant of Special Immigrant Juvenile Status by USCIS together 
provide critical stability and support for immigrant children.  This 
approach involving state family courts and USCIS offering protection 
from deportation and access to lawful permanent residency for 
immigrant children who have suffered abuse, abandonment or 
neglect helps children heal, succeed in school and move on with their 
lives to become productive and contributing members of our 
communities. 
Recent immigrant women and girls should be screened early 
and often experiences of abuse, neglect, or abandonment that 
children suffer perpetrated by their parents and step-parents to detect 
SIJ eligibility.  This screening may also detect criminal activities 
suffered in the U.S. perpetrated by the child other family members or 
caretakers that could lead to the child’s eligibility for U visa 
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protections.  Continuous screening over time by various 
professionals working with immigrant children can uncover abuse 
occurring to the child after their arrival in the U.S. and can also result 
in the child building enough trust to divulge information about past 
abuses that may make the child SIJ eligible. 
Courts should receive training to help courts detect cases in 
which non-citizen immigrant children before the court may be SIJ 
eligible.  Training can also help courts craft orders containing SIJ 
findings that include sufficient detail about the facts of the case to 
provide a ruling from which USCIS adjudicators can see how and 
why the court reached its conclusions regarding abuse, abandonment, 
or neglect, the viability of reunification with the offending parent and 
the child’s best interests.  Finally, courts should distribute at 
courthouses DHS produced information about Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status and other immigration remedies available for 
immigrant crime victims.  This will improve access to justice as that 
immigrant victims of child abuse, child abandonment, child neglect, 
domestic violence, sexual assault, human trafficking and other U visa 
covered criminal activities.  Immigrant victims who find the courage 
to seek help from state courts will learn about their legal rights to 
pursue immigration relief offering them the safety, stability and 
opportunity to receive protection from deportation and the ability to 
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Most literature on criminal deterrence in law, economics, and criminology assumes that people 
who are caught for a crime will be punished.  The literature focuses on how the size of sanctions 
and probability of being caught affect criminal behavior. However, in many countries entire 
groups of people are “above the law” in the sense that they are able to evade punishment even if 
caught violating the law. In this paper we argue that both the perceived probability of being 
punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of elites evading punishment are important parts 
of theorizing about deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. Looking at 
data on parking violations among diplomats in New York City 1997–2002, we explore how 
diplomats from different rule-of-law cultures respond to sudden legal immunity. The empirical 
observations provide clear evidence of both the stickiness and the gradual weakening of cultural 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most literature on deterring criminal behavior assumes that 
people who are caught for a crime will be punished. In the classic 
deterrence model, deterrence depends on the expected benefit of the 
criminal act, weighed against the probability of being caught, and the 
size of the sanction if caught. Yet, in many parts of the world, there 
are entire groups of people who are not really subject to the rule of 
law, as they are able to evade punishment even if caught breaking the 
law. Who these groups are, and how large they are, varies from 
country to country. De facto immunity from punishment can run with 
class status, kinship, wealth, ethnicity, or status as a political elite. For 
people who are above the law, no increase in the size of the formal 
sanction for committing a crime or corrupt act, and no increase in 
detection efforts by the government, will alter their propensity to 
engage in criminal or corrupt behavior, because the probability of 
being punished if caught is too low for legal enforcement to affect 
their behavior. 
An important question is how elites respond to de facto 
immunity and to changes in the probability of being punished if caught 
for a criminal act. Such changes may occur more often than we might 
think: Civil wars end and relative power shifts between groups; 
constitutional amendments are passed, resulting in less-favored 
groups being given formal equality; the presidency changes hands and 
with it one family rises while another falls. 
In this paper, we explore data from another such change, 
which is more easily accessible. We use data from a paper by 
Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel to examine the propensity of 
diplomats from across the world to accumulate unpaid parking 
tickets in New York City, where they for several years enjoyed 
diplomatic immunity.1 Dividing diplomats’ countries into four rule-
of-law cultures, we show that there is great variation in the reactions 
of diplomats from different cultures. Elites hailing from cultures 
where it is common to abuse elite privileges were quick to embrace 
the opportunity to do so. Diplomats from countries in which elites 
                                                
1    Raymond Fisman & Edward Miguel, Corruption, Norms, and Legal 
Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1020 (2007). 
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tend to be more accountable were more law-abiding. And 
interestingly, those diplomats from strong rule-of-law cultures who 
started violating in higher numbers over time, did so occasionally 
rather than constantly. These findings suggest that both the perceived 
probability of being punished if caught and the cultural acceptance of 
elites evading punishment are important parts of theorizing about 
deterrence, particularly about corruption among political elites. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II explains a concept 
implicit in general deterrence theory: the perceived probability of 
being punished if caught for a crime, and also discusses the 
importance of ethics and culture in constraining behavior. Here we 
also describe the data from New York that we use to explore how 
political elites from different rule-of-law cultures respond to a zero-
enforcement legal environment. In section III, we explain the 
typology that divides countries into four categories of corruption 
types that we use in our analysis. Section IV presents diplomats’ 
responses, by group, to entering a zero-enforcement environment. 
Section V concludes. 
II.  RULE OF LAW AND ELITE DETERRENCE 
Scholars of law, economics, sociology, and public policy have 
built an extensive literature exploring criminal deterrence in various 
contexts.2 The basic model in the literature theorizes that general 
deterrence from criminal behavior is a function of the probability of 
detection, the size of the sanction, and the benefit that the would-be 
violator stands to gain if not detected. Scholars have focused 
especially on how changes in the perceived or actual probability that a 
                                                
2    See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, 
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Gary S. Becker, 
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gary S. 
Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 
3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celebrity, 
Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and 
Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001); Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 
Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement, 81 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2001); Aaron Chalfin & 
Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature (May 9, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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crime is detected and changes in the size of the formal or informal 
sanction affect levels of deterrence.  Yet, the probability of being 
punished if caught for a criminal act is also a key determinant of how 
people behave, and therefore of the efficiency of deterrence. In a 
review of deterrence literature, Steven N. Durlauf and Daniel S. 
Nagin conclude that there is limited evidence of an effect of the size 
of a sanction in deterring criminal acts, but considerable evidence 
that the certainty of a sanction affects behavior.3 They point out that 
while there is an extensive literature about how this certainty is 
affected by the probability of detection, little is written about the 
probability of being prosecuted and sentenced, that is: the probability 
of being punished if caught. 
It is not an unreasonable simplification to assume that people 
are sanctioned when they are caught for a crime when studying non-
elites, but it is a heroic assumption to make about elites. Across the 
world there is great variation in elite’s propensity of being sentenced 
if caught for a criminal act. In some cases, the law actually mandates 
prosecution with a probability of zero. For example, sitting heads of 
state enjoy de jure immunity from prosecution under international law, 
and the U.S. Department of Justice does not consider a sitting U.S. 
President to be “amenable to prosecution.”4 Nevertheless, de jure 
immunity is a relatively rare phenomenon. Most people in the world 
who are immune from punishment do not enjoy de jure immunity – 
the law does not protect them. Rather, they enjoy de facto immunity. 
De facto immunity covers a broader set of people across the world and 
is based on suspects being able to use bribes, friendships, threats, 
coercion, or other means of pressure in order to avoid, minimize, 
delay, or completely avoid the sanction.5 
                                                
3    Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Overview of “Imprisonment and 
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?” 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 9 (2011). 
4    Randolph D. Moss, A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and 
Criminal Prosecution, 24 OP. O.L.C. 222 (2000), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/10/31/op-olc-
v024-p0222_0.pdf.  
5    See Brian J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, 
Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and 
Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Michael 
Johnston, Corruption, Inequality, and Change, in CORRUPTION, DEVELOPMENT AND 
INEQUALITY: SOFT TOUCH OR HARD GRAFT  13 (Peter M. Ward ed., 1989); Brian 
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The extent to which elites are able to avoid punishment when 
caught for criminal acts is closely related to corruption. Polinsky and 
Shavell demonstrate the logic of how corruption undermines 
deterrence by making it possible to bribe or extort one’s way out of 
punishment.6 Missing from the discussion is how the ability to evade 
punishment differs based on individual characteristics: we know that 
elites are much more likely to be able to evade punishment than non-
elites. We also know that there is great cultural variation in the 
acceptance of some people being above the law. In some cultural 
contexts, elites can literally get away with murder. 
While many countries could provide examples of elites 
enjoying a high degree of de facto immunity, we offer examples from 
India and Brazil to build intuition. In India’s 2014 elections for the 
543 seats in the Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), more than 
one third of the candidates faced criminal charges – and more than 
60% of those faced especially serious charges.7 Moreover, Indian 
elites are notorious for using their networks and bribes to make sure 
their criminal cases join the judicial backlog, which is now 30 million 
cases long.8 In Brazil, experimental evidence suggests that, when 
compared to lower-class drivers, upper-class drivers are both less 
likely to be stopped when committing a traffic violation and more 
likely to receive only a warning during traffic stops that do occur.9 
There is great variation in which groups of elites are above 
the law both between countries and within countries – people with a 
                                                
J. Fried, Paul Lagunes & Atheendar Venkataramani, Corruption and Inequality at the 
Crossroad: A Multimethod Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN 
AM. RES. REV. 76 (2010); Joel S. Hellman & Daniel Kaufmann, The Inequality of 
Influence (Dec. 2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
6    Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 2. 
7    Lok Sabha Elections 2014 Analysis of Criminal Background, Financial, 
Education, Gender and other details of Winners, report by the Association for 
Democratic Reform, May 18, 2014, http://www.adrindia.org/research-and-
report/election-watch/lok-sabha/2014/lok-sabha-2014-winners-analysis-criminal-
and-finan. 
8    Ram Mashru, Justice Delayed is Justice Denied: India’s 30 Million Case 
Judicial Backlog, THE DIPLOMAT, Dec. 25, 2013, 
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/justice-delayed-is-justice-denied-indias-30-
million-case-judicial-backlog/. 
9    Fried, Lagunes & Venkataramani, supra note 5. 
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high socioeconomic status, from historically advantaged ethnic 
groups, families or castes, or those who hold government positions, 
could all enjoy de facto immunity. Our main point is that for these 
elites, neither the size of the formal sanction for committing a crime 
nor the detection efforts by the government are the main 
determinants of whether they choose to commit a crime. 
1. Culture, Institutions, and Ethics 
Not all those who have an opportunity to go unpunished will 
take advantage of their impunity. Both personal ethics and group-
level culture could serve as constraints. For example, while it is well 
known that some civil servants and politicians in India take kick-
backs, speed money, and bribes, many officials are also proud to say 
that they never do so.10 
Whereas the institutional framework we examine in the 
deterrence literature is usually quite clear, the cultural and ethical 
mechanisms are not only less tidy, but also less explored in political 
science and economics. The line between culture and institutions is 
also quite fuzzy. Many aspects of culture can be thought of as a series 
of informal institutional rules, some of which work to improve 
governance, and some of which work against good governance.11 
Moreover, many sanctions are informal, rather than formal,12 such 
that an elite who takes advantage of her immunity might still be 
ostracized by fellow elites who think that her behavior reflects poorly 
on them as a group. But the concept of informal institutions does not 
capture all of culture, and does not fully explain the mechanism by 
which individuals bring their culture to a new institutional 
                                                
10    See Francesca Refsum Jensenius, Power, Performance and Bias: 
Evaluating the Electoral Quotas for Scheduled Castes in India (2013) (unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley) (on file with University of 
California, Berkeley) (interviews with politicians and civil servants in Himachal 
Pradesh, Delhi, and Uttar Pradesh in 2010 and 2011). 
11    INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS FROM LATIN 
AMERICA 11 (Gretchen Helmke & Steven Levitsky eds., 2006). 
12    FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE 
LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The 
Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 
CRIMINOLOGY  721 (1989). 
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environment, or how culture affects behavior, particularly where 
host-environment and home-environment cultural norms conflict. 
Social psychologists have long studied acculturation, 
emphasizing that a mix of both the person and the situation predicts 
behavior.13 Cultures condition the availability and accessibility of 
different implicit theories that people use to interpret the social 
world. The nature of the situation is comprised, in part, by whether 
there is cultural consensus on what the situation is and what the right 
course of action will be in a given situation.14 For example, cultures 
might vary on interpersonal levels of agreement on whether a certain 
behavior – like a political elite not paying a parking ticket – is 
acceptable for a given person.15 
2. Constraint Decay and Zero-Enforcement Environments 
The data we use in this paper are from a study that examines 
how diplomats in New York City who had enjoyed legal immunity 
responded to a sudden legal crackdown on illegal parking.16 The part 
of the data we focus on is the information about parking violations 
among diplomats in the pre-crackdown zero-enforcement 
environment. Some of these elites neither had de jure nor de facto 
immunity in their home countries. For them, moving to New York 
City therefore meant a change in the probability of being sanctioned 
– providing immunity where none was enjoyed before. For other 
elites, who enjoyed immunity in their home countries, there was little 
change in their relationship to the law when entering a zero-
enforcement environment – they remained above the law. The result 
of the legal crackdown studied by Fisman and Miguel was clear: 
enforcement worked. In this paper we are more interested in further 
                                                
13    Walter Mischel, On the Interface of Cognition and Personality: Beyond the 
Person–Situation Debate, 34 AM. PSYCHOL.OGIST 740 (1979). 
14    Shane T. Mueller & Elizabeth S. Veinott, Cultural Mixture Modeling: A 
Method for Identifying Cultural Consensus, 4 ARA TECH. REV. 39 (2008). 
15    See generally Ying-yi Ho Hong & Desiree YeeLing Phua, In Search of 
Culture’s Role in Influencing Individual Social Behaviour, 16 ASIAN  J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 26 
(2013) (providing a brief review of the literature). 
16    Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1. 
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exploring the variation in the behavior of the diplomats from 
different legal cultures in the zero-enforcement environment. 
A rational choice analysis of a zero-enforcement environment 
would predict that, on average, elites would violate the law often, or 
at least as often as the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs, 
showing at least a partial convergence on a high-violation 
equilibrium. A theory of cultural constraints would predict that elites 
in a zero-enforcement environment would continue to follow the 
norms to which they were accustomed. 
But we might imagine that there is a “constraint decay” that 
could happen over time, as those who initially are constrained by 
culture enter a new environment in which the previously stigmatized 
behavior is not stigmatized. This happens regularly in the non-
criminal context, as people move from more conservative cultures 
spheres to more liberal cultures spheres. It happens in the criminal 
context, too, as people travel between jurisdictions that criminalize 
certain behaviors (say, possession of marijuana, or consuming alcohol 
below a certain age) and those that do not. And finally, it can happen 
as elites gain or lose de facto legal immunity. 
Our idea of “constraint decay” is similar in nature to what 
Nagin refers to as “stigma erosion,” but it is on the opposite end of 
the enforcement spectrum.17  Stigma erosion is the gradual decline in 
the stigma associated with a behavior after an enforcement change 
occurs and behavior becomes newly stigmatized. Here, we examine a 
context in which the constraint comes from the culture or 
institutions of a previous environment, and we explore whether those 
constraints decay over time in a zero-enforcement environment. 
There a several ways in which constraint decay could occur. 
One is through personal experience, or what is increasingly discussed 
as Bayesian updating.18 As a person acts with impunity in a way that 
would constitute a violation under the prior regime, the prior 
                                                
17    Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the Twenty-
First Century, 23 CRIME AND JUST. 1, 23 (1998). 
18    See Shamena Anwar & Thomas A. Loughran, Testing a Bayesian 
Learning Theory of Deterrence Among Serious Juvenile Offenders, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 667 
(2011). 
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constraint will slowly erode. In some conservative cultures, members 
of the opposite sex are to avoid physical contact, including shaking 
hands. In a culture in which no such constraint exists, people from 
the conservative cultures might start to shake hands with members of 
the opposite sex in order to facilitate other goals (such as business 
opportunities or social integration), and the hesitation to offer one’s 
hand will decrease with each new handshake that occurs without 
social sanction. Or, in the wake of the legalization of possession of 
small amounts of marijuana by the City of Denver, Colorado, 
someone might smoke marijuana openly in their front yards and 
experience no sanction from a nearby police officer. Each time that 
happens, they learn that there really is no sanction for possessing and 
consuming small amounts of marijuana in that jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in an enforcement environment in which political 
elites enjoy immunity from parking tickets, elites that are accustomed 
to having to pay parking tickets in their home environment could 
shed their hesitation from parking illegally over time, as their number 
of unpaid parking tickets accumulated without sanction. 
Another pathway by which constraint decay could occur is via 
the observation of the experiences of others. With the handshake 
example, people from conservative cultures would observe 
handshakes between men and women without any social disapproval 
shown. They do not have to actually take the “risk” of shaking hands 
with someone of the opposite sex to learn that no social sanction 
exists. Similarly, when it comes to elites, we can imagine them 
changing their behavior solely based on the experiences of others 
who have been in the new legal environment for a longer time.19 
                                                
19    Constraint decay should happen faster for people who have fewer, or 
less intense, ties to the home culture upon arrival in the new environment so that 
the cultural norms of the home culture are not being consistently refreshed. For 
example, a 20 year old college student from the United States (where the drinking 
age is 21), who goes to Mexico on a church-related mission project with several 
other members of the home church, is much less likely to drink alcohol while in 
Mexico (where the drinking age is 18), than if she traveled to Mexico alone for a 
study abroad program. The number and intensity of cultural ties among the elite 
diplomats we study is impossible for us to observe with our data, so we leave this 
hypothesis for others to test. 
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Our notion of constraint decay can serve to reconcile the 
predictions of rational choice theory and a theory of fixed cultural 
constraints. If constraint decay drives behavior of elites in a zero-
enforcement environment, then we should see a gradual increase in 
violations among people from different rule-of-law-cultures over 
time, but also a persistence in cultural differences. We might observe 
it happen via the experience pathway, such that each ticket predicts 
that the next ticket will happen with a shorter delay.  And we might 
simply observe it happen over time, regardless of the number of 
tickets accumulated, which is consistent with the informal contacts 
pathway. 
III.  DATA AND MEASUREMENT 
The variation in the legal enforcement of unpaid parking 
violations for diplomats in New York City provides an excellent 
opportunity to explore what happens to elites from different rule-of-
law cultures in a zero-enforcement environment. Due to the legal 
immunity of diplomatic personnel, the City of New York experienced 
enormous amounts of illegal parking and unpaid parking tickets by 
diplomats in the city. Illegal parking presented particular challenges 
when the illegally parked diplomatic cars blocked fire hydrants and 
access to handicapped parking spots, in addition to blocking traffic 
by double-parking. The police would issue parking tickets every time 
they found an illegally parked car from a diplomatic mission,20 but if 
the mission did not voluntarily pay the ticket, the police had no 
further way of sanctioning the parking violations, since diplomats 
could not be taken to court for failing to pay the ticket. As of 2002, 
UN diplomats owed the City $18 million because of the 150,000 
unpaid parking tickets that they had accrued.21 
                                                
20    As we explain below, the vast majority of diplomats had no unpaid 
tickets over the time period, and we can assume, given the difficulties of parking in 
New York City, that many did receive parking tickets over the same time period 
and paid them. Hence, ticketing cars with diplomatic plates was a rational strategy 
for the NYC parking enforcers. 
21    Fisman & Miguel, supra note 1, at 1024. 
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When it came to parking, diplomats from across the world 
who came to New York City found themselves in a legal 
environment where they were above the law. To limit the extensive 
abuse of illegal parking, the City of New York enforced a legal 
crackdown on diplomatic parking violations in October 2002. The 
particular form of the enforcement was not to issue more tickets, but 
instead to revoke diplomatic license plates on diplomatic cars that 
had accumulated three or more parking violations that went unpaid 
more than 100 days. 
Using a dataset of month-wise unpaid parking violations for 
diplomats in New York City, Fisman and Miguel showed a strong 
correlation between the score on a commonly-used, unidimensional 
country-level corruption index and the propensity for diplomats from 
that country to park illegally in this zero-enforcement environment.22 
They also analyzed individual-level data and demonstrated that the 
number of unpaid violations per month increased with tenure in New 
York City. While the emphasis in their article is on the impressive 
effect of enforcement after 2002 – when the New York police started 
towing cars that had an unpaid parking ticket – it is also an excellent 
empirical example of what Durlauf and Nagin describe as a sudden 
change in the certainty of punishment. The data are interesting because 
they provide a unique insight into petty violations among elites from 
across the world, rather than the more commonly studied college 
students and non-elite criminals.23 Finally, it provides evidence of 
what happens when individuals from various contexts encounter a 
situation where it is common and fairly acceptable to commit an 
infraction. 
                                                
22    Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance 
Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004 WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH, 
(May 2005), http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0. (The “Kaufmann” 
corruption index is one of the most common unidimensional ways to analyze 
corruption. It is based on the work of Daniel Kaufmann and coauthors. Kaufmann 
was Director of the World Bank Institute when the score was developed).Daniel 
Kaufmann, Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper, May 2005), 
http://go.worldbank.org/2GF3HGVDO0.  
23    Durlauf & Nagin, supra note 3, at 16. 
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In this paper, we use data from the pre-enforcement time 
period to gain insight into what happens when political elites from 
different cultures arrive in a zero-enforcement regime. The data 
include the monthly number of parking violations for 1,995 
diplomats present in New York for some or all of the time December 
1997 until October 2002 – adding up to a total of 17,972 violations 
or an average of about 1 violation per diplomat per month across 
these years. 
1. Rule-of-Law Cultures 
Fisman and Miguel found that the overall corruption score of 
a country was strongly correlated with unpaid parking violations, but 
why was this the case? Why should the overall level of corruption in a 
society result in diplomats feeling comfortable breaking the law while 
abroad?  Why should the habit of business elites in a country paying 
their way to contracts, or bureaucrats extorting grease payments for 
provision of simple services, or police extorting the citizenry, predict 
these elites feeling comfortable parking illegally and not paying for 
the parking ticket afterwards?  We posit that it is not the level of 
corruption in the country per se, but rather the rule-of-law culture and 
the extent to which elites are used to (and comfortable with) being 
above the law that predicts their behavior. 
Measuring the cultural background of diplomats and their 
perceived probability of being punished for a crime is not an easy 
task. Corruption measures incorporate much more than the rule of 
law, and rule of law measures incorporate much more than just the 
“thin” concept of whether the government is subject to the law. A 
growing literature calls into question the usefulness of existing 
measures of the rule of law itself finding that they are both under- 
and over-inclusive for measuring both “thick” and “thin” concepts of 
the rule of law.24 General measures of the average rule of law in a 
                                                
24    See generally THOMAS CAROTHERS, PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW 
ABROAD: IN SEARCH OF KNOWLEDGE (Thomas Carothers ed. 2006); Gillian K. 
Hadfield & Barry R. Weingast, Microfoundations of the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL. 
SCI. 21 (2013); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Matthew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, 
The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455 (2009); Melissa A. Thomas, What Do 
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country do not capture the perceived probability of being punished 
for the elite in a country. Our ideal measure might take into account 
perceptions of whether the law governs the governors and whether 
the judiciary is independent from other branches of government. It 
would be less concerned with other aspects of existing measures, like 
civil rights protection.25 
To approximate the concept we are interested in, we turn to 
an interesting effort to measure corruption that emphasizes the role 
and importance of elites specifically. Michael Johnston proposed four 
“Syndromes of Corruption,” or clusters of country corruption in 
multidimensional space.26 His four clusters present an intuitive, 
facially valid, description of elite subjection to the rule of law – 
indeed, his conception of corruption, on which his clusters are based, 
is “uses of and connections between wealth and power that 
significantly weaken open, competitive participation and economic 
and political institutions, or delay or prevent their development”, in 
other words, elites’ uses of their elite status in ways that, even if not 
illegal, undermine the country’s institutional frameworks.27 
In creating the four syndromes, Johnston conducted a cluster 
analysis on data for 97 countries. He used the Polity score to measure 
the level of democracy in 1992 and 2002, the World Economic 
Forum’s 2002 score for institutional and social capacity, the Heritage 
Foundation’s 2002 measure of property rights, and the Economic 
Freedom in the World ranking from the Fraser Institute from 1990 
                                                
the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure, 22 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 31 (2010); Svend-
Erik Skaaning, Measuring the Rule of Law, 63 POL. RES. Q. 449 (2010).   
25    In recent years the World Justice Projects has made great gains in 
creating such a measure. However, these measures are not available for the time 
period of the parking data we use. 
26    MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH, 
POWER, AND DEMOCRACY, 3 (2005); See also Mark David Agrast, et al., Rule of Law 
Index 2011, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT 2011, 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011
_Report.pdf  (A more recent measure which could be used to operationalize elite 
law abidingness now exists: the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index, which 
measures rule of law according to multiple dimensions, one of which is the 
likelihood that elites are punished). 
27    Johnston, supra note 27, at 12.  
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and 2001.28 Democratic development and institutional and social 
capacity would all tend to improve the rule of law, moreover, 
impressions of elite legal compliance probably inform the measures 
that are survey based. Using data from 1992 and 2002 allowed 
Johnston to measure rates of change in these countries, as some of 
the countries democratized and liberalized after their transitions from 
communism and authoritarianism. Based on these data, Johnston 
identified four groups of countries, which he described as Influence 
Markets, Elite Cartels, Oligarchs and Clans, and Official Moguls.29 
Importantly, the groups of countries cut across region, and one of 
their most important distinctions is the status and power of elites in 
each country. 
Influence Markets (IMs) are eighteen countries that have a 
generally high level of human development, are established 
democracies, and have a strong rule of law. Leaders face competition 
and are constrained from acting arbitrarily, economies are free, and 
society is generally able to focus on quality of life, rather than 
survival. These countries are called Influence Markets because the 
rich generally have access to and influence on power, but the 
institutionalization of the state does not allow corruption to violate 
the established institutions. In Johnston’s words, “often politicians 
serve as middlemen, putting their connections out for rent in 
exchange for contributions both legal and otherwise.”30 Influence 
markets include Japan, Austria, Uruguay, Finland, Germany, and 
Costa Rica, among others. In terms of our discussion, elites’ 
perceived probability of being punished if caught in Influence 
Markets countries probably does not vary much across individuals, 
and is close to one for almost all people. 
Elite Cartels (ECs), which include Argentina, Belgium, 
Botswana, Greece, Israel, and South Korea, among others, are less 
                                                
28    For more information about Johnston’s methodology, see his 
description in Johnston, supra note 27. Our efforts to re-cluster his data by 
systematically dropping one indicator at a time have resulted in poorer separation 
between clusters. 
29    See infra p. 33 Appendix A (providing a full list of the countries, the 
rule-of-law cultures to which they pertain, and the distance from the statistical 
center of the cluster identified by Johnston’s ANOVA). 
30    Johnston, supra note 27, at 42.  
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tightly clustered in Johnston’s data, but do share plenty of 
commonalities. Namely, “the rules of the game” are less certain in 
these twenty-one countries. Elites inside and outside of government 
are less constrained by the rule of law, and “relatively established 
elites collude within a moderately strong institutional framework.”31 
The citizens of these countries are “relatively affluent,” and their 
markets are relatively stable and open. However, institutionalization 
of government is less well-developed or less-well controlled than in 
the IM countries. Because of rapid industrialization or 
democratization, elites in these countries find alliances across sector 
lines and across the public/private sector divide. Black markets are 
more prominent in Elite Cartels than in Influence Markets. In terms 
of our discussion, we might expect the probability of being punished 
to have a higher variance in ECs than in IMs but to still be fairly 
close to one for most people. South Korea is a typical example: the 
“rules of the game” are not as predictable as in IM countries, yet two 
sons of two different South Korean presidents recently served time 
in prison for corruption.32 
Oligarchs and Clans (OCs) comprise thirty countries, 
including Albania, Bangladesh, Colombia, Ghana, India, Nepal, 
Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines. Oligarchs and Clans countries 
have reformed politics and economics to a degree, but their 
institutionalization has not caught up with their success in those 
areas. Rule of law is uncertain in Oligarchs and Clans countries. As a 
result of under-institutionalization, political elites will be “ill-equipped 
to resist [. . .] abuses.”33 Political and civil rights are not always 
guaranteed as a result. Security is low, which results in capital flight, 
and political regimes are unstable. Regulation is “extensive and of 
dubious quality”, and black markets are extensive.34 People are 
generally poor in these countries, and primary exports are relied upon 
heavily. In the case of our example, the perceived probabilities of 
                                                
31    Id. at 45. 
32    See Caroline Gluck, S. Korean President’s Son Jailed, BBC NEWS WORLD 
EDITION (Nov. 1, 2002), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2384707.stm; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, Seoul’s Mighty, Once Immune, Now Feel the Arm of the Law, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/14/world/seoul-s-
mighty-once-immune-now-feel-the-arm-of-the-law.html.  
33    Johnston, supra note 27, at 45.  
34    Id. at 57. 
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punishment for elites in OC countries will vary according to the 
would-be offender’s connections to the Oligarchy or Clan that is in 
power. Diplomats at the UN Headquarters are likely to be well-
connected to the elite and their home-country expectation of 
punishment is therefore likely to be low. 
The twenty-nine Official Mogul countries (OMs) are similar 
to Oligarchs and Clans countries in that they are riddled with black 
markets and poverty with ineffective governance and corruption 
controls. However, in these countries, political elites are not 
accountable to the people and are therefore effectively immune from 
accountability. “[P]olitical power is personal, and is often used with 
impunity.”35 Of all the groups, Official Mogul countries offer the 
least protection of civil and political rights. They are also heavily 
dependent on primary exports, and foreign aid that enters the 
country can easily be skimmed off by elites. These countries include 
countries like Chad, China, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Kuwait, 
Morocco, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. In terms of our model, it is clear 
that the perceived probability of being punished for a crime for 
members of the elite is close to zero. Elites from these countries are 
therefore likely to be used to being above the law and feel quite 
comfortable with this state of affairs. 
When we divide the data for New York diplomats between 
December 1997 and October 2002 according to the four rule-of-law 
cultures, the data includes 516 diplomats from 17 IM countries, 427 
diplomats from 21 EC countries, 566 diplomats from 29 OC 
countries and 485 diplomats from 27 OM countries.36 
                                                
35    Id. at 46.  
36    Dividing the data into rule-of-law cultures reduces the amount of 
information analyzed, because whereas the original parking tickets data included 
151 countries, Johnston only has complete data on 95 of those countries. Most of 
the countries that are omitted are small, but there are some exceptions such as 
Israel and Saudi Arabia that we would like to be able to analyze but cannot for lack 
of data. Overall, the patterns in the data do not change much in this reduced form. 
Johnston’s sample has a mean corruption level of -0.19, which is slightly less 
corrupt (around four percent less corrupt) than the parking ticket data’s mean of -
0.009. This is a tiny difference in the data – it is 0.2 standard deviations on the 
corruption indicator, and in the original dataset, there are only a few countries 
between the original mean (-0.009) and the new mean (-0.19). In the Appendix we 
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In the following sections we use these data to explore or ideas 
about rule-of-law cultures and constraint decay.   
Our first hypothesis is that because of the varying levels of 
elite subjection to the rule of law among the four rule-of-law cultures, 
on average, 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" , where 𝑉 is the mean number 
of violations per diplomat per month, and the subscripts define the 
group of countries. In other words, there should be a clear difference 
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. 
Our second hypothesis is about changes in diplomat behavior 
over time. According to a Rational Choice perspective we should 
expect to see that as diplomats’ time in New York increases, the 
importance of the rule-of-law culture of origin rapidly disappear, such 
that 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" = 𝑉!" . A culturalist explanation would, on 
the other hand, would predict little change in behavior over time. 
Based on our discussion we would rather expect to see cultural 
differences persist (𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!" < 𝑉!") but weaken as the 
diplomats’ home-country cultural constraints fade over time. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
In this section we will look at overall patterns, patterns over 
time, and individual-level patterns in parking violations based on the 
four rule-of-law cultures introduced in the previous section. We 
begin our analysis by calculating the average number of parking 
violations per diplomat per month, by group, as illustrated in Figure 
1. 
As is clear in Figure 1, there was considerable variation in the 
average monthly number of violations across diplomats from 
countries with different rule-of-law cultures for the period 1997–
2002. The differences in means between the four groups are reported 
in Table 1. A series of two-sample permutation tests comparing the 
differences in average monthly violations per diplomat between the 
different groups of countries indicate that there are clear differences 
in the behavior of diplomats from different cultures. In particular it 
                                                
should the full list of countries in each group, how the groups related to the 
Kaufman corruption score and also how it relates to Rule of Law measures. 
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should be noted that the OC and OM countries (which have very 
similar scores on corruption indices) differ significantly from each 
other.37 
Figure 1: Average number of parking violations per diplomat 
per month, by group (1997-2002) 
 
  
                                                
37    We include in the appendix a box plot of both corruption indicators 
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          Table 1: Mean violations per diplomat per month (1997-     









Note: The comparison is between the group of countries on the 
reporting line and the one listed above it. Data is individual-level 
diplomat data on monthly violations aggregated to the country 
group. P-values are from two-sample permutation tests with 
10,000 permutations, using the perm.test() package in R. 
 
But did all the diplomats start violating the law in this zero-
enforcement environment?  Table 2 shows the data for the diplomats 
present in NYC between December 1997 and 2002.  We present 
diplomats’ average number of violations per month during the whole 
time they were in the city. In this case the sample size given is for 
diplomats, not diplomat-months. 
 
We can see that among the diplomats from IM countries about 
92% never accumulated unpaid parking tickets even once during their 
stay in New York; about 7% let tickets go unpaid on average between 
0 and 1 times per month and four diplomats had an average of more 
than one unpaid violation per month. 
 
Table 2: Percentages of diplomats with different average 
numbers of violations per month 
 
Average monthly IM EC OC OM 
violations (N=516) (N=427) (N=566) (N=485) 
 0 92.4 77.3 79.5 61.2 
(0,1] 6.8 17.1 11.8 21.6 
(1,3] 0.8 4.0 4.4 11.6 
(3,5] 0.0 0.5 2.7 2.7 
>5 0.0 1.2 1.6 2.9 
 
 Mean by 
group 
Difference P-value 
 IM 0.14 – – 
EC 0.70 0.56 <0.01 
OC 1.06 0.36 <0.01 
OM 1.91 0.85 <0.01 
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Interestingly, there is a major jump from the behavior of 
diplomats from IM countries to EC countries. In the case of EC 
countries, about 77% of the diplomats always paid their tickets, while 
the rest failed to pay, at least occasionally. The trend we see is that 
many of the diplomats from EC countries seemed to have adapted to 
the new cultural environment by violating a bit, while few of them 
were extreme violators. Among the diplomats from OC countries, on 
the other hand, about 79.5% never violated, but there were a few 
extreme violators that pulled up the average for the rest. 
 
Looking finally at the diplomats from the OM countries, the 
difference is striking: Among the diplomats from the OM countries 
about 39% failed to pay parking tickets during their time in New 
York City, and several of the diplomats failed to pay more than five 
tickets every single month. Coming from a culture where they were 
used to being above the law, and being placed in a zero-enforcement 
environment, the diplomats from OM countries seem to have felt the 
least compelled to follow parking regulations by paying their parking 
tickets, or, put another way, the most willing to take advantage of 
their immunity. 
 
This provides empirical support in favor of our first hypothesis: 
there is a clear rank-ordering in both the number of violations and 
the number of diplomats choosing to violate. 
 
We now turn to our hypotheses about convergence and cultural 
constraints over time. In Figure 2 we look at the average monthly 
number of violations for diplomats broken down by how long they 
had been in New York. If diplomats behave purely rationally, then 
we should observe them adapting quickly to the zero-enforcement 
environment.  Whatever their number of violations in the early days, 
we should see a convergence at a relatively high level of violations 
across groups. If diplomats behave purely according to their home 
country cultures, we should see stable cultural differences in the 
number of violations, which persist over time. However, if constraint 
decay occurs, then we should see cultural differences at the outset, 









Figure 2: Average number of violations over time, by rule-of-law 
culture 
 
As we show in Figure 2, cultural constraints appear to be present, 
but they also seem to decay over time.  Interestingly, few of the new 
diplomats accumulated unpaid tickets during their first three months 
in the city. As expected, the diplomats from OC and OM countries 
were quicker to start taking advantage of the zero-enforcement 
environment, increasing violations after only three months in New 
York City. The diplomats from IM and EC countries seem to have 
been more constrained by their cultures, although these constraints 
gradually seemed to have weakened over time, with violations 
accumulating after 6-12. 38  We view the gradual increase in unpaid 
parking tickets in IM and EC countries as evidence of considerable 
                                                
38    The separation is much clearer than if we run the simple quantiles of 
the corruption index, implying that the typology of rule-of-law cultures gives more 
explanatory power than the corruption score. Also, in this picture the difference in 
the number of violations in OM and OC countries does not look as stark as in in 
the previous table. The reason is that more of the diplomats from the OM 
countries had stayed in NYC for more than one year. Their overall average was 
therefore pulled up by all the frequent violators who had lived in the city for a long 
time. We break down the length of diplomatic stay by rule-of-law culture in the 
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constraint decay: the cultural view that it is ethically wrong to take 
advantage of one’s elite status dissipated when enough of others in 
this new environment violated on a regular basis. At the same time, 
Table 2 reminds us that less than 1% of all IM diplomats 
accumulated more than one unpaid ticket per month on average. 
Substantial cultural constraints remained. 
 
Data on repeat violators helps to complete the picture. We 
reduce the data to only the sub-sample of violators who left more 
than one ticket unpaid during the time in New York. Among these 
repeat violators, the average number of violations the first month they 
violated at all was less than 1.5 for IM and EC diplomats. For OC and 
OM diplomats it was 2.25 and 2.34, respectively, and these numbers 
increased to 3.33 and 2.89 in the second month. Repeat violations 
among diplomats from IM and EC countries held more or less steady 
in their second month. Looking at how fast diplomats started to 
violate, 20% of repeat violators from IM counties accumulated at 
least one parking ticket during their first month in the city, a number 
that was closer to 30% for the diplomats from EC, OC and OM 
countries. On average, repeat violators received their first ticket after 
they had spent about three months in the city, with the exception of 
diplomats from OM countries, who got their first ticket after less 
than two months in the city. Diplomats from IM countries were the 
slowest to repeat violations, and diplomats from OC and OM 
countries were the fastest.  We summarize these results in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Violation Behavior Among Repeat Violators 
 IM EC OC OM 
 (N=34) (N=79) (N=88) (N=146) 
Percent of Diplomats 
who were Repeat 
Violators 
21.21 29.11 28.41 30.82 
Average Month of 
First Violation 
3.03 3.38 3.5 1.80 
Average Number of 
Violations, First 
Month Violating 
1.15 1.49 2.25 2.34 
Average Number of 
Violations, Second 
Month Violating 
1.14 1.57 3.33 2.89 
Average Number of 
Months between First 
and Second Violation 
8.10 5.81 4.27 3.49 
Average Number of 
Months between 
Second and Third 
Violations 
5.15 3.32 2.41 2.81 
     
Based on our theoretical discussion we believe that for OC and 
OM diplomats, a home-country cultural background that views them 
as largely above-the-law increased their readiness to “hit the ground 
violating”, when compared to diplomats from IM, and to perhaps a 
lesser degree, EC cultures. 
 
The data we have presented in the previous sections reveal 
several interesting patterns. First, we can to a large extent predict the 
behavior of diplomats based on their rule-of-law culture. Diplomats 
from OM and OC cultures were less likely to have entered New York 
with any constraints on their immunity, and they were quick to start 
violating the law.  They also responded with frequent violations. 
Second, even for diplomats from IM and EC countries, the 
propensity to break the law increased over time, suggesting that their 
cultural constrains decayed over time. 
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Even so, it is important to note that most diplomats actually 
complied with the law. Even in a zero-enforcement environment, 
most diplomats paid their parking tickets, and among those who did 
violate, most violated only once.  In light of zero-enforcement and 
constraint decay, a large proportion of diplomats seem to have seen it 
as legitimate to violate occasionally, but not constantly. 
 
Together these findings point to interesting interactions between 
rule-of-law cultures and institutional constraints. Members of a 
society might vary in their probability of sanction even if caught red-
handed, and deterrence might function quite differently for elites 
than for others. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Rule-of-law cultures and the social status of the actors 
involved are both important and under-theorized considerations of 
corruption deterrence. While deterrence is often thought of in terms 
of the probability of detection and the size of the sanction, the 
probability of punishment conditional on being caught is a missing 
piece of the theory, and one that we hope to have illuminated in this 
paper. This is particularly important in the case of elites, as there are 
many groups and individuals across the world that may go 
unpunished even in countries with otherwise well-functioning legal 
systems. 
When diplomats from across the world found themselves to be 
effectively immune from punishment for parking illegally, diplomats 
from some countries – namely those where elites are accustomed to 
being able to evade punishment for criminal acts – took advantage of 
the zero-enforcement environment. While existing theories of 
deterrence would predict that all diplomats would abuse this rule to 
the same extent, or that culture would dominate and levels of 
violations would remain unchanged, we see instead that the 
diplomats from countries in which elites tend to be more accountable 
were more law-abiding. Some diplomats from strong rule-of-law 
cultures also started violating in higher numbers over time, as their 
cultural constraints decayed. 
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Our study has focused on a rarified example – that of political 
elites from all over the world living in a zero-enforcement 
environment – but it joins other cross-cultural socioeconomic studies 
that find cultural differences in economic behavior.39 Future research 
on the mechanisms underlying the differences in behavior between 
elites and non-elites would deepen our understanding about how 
people behave in new institutional settings. 
                                                
39    See, e.g., Joseph Henrich, et al., Economic Man in Cross-Cultural 
Perspective: Behavioral Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies, 28 BEHAV. AND BRAIN 
SCIENCES 795 (2005).  
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A. APPENDIX: RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES 
Table A.1: Influence Markets 




1 New Zealand 0.91 
2  Germany 2.32 
3  Switzerland 13.65 
4  Netherlands 3.87 
5  Sweden 8.76 
6  Ireland 8.30 
7  Austria 3.60 
8  Australia 7.28 
9  UK 1.29 
10  Costa Rica 3.84 
11  Denmark 3.65 
12 Canada 2.78 
13  USA* 3.86 
14  Uruguay 9.90 
15  France 9.24 
16  Finland 8.24 
17  Norway 7.66 
18  Japan 2.92 
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Table A.2: Elite Cartels 




1 Czech Rep 2.49 
2  Slovak Rep 2.31 
3  Greece 9.01 
4  Chile 2.34 
5  Paraguay 4.65 
6  Panama 5.72 
7  South Africa 5.52 
8  Spain 7.39 
9  Israel 6.88 
10  Italy 2.98 
11  Hungary 5.75 
12 Namibia 4.57 
13  Korea South 3.22 
14  Portugal 2.63 
15  Botswana 3.64 
16  Belgium 9.07 
17  Poland 3.75 
18  Bolivia 8.03 
19 Zambia 10.62 
20 Brazil 5.54 
21 Argentina 5.72 
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Table A.3: Oligarchs & Clans 




1 Sri Lanka 9.49 
2  Malaysia 7.20 
3  Mexico 7.10 
4  Malawi 2.48 
5  Russia 12.69 
6  Peru 11.62 
7  Pakistan 14.73 
8  Romania 4.25 
9  Philippines 4.14 
10  Nicaragua 2.86 
11  Nepal 3.08 
12 Senegal 7.90 
13  Niger 9.07 
14  El Salvador 2.31 
15  Ecuador 3.99 
16 Benin 1.64 
17  Guatemala 3.63 
18  Ghana 6.99 
19 Turkey 3.24 
20 Bangladesh 9.41 
21 Albania 8.67 
22 Colombia 4.81 
23 Venezuela 8.28 
24 India 3.72 
25 Thailand 7.53 
26 Madagascar 6.79 
27 Jamaica 9.04 
28 Trinidad & Tobago 8.89 
29 Bulgaria 3.69 
30 Honduras 2.99 
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Table A.4: Official Moguls 




1 Tunisia 2.36 
2  Syria 12.33 
3  Zimbabwe 8.38 
4  Uganda 13.63 
5  Togo 3.96 
6  United Arab Emirates 7.44 
7  Tanzania 5.66 
8 Rwanda 2.94 
9  Gabon 5.50 
10  Egypt 5.58 
11  Central Africa Republic 10.60 
12 Indonesia 9.59 
13  Haiti 2.54 
14  Guinea-Bissau 7.93 
15  Cameroon 2.82 
16 Algeria 5.87 
17  Congo Rep of 11.17 
18  China 6.12 
19 Morocco 7.79 
20 Malawi 13.85 
21 Kuwait 5.56 
22 Oman 8.63 
23 Nigeria 10.03 
24 Ivory Coast 7.20 
25 Iran 11.66 
26 Chad 2.94 
27 Myanmar 11.53 
28 Jordan 13.77 
29 Kenya 2.11 
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B. COMPARING RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES AND THE CORRUPTION 
INDEX 
Figure B.1: Level of corruption among the countries belonging 
to countries in each of the rule-of-law cultures 
 
How do the rule-of-law cultures relate to the Kaufman 
corruption index used by Fisman and Miguel?  Figure B.1 shows 
corruption levels by rule-of-law culture. As can be seen in Figure B.1, 
the Influence Markets’ mean level of corruption is much lower than 
for the other groups, the mean level for the Elite Cartels is slightly 
higher, while the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans have a 
similar and high level of corruption. While the Oligarchs and Clans 
and Official Moguls have a fairly low variance on the corruption 
index (0.12 and 0.29, respectively), Influence Markets and Elite 
Cartels have a much higher variance of corruption levels, 0.44 and 
0.51, respectively. Since the Official Moguls and Oligarchs and Clans 
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indicator would predict a similar level of parking violations by 
diplomats from the countries from these rule-of-law cultures. 
However, as we observe in the analysis in the main text, diplomats 
from the two groups of high-corruption countries behave differently, 
lending credence to the idea that rule of law is not adequately 
captured by corruption measures. 
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C. RULE OF LAW INDEX AND RULE-OF-LAW CULTURES 
We do not pursue a strategy involving a new rule of law typology 
here because of the under-conceptualization and difficult 
operationalization of rule of law over the time period. Specifically, we 
lack quality data underlying the 2002 Rule of Law indicator measure 
from the World Bank Institute, but even if it existed, is it largely built 
on overlapping indices that do not separate nicely into clusters for 
analysis. Instead, we show here that the rule-of-law cultures overlap 
with the 2002 rule of law indicator in a very similar way as we saw in 
Figure B.1, though the pattern is more muted. 
 
Figure C.1: Syndromes by Rule of Law Measure 
 
We believe that future scholars will be able to better approximate 
rule of law measures – both “thick” and “thin” concepts. The World 
Justice Project has already made great gains. Its data, unfortunately, 
does not overlap with the time period under analysis here. 
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Worldwide, many cultural properties have been wrongfully exported to other countries in times 
of war and colonization. Furthermore, cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal 
transaction due to their substantial economic value. Illicit trade in cultural properties is now the 
third largest black market after drug and firearms. There are several international treaties 
aimed at combating the illicit export and enabling the restitution of cultural properties.  Despite 
these efforts, more legislative and judicial cooperation between countries will be necessary to truly 
solve the problem. This article reviews international legal instruments for restitution of illegally 
exported cultural property, and suggests some new judicial principles that should be applied by 
domestic courts for supplementing drawbacks of international treaties. The author suggests to 
adopt “lex originis” rule for choice of governing law instead of traditional “lex rei sitae” rule 
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Convention, The 1970 UNESCO Convention, The 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, lesx rei sitae, lex originis, Shifting the Burden 
of proof 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2011, two significant incidents occurred regarding the 
restitution of cultural properties: Korea recovered 297 volumes of the 
royal Uigwe1 that had been carried away by French soldiers from the 
Oegyujanggak2 during the French Invasion of 1866 and stored in the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BnF)3; and Turkey recovered the 
Bogazköy Sphinx, which was the object of a long-running dispute 
between Turkey and Germany, from the Pergamon Museum in 
Berlin, Germany.4 Those cases captured the world’s attention. 
The cultural properties in those cases were illegally exported 
during the Imperial Period. The matter of restitution of cultural 
properties is mostly recognized as pertaining to cultural properties 
illegally exported during World War I, World War II, or the period 
when imperialism was rampant, as these types of cultural properties 
are at the center of a significant portion of restitution disputes. 
According to the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea, as of 
2015 a total of 160,342 pieces Korean cultural properties reside 
overseas. Among those cultural properties, approximately 75,000 
pieces are thought to have been illegally exported to an estimated 20 
countries. 
Most of those cultural properties were illegally exported 
during the Japanese colonial period, the U.S. military government 
period, and the historical turmoil of the Korean War. Most cultural 
                                                
1   The Uigwe are Royal Records of the State Rites of the Joseon 
Dynasty, which ruled the Korean peninsula from 1392 until 1897. Douglas Cox, 
Case Note, “Inalienable” Archives: Korean Royal Archives as French Property under 
International Law, 18 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROPERTY 410 (2011). 
2   The Oegyujanggak was the Royal Library of the Joseon Dynasty, 
located outside of the royal palace. Id. at 411. 
3   See S. Korea welcomes accord with France on transfer of ‘Oegyujanggak’ royal 
books, KOREA HERALD, Mar. 17, 2011, 
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/17/34/0301000000AEN2011
0317001800315F.HTML; see Cox, supra note 1, at 409-23 (for a case study of the 
Uigwe). 
4   Çorum - Anatolia News Agency, Hattu a reunites with sphinx, 
HURRIYET DAILY NEWS, Nov. 7, 2011, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hattusa-reunites-with-
sphinx.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7062&NewsCatID=385.  
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properties plundered and illegally exported during the age of 
imperialism have not been returned so far. Even so, the restitution of 
cultural properties is becoming a bigger global issue. However, not all 
cultural properties were exported during past, unfortunate periods. 
Cultural properties are currently constant targets of illegal transaction 
stemming from their inherently enormous value. According to the 
United States Department of Justice (DOJ), illegal cultural properties 
make up the third largest concentrated black market— after the 
illegal drug and firearms markets.5 In particular, illegal transactions of 
cultural properties in the Middle East are reported to be a basis for 
funding terrorist groups.6,7 
With the development of means of communicating and 
conducting transactions, the current illegal trade of cultural properties 
has grown to include not only criminal organizations, but also 
ordinary people. For example, the illegal transaction of cultural 
properties is frequently carried out using online auction sites such as 
eBay8 and international parcel delivery services.9 This situation is 
                                                
5   Noah Charney et al., Protecting Cultural Heritage from Art Theft: 
International Challenge, Local Opportunity, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL. (U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, D.C.), Mar. 2012, https://leb.fbi.gov/2012/march/protecting-cultural-
heritage-from-art-theft-international-challenge-local-opportunity. 
6   See Kimberly L. Alderman, Honor Amongst Thieves: Organized Crime and 
the Illicit Antiquities Trade, 45 IND. L. REV. 601, 609-611 (2012); Russell Howard et 
al., Digging in and Trafficking out: How the Destruction of Cultural Heritage Funds Terrorism, 
8 CTC SENTINEL 14, 14-17 (2015); Janine di Giovanni et al., How does ISIS fund its 
reign of terror? NEWSWEEK, Nov. 6, 2014, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-does-isis-fund-its-reign-terror-
282607.html. 
7   On Feb. 12, 2015, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2199 
at its 7379 meeting. Resolution 2199 condemns the destruction of cultural heritage 
in Iraq and Syria, particularly by ISIL and ANF, and also decrees that all Member 
States shall take appropriate steps to prevent the trade in Iraqi and Syrian cultural 
properties and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, and 
religious importance that have been illegally removed from Iraq since Aug. 6, 1990 
and from Syria since Mar. 5, 2011, including by prohibiting cross-border trade in 
such items. United Nations, Press Release, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2199 
(2015), Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups, 
Threatens Further Targeted Sanctions, Feb. 12, 2015, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11775.doc.htm. 
8   Kurt Siehr, Unidroit Convention of 1995 and Unclaimed Cultural Property 
without Provenance, 2013 ELTE L. J. 89, 95 (2013). 
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additionally problematic given the people involved in such 
transactions are often unaware that the transactions run afoul of the 
law. 
International societies agree on the necessity of preventing 
illegal transactions of cultural properties and returning them to their 
source countries. In response to this increasing problem, they have 
established various international norms, such as the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention10 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.11 However, 
some disputes over the restitution of cultural properties cannot be 
resolved through such conventions. Those disputes can be resolved 
through diplomatic channels, mutual agreements, or decisions of 
domestic courts. 
Although each country usually has a national law to prevent 
illegal exportation of cultural properties, few nations have any special 
act applicable to disputes over the restitution of cultural properties. 
Therefore when a lawsuit for the restitution of illegally exported 
cultural properties is filed in a domestic court, the competent court 
has no option but to apply general legal principles applicable to a 
lawsuit over other goods. However, if the court applies general legal 
principles, it might overlook the unique characteristics of cultural 
properties. Cultural properties differ from typical goods given that 
the property contains special relevance to the historical, spiritual, and 
cultural identity of a state unlike other goods. This intrinsic and 
specialized value exemplifies why cultural properties should not be 
distributed by normal market forces. 
                                                
9   Crime ring busted for smuggling Korean relics overseas, DONG-A IIBO, Apr. 
27, 2012, http://english.donga.com/List/3/all/26/403691/1. 
10   Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 1970, Nov. 14, 
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 321, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 289 (1971) [hereinafter 1970 
UNESCO Convention]. The Convention has been in force since Apr. 27, 1972, 
with 131 State Parties as of April 2016. 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E (last 
accessed May 4, 2016). 
11 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects, June 24, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter 1995 UNIDROIT Convention].  
The Convention has been in force since July 1, 1998, with 37 State Parties as of 
April 2016. http://www.unidroit.org/status-cp (last accessed May 4, 2016). 
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Based on such a viewpoint, this paper suggests some legal 
principles that could be applied to international disputes over 
restitution of cultural property, particularly in the global context. 
Chapter II examines the meaning and characteristics of cultural 
property. Chapter III reviews international legal instruments for 
prevention of illegal exportation of cultural property and restitution. 
Chapter IV identifies some problems posed in cases where a lawsuit 
over restitution of cultural property is filed in a domestic court, and 
suggests new judicial principles to solve the problems. Chapter V 
summarizes the conclusions. 
II. THE MEANING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
A. The Definition of Cultural Property 
At the outset, it is imperative to clarify what should be 
identified as cultural property. The classification of the property itself is 
a preliminary question to all legal challenges in the restitution of 
cultural property issues. It is difficult to establish a universal 
definition of cultural property. Broadly stated, the term cultural property 
refers to objects with artistic, ethnographic, archaeological, or 
historical value.12 Cultural property includes art, artifacts, antiques, 
historical monuments, rare collections, religious objects of 
importance to the cultural identity of a group of people, and other 
items representing significant historical, artistic, and social 
accomplishments.13 
The word property has a semantic nuance limited to tangible 
things. However, a product of the cultural activities of a human being 
or tribe contains a myriad of intangible things. Therefore, the term 
cultural heritage is sometimes used as a broad concept encompassing 
not only tangible, but also intangible cultural products.14 Also, the use 
of word property in relation to cultural property slants considerably 
                                                
12   JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES: 
CRITICAL ESSAYS ON CULTURAL PROPERTY, ART AND LAW 27 (2nd ed. 2009). 
13   Christine K. Knox, Note: They’ve lost their Marbles: 2002 Universal 
Museums’ Declaration, the Elgin Marbles and the Future of the Repatriation Movement, 29 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 315, 317-318 (2006). 
14   Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural 
Property’?, 1 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 307, 307-08 (1992). 
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toward economic value and connotes protection of the rights of the 
possessor.15 Thus, the term cultural object is sometimes used instead of 
cultural property to exclude the implication of ownership. Because 
uniform standards have not been established for the definition of 
cultural property, and each country defines the term according to its 
national laws or classification by its experts.16 The terms are 
commonly used interchangeably without strict differentiation. Since, 
in the interest of brevity, all the legal definitions of cultural property 
by each state cannot be reviewed, this section focuses on the 
definitions in major conventions. 
It is noted that the 1954 Hague Convention17 is the first time 
the term cultural property was employed in an international legal 
context.18 The 1954 Hague Convention compromised in defining 
cultural property by using an illustrative definition in the form of lists 
of cultural properties as objects of protection. Article 1 of the 1954 
Hague Convention describes the objects entitled to consideration as 
cultural properties regardless of their origin and ownership.19 By 
                                                
15   Id. at 307, 309-10.  
16   ART LAW HANDBOOK 391 (Roy S. Kaufman ed., 2000). 
17   Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May 
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague Convention]. The Convention 
has been in force since August 7, 1956 with 127 States Parties as of April 2016. 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E (last 
accessed May 4, 2016)  
18   Manlio Frigo, Cultural property v. cultural heritage: A “battle of concepts” in 
international law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367, 367 (2004).  
19  See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17, at 242. [Definition of 
cultural property].  
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term ‘cultural 
property’ shall cover, irrespective of origin or ownership:  
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of 
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; 
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of 
historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books 
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; 
as well as scientific collections and important collections of 
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined 
above; 
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or 
exhibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph 
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contrast, Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention provides a 
specific definition of cultural property.20 As regards the notion of 
cultural property, Cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism 
                                                
(a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, 
and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, 
the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a); 
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as 
defined in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as ‘centers 
containing monuments’.  
20  See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 234-35.  
For the purposes of this Convention, the term ‘cultural property’ means property 
which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by each State as 
being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science 
and which belongs to the following categories:  
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and 
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science 
and technology and military and social history, to the life of 
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artist and to events of 
national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or 
archaeological sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as 
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely 
by hand on any support and in any material (excluding 
industrial designs and manufactured articles decorated 
by hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any 
material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any 
material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and 
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, 
literary, etc.) singly or in collections; 
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic 
archives; 
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old 
musical instruments. 
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have been a source of contention,21 and international conventions 
properly consider both views. The 1954 Hague Convention defines 
cultural property as objects of protection from the standpoint of 
cultural internationalism.22 Although the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
embraces both cultural nationalism and cultural internationalism, it is 
generally perceived to have favored cultural nationalism.23 This 
understanding is supported by the preamble of this Convention: 
Cultural property constitutes one of the basic 
elements of civilization and national culture, that its 
true value can be appreciated only in relation to the 
fullest possible information regarding origin, history 
and traditional setting, and that it is incumbent upon 
every State to protect the cultural property existing 
within its territory against the dangers of theft, 
clandestine excavation, and illicit export.24 
This expression puts stresses on the national characteristics of 
cultural property. 
Article 1 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention enumerates 11 
abstract categories in its definition of cultural property and 
commissions a concrete definition of cultural property to a special 
designation within each state. That is, among the items enumerated 
from (a) to (k), only those “specifically designated” by each state are 
acknowledged as cultural properties.25 In other words, the 1970 
UNESCO Convention vests each country with broad discretion to 
determine what should be protected as cultural properties. 
Accordingly the State Parties deem which specifically designated 
items will be protected as cultural properties under their national laws 
pursuant to this Convention. In addition to the categories provided 
in Article 1, Article 4 establishes five categories of cultural 
properties.26 Article 4 protects items that are worth protecting, but 
                                                
21   John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 
AM. J. INT’L L., 831, 831-833 (1986). 
22   Id. at 833.  
23   Id. at 842.  
24   See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 232. 
25   See supra text accompanying note 20. 
26   See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, at 237-38:  
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not specifically designated as cultural property under national law per 
Article 1. 
The most controversial issue in the drafting of the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention was how to define cultural objects.27 Some 
advocated a comprehensive definition, while others sought a concrete 
and enumerative definition. Ultimately, the Convention used an 
eclectic approach.28 Particularly, the Convention adopted a 
comprehensive clause for the definition of cultural property in Article 
229 and enumerated concrete objects to be regarded as cultural 
property in the Annex.30 
                                                
The States Parties to this Convention recognize that for the 
purpose of the Convention property which belongs to the 
following categories forms part of the cultural heritage of each 
State: 
(a) Cultural property created by the individual or collective 
genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural property 
of importance to the State concerned created within the territory 
of that State by foreign nationals or stateless persons resident 
within such territory; 
(b) cultural property found within the national territory; 
(c) cultural property acquired by archaeological, ethnological or 
natural science missions, with the consent of the competent 
authorities of the country of origin of such property; 
(d) cultural property which has been the subject of a freely 
agreed exchange; 
(e) cultural property received as a gift or purchased legally with 
the consent of the competent authorities of the country of origin 
of such property. 
27 IRINI A. STAMATOUDI, CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW AND RESTITUTION: 
A COMMENTARY TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EUROPEAN UNION 
LAW 72 (2011). 
28   Id. 
29  See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at 464, which states: 
For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are those which, on religious 
or secular grounds, are of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, 
literature, art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to 
this Convention. 
30  Id. at 473. The Annex states:  
(a) Rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and 
anatomy, and objects of palaeontological interest; 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science 
and technology and military and social history, to the life of 
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B. Cultural Property as res extra commercium 
Things (goods) can be classified according to diverse 
academic criteria. One type of classification is the characterization of 
goods as res in commercio (a thing inside commerce) or res extra 
commercium (a thing outside commerce).31 Res in commercio includes 
objects that can be transacted under private laws; contrariwise res 
extra commercium objects cannot be so. Most countries have cultural 
property protection–related laws, which prohibit the transfer or 
distribution of cultural property. The origin of such provisions needs 
some explanation. 
The classification of objects into res in commercio and res extra 
commercium dates back to the Institutiones and Digesta of the Corpus iuris 
civilis issued from 529 to 534 by order of Justinian I, Eastern Roman 
Emperor.32 The Corpus iuris civilis classifies objects into those subject 
                                                
national leaders, thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of 
national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or 
archaeological sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as 
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on 
any support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and 
manufactured articles decorated by hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and incunabula, old books, documents and 
publications of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, 
literary, etc.) singly or in collections; 
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic 
archives; 
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old 
musical instruments. 
31   AMAILE WEIDNER, KULTURGÜTER ALS RES EXTRA COMMERCIUM IM 
INTERNATIONALEN SACHENRECHT 15 (2001).  
32   Id. at 15.  
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to human law (res humani iuris) and those subject to divine law (res 
divini iuris). Res divini iuris, things that build the relationship between 
god and man, were regarded as res extra commercium and could never 
be alienable in any case.33 Things among res humani iuris could also be 
regarded as res extra commercium, such as res publicae, which belongs to 
the state; res communes omnium, which refers to natural things such as 
air, sea, and rivers; and res in patrimonio Caesaris, which refers to 
Caesar’s Legacy.34 In the case of artworks, the Corpus iuris civilis 
established some as res divini iuris and others as res publicae, both of 
which were res extra commercium. The remaining artworks could be 
transacted as res private, which were personal belongings.35 The 
current classification of things and the concept of cultural property 
under the cultural property protection–related laws of each country 
thus fundamentally originated in the Corpus iuris civilis. Res sacra under 
Canon Law succeeded res extra commercium for artworks under the 
Corpus iuris civilis. Afterwards, first in Europe, Greece promulgated a 
cultural property protection law in 1834, followed by France in 1887, 
Italy in 1902, and Germany in 1955. 
Currently, most states acknowledge inalienability for certain 
types of cultural properties according to their own cultural property 
protection–related laws. Nowadays, the idea of cultural properties as 
res extra commercium means the property can be inalienable and 
imprescriptible under private law. Furthermore, the property can be 
state-owned under public law and thus be forbidden goods for export 
and import under international trade law.36 
In Korea, Article 21 of the Cultural Heritage Protection Act 
forbids the export of cultural properties. Article 54 of the same Act 
prohibits any transfer or establishment of private rights for state-
owned cultural properties. The foundation of those provisions is in 
                                                
33   Id. at 15-16.  
34   Id. at 18-19.  
35  Id. at 19-21; MARC WEBER, UNVERÄUßERLICHES KULTURGUT IM 
NATIONALEN UND INTERNATIONALEN RECHTSVERKEHR 6 (Dr. Wilfried Fieldler, 
Dr. Dr.h.c. Erik Jayme, Dr. Kurt Sieher, eds., 2002) 
36   WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 35-43. See also Kurt Siehr, Legal Aspects of 
the Mystification and Demystification of Cultural Property, 16 ART, ANTIQUITY & LAW 
173, 202-203 (2011).  
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III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS FOR RESTITUTION OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY 
A. Multilateral Conventions 
1. The 1954 Hague Convention 
World War I and World War II brought unprecedented 
plunder and destruction of cultural property to the world, which 
clarified a need to establish an international convention to protect 
cultural heritage in time of war. In 1954 at The Hague, the 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict37 and a separate optional protocol called the First 
Protocol were adopted. The 1954 Hague Convention and the 
Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, which constitute 
an integral part of it, are the basic and comprehensive international 
treaty focusing on the protection of cultural property during wartime 
or armed conflict.38 The 1954 Hague Convention is supplemented by 
the First Protocol,39 adopted with the Convention, and the Second 
Protocol,40 adopted in 1999. It is also influenced by incidents that 
took place in Yugoslavia during the 1990s. 
                                                
37   See 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 17.   
38  John Alan Cohan, An Examination of Archaeological Ethics and the 
Repatriation Movement Respecting Cultural Property (Part Two), 28 ENVT’L L. & POL’Y J. 
1, 38 (2004).  
39   Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in 
the Event of Armed Conflict 1954, The Hague 14 May 1954 [hereinafter First 
Protocol] First Protocol of has been in force since 7 August 1956 with 104 States 
Parties as of April 2016. 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15391&language=E (last 
accessed May 4, 2016).  
40   Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection 
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, The Hague, March 26, 1999 
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The major content of the 1954 Hague Convention about the 
restitution of cultural property is contained in the First Protocol. 
Each signatory state agrees to prevent the exportation of cultural 
property from any territory it occupies during an armed conflict41; to 
take into its custody cultural property imported into its territory 
either directly or indirectly from any occupied territory42; and to 
return, at the close of hostilities, to the competent authorities of the 
territory previously occupied, cultural property in its territory.43 
Cultural property taken from the territory of a signatory state and 
deposited by it in the territory of another signatory state for the 
purpose of protecting such property against the dangers of an armed 
conflict shall be returned by the latter at the end of hostilities to the 
competent authorities of the territory from which it came.44 
2. The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
Given the 1954 Hague Convention was promulgated on the 
premise of a special situation, the protection of cultural property in 
the event of armed conflict, international society started debating the 
need to establish a more comprehensive international instrument 
applicable for a broader protection of cultural property. 
Immediately after World War I, the League of Nations 
debated the matter of plunder of cultural property.45 UNESCO 
prepared a draft convention about the restitution of artistic, 
historical, or scientific objects illegally transferred in cooperation with 
the Office International des Musées (OIM).46 However, this attempt failed 
to advance further because of the outbreak of World War II in 1939, 
and afterward, UNESCO could not help concentrating on the 1954 
                                                
[hereinafter Second Protocol]. The Second Protocol has been in force since 27 
April 1972 with 68 State Parties as of April 2016. 
http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=15207&language=E (last 
accessed May 4, 2016). 
41   First Protocol, supra note 39, at Part I.  
42   Id. at Part I.2. 
43   Id. at Part I.3. 
44   Id. at Part II.5.   
45  PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, CULTURAL HERITAGE 
CONVENTIONS AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 64 (2011).  
46  PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, COMMENTARY ON THE 1970 UNESCO 
CONVENTION 3 (2nd ed. 2007).  
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Hague Convention.47 As newly independent and East European 
countries with particular interest in the restitution of cultural property 
increasingly participated in that Convention, UNESCO came to face 
new challenges. In particular, Mexico and Peru posed problems of 
unlawful trade in cultural property during the 11th General 
Conference of UNESCO in 1960, and it became clear that the First 
Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention alone could not deal with 
these problems comprehensively.48 Accordingly, UNESCO adopted 
the Recommendation on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property in 1964 as a 
preliminary step.49 A convention draft based on that 
Recommendation was circulated to collect the opinions of member 
states in 1968, and the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Export, Import and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property was adopted on November 14, 1970 by the General 
Conference of UNESCO at its 16th session. This is called the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, and it established an international normative 
framework to prevent the illicit traffic of cultural property during 
peacetime.50 
This Convention, which contains a preamble and 26 articles, 
protects cultural property from illicit trade by means of 
administrative enforcement and international cooperation, rather 
than by private law. The major contents of this Convention are as 
follows: (a) the Convention acknowledges that the import, export, or 
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the 
provisions adopted under this Convention is illicit51; (b) member 
states undertake to set up national services and establish a list of 
important public and private cultural properties to be protected52; (c) 
they undertake to introduce an appropriate certificate for the export 
of cultural property53; (d) they agree to take the necessary measures 
                                                
47   O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 45 at 64. 
48   O’KEEFE, supra note 46 at 5. 
49   Id. 
50   Jennifer N. Lehmen, The Continued Struggle with Stolen Cultural Property: 
The Hague Convention, The UNESCO Convention, and The UNIDROIT Draft Convention, 
14 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 527, 538 (1997). 
51   1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. 
52   Id. at art. 5. 
53   Id. at art. 6.  
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against the acquisition or import of illegally removed cultural 
property54; (e) they undertake to impose penalties or administrative 
sanctions on any person involved in the illicit import or export of 
cultural property55; (f) they undertake to participate in a concerted 
international effort to determine and carry out the necessary concrete 
measures under the Convention56, and (g) the Convention regards the 
export and transfer of ownership of cultural property under 
compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a 
country by a foreign power as illicit.57 
3. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
Problems with the 1970 UNESCO Convention underlay the 
emergence of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.58 First, the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was not self-executing, and thus the signatory 
states had to adopt domestic legislation to implement it.59 In other 
words, unless the signatory states to the UNESCO Convention 
legislate domestic laws, the Convention does not become effective to 
the signatory states directly. Second, with respect to the 
implementation of the Convention, the signatory states can adjust the 
provisions or measures of the Convention pursuant to their domestic 
laws or regulations. Thus, the contents or level of scrutiny of the 
Convention adopted by each signatory state lack uniformity. This 
becomes an impediment to achieving purposes of the Convention.60 
Third, Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention defines cultural property 
only as cultural properties specifically designated by each member 
state, leaving undiscovered or unexcavated cultural property 
                                                
54   Id. at art. 7. 
55   Id. at art. 8 
56   Id. at art. 9.  
57   Id. at art. 11. 
58   Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does 
The UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the 
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L., 469, 490-91 (1994); Carol A. 
Roehrenbeck, Repatriation of Cultural Property-Who Owns the Past? An Introduction to 
Approaches and to Selected Statutory Instruments, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO 185, 196 
(2010). 
59 ANDREA F. G. RASCHÈR, KULTURGÜTERTRANSFER UND 
GLOBALISIERUNG 53 (2000). 
60   Id. at 61.  
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unprotected.61Fourth, because the UNESCO Convention operated 
mainly in terms of public law, it had limitations to stipulating clear 
regulations in terms of private law, such as good faith acquisition.62 
To solve those problems, UNESCO requested the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) to 
complement the regulations of private laws for a substantial 
implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.63 Accordingly, a 
preliminary draft was prepared by an expert study group, mainly 
written by Austrian professor Gerte Reichelt. The Diplomatic 
Conference to adopt the draft convention was held in Rome under 
the auspices of the Italian government in June 1995, and the current 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention64 was adopted through the voting of 
member states on July 24, 1995. The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention 
was intended to solve the problems inherent in the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, to embody the regulations of the UNESCO 
Convention, and to establish uniform rules among states that would 
facilitate the effective restitution of unlawfully possessed cultural 
properties in terms of private law. 
The adoption of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention does not 
reduce the meaning or function of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. 
Whereas the UNESCO Convention aimed to “prohibit” and 
“prevent” the export, import, and transfer of ownership of stolen or 
illegally exported cultural properties, the UNIDROIT Convention 
focuses on the “restitution” or “return” of stolen or illegally exported 
cultural properties. So, the directing points of these two conventions 
differ. Besides, the UNESCO Convention authorizes the contracting 
“state” to take mainly “administrative” measures to prevent the 
export and import of unlawful cultural properties, whereas the 
UNIDROIT Convention gives the “owner” or “state” “judicial” 
                                                
61  Ian M. Goldrich, Balancing the Need for Repatriation of Illegally Removed 
Cultural Property with the Interests of Bona Fide Purchasers: Applying the UNIDROIT 
Convention to the Case of the Gold Phiale, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 118, 137-138 (1999); 
Kathleen Anderson, The International Theft and Illegal Export of Cultural Property, 8 
NEW ENG. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 421 (2002).  
62   RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.  
63  Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT: A Partnership Against 
Trafficking in Cultural Objects, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 59, 61 (1996).  
64   See 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11.  
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powers to demand restitution or the return of cultural properties. In 
this sense, the two Conventions have complementary goals.65 
The features of the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are 
summarized as follows: First, the UNIDROIT Convention enables 
claimants to demand the restitution of unregistered cultural 
properties or privately owned cultural properties, unlike the 
UNESCO Convention.66 Second, the UNIDROIT Convention does 
not allow the good faith acquisition of stolen or illegally exported 
cultural properties. Instead, such cultural properties should be 
compulsorily returned.67 Third, it stipulates that a fair and reasonable 
compensation should be paid to an acquirer in good faith instead of 
unconditional restitution.68 Forth, the Convention imposes limitation 
periods within which claimants must demand the return or restitution 
of cultural property.69 
B. Bilateral Agreements 
1. Overview 
Because multilateral conventions must contain common 
concerns among all stakeholder countries, agreeing on concrete 
content is difficult. In contrast, bilateral agreements can express the 
interests of both parties; therefore, bilateral agreements are more 
effective than a multilateral convention in attaining specific goals. In 
cases where the return of a specific cultural property emerges as an 
issue between country A and country B, the best way to solve the 
problem is generally to conclude a bilateral agreement on the return 
of the cultural property in dispute. For instance, Korea recovered the 
Oegyujanggak Uigwe, stored previously in the BnF, through an 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Restitution of the Oegyujanggak 
Uigwe between France and Korea in 2011.70 That same year, Korea 
recovered another Uigwe of the Joseon Dynasty, which had been held 
                                                
65  STAMATOUDI, supra note 27, at 67.   
66   1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 3, 5.   
67   Id. 
68   Id. at art. 4, 6. 
69   Id. at art. 3, 5. 
70   See supra notes 1-3. 
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in the Kunaicho of Japan, by an Agreement on the Return of 
Historical Archives between Japan and Korea. 
Bilateral agreements not only target the restitution of specific 
cultural property, but can also comprehensively handle overall 
matters related to the restitution of cultural property between two 
countries. There are many agreements which exemplify what can be 
covered by a bilateral agreement. In the Belgo-Zairian Cultural 
Agreement, concluded in 1970, Belgium agreed to return to Zaire71 all 
the ethnological and artistic cultural properties acquired during the 
colonial period.72 The Treaty on the Return of Stolen Cultural 
Property, established in 1970 between the U.S. and Mexico, 
concluded in 197073 stipulates that, e.g., when the Mexican 
government requests the U.S. government to return stolen cultural 
property, the U.S. government shall recover and return it to the 
Mexican government.74 Similarly, in 1997 the U.S. and Canada 
concluded an agreement prohibiting the import and export of objects 
of archaeological and ethnological value75 in accordance with the 
UNESCO Convention. 
Bilateral agreements are effective in preventing illicit trade of 
cultural property between neighboring states. Because of the wide 
perception that multilateral conventions have little effect on the 
restitution of cultural property, the adoption of bilateral agreements 
is increasing. 
                                                
71   Known as “Democratic Republic of the Congo” since 1997. 
72  Huguette van Geluwe, Belgium’s Contribution to the Zairian Cultural 
Heritage, 31 MUSEUM 32, 35 (1979); Treaty of Cooperation Between the United 
States of American and the United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and 
Return of stolen Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Propertties, July 17, 1970, 
22 U.S.T. 494, T.I.A.S. No. 7088. 
  73  Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the 
United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen 
Archaeological, Historical and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 494, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7088. 
74   Regarding the meaning of this Treaty, see Michael S. Blass, Legal 
Restrictions on American Access to Foreign Cultural Property, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 
1193-1194 (1978). 
75   Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of the Unites States Concerning the Imposition of Import Restrictions on Certain 
Categories of Archeological and Ethnological Material, April 10, 1997, CA1 EA 
97T08 EXF. 
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2. Exkurs: Agreement on Cultural Property Between the Republic 
of Korea and Japan 
A typical example of a bilateral agreement on the restitution 
of cultural property signed by Korea is the Agreement on the Art Objects 
and Cultural Co-operation between Japan and the Republic of Korea76 in 1965. 
After Korea’s emancipation from Japanese colonization in 1945, 
Korea and Japan held seven rounds of bilateral talks from 1951 to 
1965, culminating in the Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the 
Republic of Korea,77 which stipulated normalization of their relations.78 
Based on that Treaty, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between 
Korea and Japan, which has a preamble, 4 articles of text, and an 
annex, was also signed. 
Among the contents of this Agreement, the significant article 
related to the restitution of cultural property is Article 2: “The 
Government of Japan shall, in accordance with the procedure to be 
agreed upon between the two Governments, turn over to the 
Government of the Republic of Korea the art objects enumerated in 
the Annex within six months after the entry into force of the present 
Agreement.”79 Article 2 mentions the subject, object, procedure, and 
time of the turnover of cultural property.80 
                                                
76   Agreement on the Art Objects and Cultural Co-operation between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, June 22, 1965[hereinafter Agreement on 
Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan], translated in “The World and 
Japan” Database Project at the University of Tokyo, available at 
http://www.ioc.u-
tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPKR/19650622.TNE.html, 
(last visited May. 4, 2016). 
77   Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
June 22, 1965, translated in “The World and Japan” Database Project at the 
University of Tokyo, available at 
http://www.ioc.utokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19650622.T1E.html, 
(last visited May. 4, 2016).  
78   See Geoffrey R. Scott, Spoliation, Cultural property, and Japan, 29 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 803, 854-57 (2008) (discussing the background and proceeding of this 
Treaty). 
79   Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan, supra 
note 76. 
80   Id. 
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The subject of the turnover is the Japanese government, and 
the subject of the takeover is the Korean government. The objects of 
transfer are cultural properties enumerated in the Annex. The Annex 
specifies a list of cultural properties totaling 1,432 pieces, including: 
ceramic ware, archaeological relics, stone-made art objects, books, 
and articles related to the postal service and telecommunications. The 
procedure of turnover complies with a mutual agreement between 
Korea and Japan.81 The time of turnover is stipulated as within six 
months of the entry into force of the Agreement. 
However, this Agreement has the following problems: First, 
because the cultural properties exported to Japan during the colonial 
period were illegally exported, the action to be taken should be 
expressed as ‘recovery (回收)’ or ‘restitution (返還),’ but it is instead 
neutrally expressed as ‘turnover (引き渡).’ This fails to make clear 
the illicitness of the original export of the cultural property to Japan. 
Second, this Agreement limits the cultural properties for turnover to 
the 1,432 pieces of cultural property enumerated in the Annex. 
After the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea 
and Japan was signed in 1965, the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention were concluded. There is a need 
to review the correspondence between the Agreement on Cultural 
Property Between Korea and Japan and the two Conventions. 
Although both Korea and Japan signed the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, neither of them signed the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention. I here review the relationships among those three 
treaties as if both Korea and Japan had signed the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention. 
The Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and 
Japan is a bilateral agreement, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are multilateral conventions. 
Therefore, the Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and 
Japan is special law (lex specialis), and the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are general law (lex generalis). 
According to the principle of Lex specialis derogat legi generali,82 the 
                                                
81   Id. at art 2.  
82   Latin maxim meaning “Special law repeals general laws.”  
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Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan should be 
applied over both Conventions. In terms of enforcement date, the 
Agreement on Cultural Property Between Korea and Japan 
corresponds to prior law, and the 1970 UNESCO Convention and 
the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention correspond to posterior law. 
Thus, according to the principle that Lex posterior derogat legi priori,83 
the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention should be applied over the Agreement. Although those 
ideas seem contradictory, they are actually not. If only the cultural 
properties in the Annex to the Agreement on Cultural Property 
Between Korea and Japan are targeted, this Agreement will take 
precedence as lex specialis. However, if cultural properties illegally 
exported to Japan other than those enumerated in the Annex are 
included, then the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention take precedence as lex posterior. 
IV. NEW JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES 
A. International Conventions, National Laws and Domestic Courts 
As of 2015, 129 states have signed the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, and only 37 states have signed the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.84 The difference between those two numbers is caused 
by a considerable difference in normative aspect rather than the gap 
between the enforcement dates of these two conventions. 
Under the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the subjects of its 
rights and obligations are the governments of signatory states, which 
should meet its requirements. In contrast, under the 1995 
UNIDROIT Convention, not only signatory states, but also 
organizations and individuals, obtain rights or obligations for 
restitution of cultural properties. In other words, the 1970 UNESCO 
Convention has the nature of public and administrative law85, 
whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention has the nature of private 
law centered on the restitution relationship between the current 
                                                
83   Latin maxim meaning “Posterior law abrogates prior laws.” 
84   See supra notes 10 and 11.  
85   RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 65.  
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possessor and original owner.86 In determining whether cultural 
property is illicitly acquired or not, the 1970 UNESCO Convention 
stipulates that the national laws of contracting states should be 
applied,87 whereas the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention directly 
specifies ‘theft’ and ‘illicit export’ as the object of regulation.88 The 
two conventions also show a great difference in the binding force of 
their provisions. Since the 1970 UNESCO Convention is not self-
executing, it secures no executive power against non-implementation. 
On the contrary, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is self-executing 
and a competent court in a signatory state can directly apply the 
Convention’s provisions as governing law.89 
This difference works as an important factor when each state 
decides to join the convention. The 1970 UNESCO Convention 
concnerns mainly the intent of signatory states’ administrative actions 
for protecting cultural property, and so it is not difficult to 
implement. Besides, because the Convention is not self-executing, 
signatory states do not have to worry about normative binding power 
or feel a great burden in signing this Convention. However, since the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention has direct effects on not only the 
governments of signatory states, but also common individuals, it can 
collide with domestic legal systems such as civil law. Thus, states have 
shown reluctance to sign the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention until the 
relations between its provisions and those of national laws have been 
properly established.90 Thus, notwithstanding the international 
convention to prevent illicit traffic in cultural property, national laws 
still play an important role in tackling disputes over the restitution of 
cultural property. 
                                                
86   Zsuzsanna Veres, The Fight Against Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property: 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 91, 100 (2014).  
87   1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. See PATRICK J. 
O’KEEFE, supra note 46, at 41 (providing interpretation of this Article). 
88 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, art. 2, 3, and 5.   
89 RASCHÈR, supra note 59, at 70; see also BETTINA THORN, 
INTERNATIONALER KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZ NACH DER UNIDROIT-
KONVENTION 97 (2005). 
90  Michael L. Durta, Sir, How Much is that Ming Vase in the Window?: 
Protecting Cultural Relics in the People’s Republic of China, 5 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & 
POL’Y J. 62, 76-77 (2004).   
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Suppose a cultural property owned by a private museum in 
country A has been illegally exported to country B. If both country A 
and country B are signatory states to the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention, the original owner of country A can file a lawsuit in a 
court in country B to demand the restitution of cultural property 
against the current possessor. In this case, the court decides on the 
restitution of the cultural property based on the 1995 UNIDROIT 
Convention.91 If neither country A nor country B is a signatory to the 
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, a court would decide on the 
restitution of the cultural property according to domestic norms. In 
that case, the civil law and cultural property protection law of the 
country concerned are most central to domestic norms. Civil law and 
cultural property protection law differ among countries. For instance, 
under the Korean legal system, Korean civil law and cultural property 
protection law are written in a code. Under the Anglo-American legal 
system, civil law consists primarily of judicial precedent. The 
definition of cultural property also varies by country, as do the 
contents or scope of laws regulating cultural property. 
The principles of trial are not currently specifically established 
to handle disputes about the restitution of cultural property. Thus, 
each country’s court is likely to handle a lawsuit filed for the 
restitution of cultural property in the same way it handles a dispute 
over the restitution of other objects. However, as reviewed above, 
cultural property is res extra commercium,92 and thus it is not desirable to 
handle lawsuits about cultural property in that way. Considering the 
peculiarities of cultural properties, courts should apply special legal 
doctrines to a case of restitution of a cultural property. For a given 
cultural property, a new principle should apply in choosing the 
governing law relevant to the dispute, and the burden of proof 
should shift to the defendant. 
B. New Principle for Choice of Governing Law 
When a cultural property has been exported from a country 
and situated in the territory of another country, and a person claiming 
                                                
91   To apply the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention to this case, a cultural 
property had to be stolen or exported after both states became parties to the 
Convention. 1995 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, at art. 10.  
92   See supra notes 31-36. 
2016 Song 4:2 
741 
ownership of the cultural property has filed a lawsuit in a court, the 
court must choose which state’s law  governs.93 The substantial legal 
issues in the ownership of an exported cultural property are 
summarized as follows: First, if a cultural property was illegally 
exported and distributed, and a third party has acquired the cultural 
property without perceiving this inherent illegality, the court must 
decide whether to recognize good faith acquisition for the third party. 
Second, in cases where a third party has acquired the property outside 
a transaction process and fails to meet the requirements for good 
faith acquisition, the court must decide whether to recognize the 
ownership based on the acquisitive prescription and whether the 
right to demand restitution is extinguished according to the extinctive 
prescription. 
Representatively, the case of Winkworth vs. Christie, Mason & 
Woods Ltd.94 was a case of whether to recognize good faith 
acquisition. The case of Koerfer vs. Goldschmidt95 was a case of whether 
acquisitive prescription was completed. The case of Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Jerusalem vs. Christie’s, Inc.96 was a case of whether or not 
the extinctive prescription was completed. The requirements and 
exercise processes for good faith acquisition, acquisitive prescription, 
and extinctive prescription vary by country. So, in legal relationships 
with foreign elements, which country’s law will be chosen as the 
governing law is a decisive factor affecting lawsuit results. 
The courts where the above-mentioned lawsuits were filed 
chose the governing law according to the principle of lex rei sitae. 
More specifically, those case were decided according to the laws of 
the countries where the cultural properties were situated at the time a 
juristic act to acquire it was performed or a juristic fact to create its 
legal ownership was completed. When a court decides on a right 
about an object, especially a movable object, it is not inherently 
wrong to choose, as a governing law, the local law of the country 
                                                
93   MICHAEL ANTON, INTERNATIONALES KULTURGÜTERPRIVAT- UND 
ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT 426 (2010). 
94   Winkworth v. Christie, Manson & Woods Ltd., 1 All E.R. 1121 (1980).  
95   Koerfer gegen Goldschmidt, BGE 94 II 297 (Swiss Federal Court, Dec. 13, 
1968).  
96   Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., 1999 WL 
673347 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
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where the act of altering a right is performed or a fact of creating a 
right is completed. In fact, that choice is a general principle of private 
international law.97 Also, if a court decides the dispute according to 
the principle of lex rei sitae, the local law of that time is applied to a 
transaction or acquisition performed within the territory where the 
object is situated. Another result isthat, insofar as the court of a third 
country respects the sovereignty of the country where the object is 
situated, the court observes international comity.98 
Although the principle of lex rei sitae is generalized in that 
way, its application to cultural properties as if they were ordinary 
objects can hardly deflect criticism for mechanically applying the law 
without any thought of the nature of cultural properties. Suppose 
that a cultural property owned by person   of country A was stolen 
and exported to country B and there purchased at an antique shop by 
person  , who does not know how it came to the shop. If person   
filed a lawsuit in a court of country B against person   demanding 
the restitution of the property, the court in country B should decide 
which country’s law is governing. In this case, if the court in country 
B chooses according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the law of country 
B where the object is currently situated will become the governing 
law. If country B’s law recognizes good faith acquisition, person   
will be able to maintain ownership through good faith acquisition. 
Furthermore, suppose that person   now sells this object to 
person   in country C, and person   currently has possession. If 
person   has filed a lawsuit in a court of country C against person   
demanding the restitution of the property, the court of country C 
must also decide which country’s law is governing. This time, if, 
according to the principle of lex rei sitae, the court of country C 
decides whether or not person   has properly acquired ownership of 
the object, it will judge whether or not person   meets the 
requirements of good faith acquisition. In that case, the governing 
law would be the law of country B where the object was situated 
when person  ’s good faith acquisition was completed. Also, if the 
court of country C judges that person   fails to meet the 
                                                
97   Derek Fincham, How Adopting the Lex Originis Rule Can Impede the Flow 
of Illicit Cultural Property, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 111, 115 (2008).  
98   Id. at 115.  
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requirements of good faith acquisition but person   is likely to meet 
them, it can choose and apply, as a governing law, the law of country 
C where the object was situated when person  ’s good faith 
acquisition was completed. 
That is the mechanism for the choice of a governing law 
according to the principle of lex rei sitae currently applied. However, it 
can be justified only on the condition that the cultural property in 
question is viewed as an object of transaction. In other words, that 
procedure is only justifiable if the features of res extra commercium are 
completely excluded from the cultural property, and it is considered a 
normal object. However, cultural property is an object sui generis that 
has inalienability as part of its basic nature; therefore, it is 
inappropriate to treat cultural properties like normal objects. 
Moreover, the legal regulations protecting cultural properties vary by 
country. Suppose that a cultural property is illegally exported from 
country A to country B. If country A’s law prohibits the distribution 
or good faith acquisition of a cultural property, but country B’s law 
recognizes good faith acquisition, the ownership of the cultural 
property can be easily changed or laundered in country B by illegally 
exporting the cultural property from country A to country B and 
there involving an innocent third party for completion of good faith 
acquisition. Afterwards, the illegal cultural property can be legally 
distributed. In this hypothetical, country A’s law for cultural property 
protection becomes meaningless. Thus, the principle of lex rei sitae is 
likely to be abused as means of ownership laundering for cultural 
properties, which require a principle of governing law different from 
that of normal objects. 
To this end, the principle of lex originis has been suggested as 
an alternative.99 In cases where the principle of lex originis is adopted 
as a governing law applicable to legal disputes about cultural 
properties, the problem becomes deciding what should be viewed as 
                                                
99   German scholar Prof. Erik Jayme has already proposed connecting 
the factor “Heimatrecht” (law of home-country) and the developed lex orignis 
rule in international disputes over cultural property. Erik Jayme, Internationales 
Kulturgüterscchutz: Lex originis oder lex rei sitae – Tagung in Heidelberg, IPRAX 1990 at 
347; see also Erik Jayme, Neue Anknüpfungsmaximen für den Kulturgüterschutz im 
internationalen Privatrecht, in DOLZER ET AL., RECHTSFRAGEN DES 
ITERNATIONALEN KULTURGÜTERSCHUTZES 5 (1994).  
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the ‘origin’ of a cultural property to determine the ‘connecting 
factors.’ Because cultural properties are historical products unlike 
other objects, it is difficult to uniformly define their origin, which 
requires consideration of multiple criteria,100 such as: religious value, 
national identity, place where the cultural property was produced, 
place where the cultural property is situated, place where the cultural 
property was installed, place where the cultural property was found, 
place where the cultural property was inherited, and place where the 
cultural property was designated as res extra commercium. 
In summation, a court having jurisdiction over cultural 
property disputes should judge what connecting factors should be 
established and which country’s law should be adopted as a 
governing law. In this regard, two values can conflict: transaction 
safety and cultural property protection. In other words, the court 
must decide whether to place a high value on protecting a good faith 
purchaser of a cultural property or to privilege the original owner of a 
cultural property. A court that emphasizes the former will generally 
determine governing law according to the conventional principle of 
lex rei sitae, whereas a court that regards the latter as more important 
will adopt the alternative principle of lex originis as governing law. In 
short, the principle of lex rei sitae is generally appropriate as governing 
law for normal objects, whereas the principle of lex originis is 
appropriate for cultural property.101 
C. Shifting the Burden of Proof 
Who bears the burden of proof in a civil suit greatly affects 
the results. In the period of Roman law, the general principal for the 
burden of proof was not stably established. However the principle 
“Necessitas probandi incumbit ei qui agit”102 was in common use. 
Afterwards, with the development of the law of evidence, a 
contemporary principle of the burden of proof was established by 
                                                
100   WEIDNER, supra note 31, at 194-201; ANTON, supra note 93, at 851-
91.  
101   Fincham, supra note 97, at 146; Symeon C. Symeonides, A Choice-of-
Law Rule for Conflicts Involving Stolen Cultural Property, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
1177 (2005). 
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German scholar Leo Rosenberg: Each party to proceedings must 
assert and prove the existence of the conditions for application of the 
rule on which s/he relies.103 According to this principle, if an object 
has been transferred from its owner to another person without legal 
ground and is currently kept by the other person, the owner should 
prove ownership of the object. 
But what if the object is a cultural property? Current civil 
procedure laws have no specific regulations in that regard. If the 
principle of the burden of proof is equally applied to a cultural 
property, the person who asserts ownership of the cultural property 
currently possessed by another person must prove ownership of the 
object and that the other person possesses it illegally. However, that 
principle is inappropriate to cultural properties because they have 
basically the nature of inalienability, unlike normal objects. If a 
cultural property designated as res extra commercium by a national law is 
transferred to other place, it does not exist under normal conditions. 
So in that case, the person who currently possesses the cultural 
property should be required to prove he has duly acquired it. If he 
fails to prove his legitimacy in possessing the cultural property, the 
property should be returned to the original owner. 
It could cause confusion to the current property system to 
shift the burden of proof for all cultural properties in restitution 
lawsuits. Accordingly, the burden of proof should be shifted only for 
cultural properties that meet certain requirements. Such cultural 
properties can be reviewed in terms of two aspects. The first is 
category, such as cultural properties that represent royal authority and 
religious cultural properties that belonged to churches or temples. It 
should be difficult to assume that a state or churches or temples sold 
or donated such cultural properties to other persons. An individual 
person who possesses those kinds of cultural property should be 
required prove that s/he acquired it legitimately. The second aspect 
concerns the time of acquisition. If a cultural property was exported 
without a legitimate source of right in a time of war or colonization, 
it cannot be easily accepted that the current possessor of the cultural 
                                                
103   “Jede Partei hat die Voraussetzungen der ihr günstigen Norm (= 
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property acquired it legitimately. Therefore, in that case, the current 
possessor should be required to prove that s/he acquired it 
legitimately. However, it is necessary to set a time limit for that shift 
in the burden of proof to recent wars or colonial periods with 
reasonable current influence. 
As a possible example for shifting the burden of proof, 
consider a special exhibition called the Ogura104 collection in the 
Tokyo National Museum, Japan. It contains a helmet and armor 
worn by King Gojong, who reigned when Japan annexed Korea. 
That armor and helmet are those King Gojong put on in war and are 
the symbols of the supreme commander. Thus, they cannot have 
been transferred or donated to another person. They were quite likely 
to have been exported during the Japanese colonial period, and it is 
unlikely that they were sold or donated to Ogura. Thus, if the Korean 
government were to demand that the Tokyo Museum return them, 
the Tokyo Museum, as current possessor of the cultural properties, 
should be required prove that it acquired them legitimately. 
V. CONCLUSION 
These days, each state tries to protect its cultural properties 
and recover illicitly exported cultural properties. There is controversy 
over whether cultural properties are the exclusive property of each 
country (cultural nationalism) or the common heritage of humanity 
(cultural internationalism). However, it is obvious illicit trafficking of 
cultural properties should be prohibited and illicitly exported cultural 
properties should be returned to their country of origin. The 1970 
UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention are 
based on that perception. These international conventions are 
important because they are international standards to prevent the 
illicit export of cultural properties and enable the restitution of illicitly 
exported cultural properties. However, because the 1970 UNESCO 
                                                
104   Ogura Dakenoske (小倉 武之助: 1870–1964) was a Japanese 
businessman who collected a huge number of Korean cultural properties during 
the Japanese colonial era in Korea. He donated his collected Korean cultural 
properties to the Tokyo National Museum. Park Soo-mee, Legacy Lost: Korea’s 
Missing Treasures, KOREA JOONGANG DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008, 
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Convention focused on administrative measures of the government 
to “prevent” the illicit trafficking of cultural properties and lacks self-
executing power, it is limited to being a basic norm for the restitution 
of illicitly exported cultural properties. To reinforce those weak 
points, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention was promulgated, but 
counties worried about recession in the art market are reluctant to 
sign. These two Conventions cannot be applied to restitution of 
cultural properties exported illicitly to other countries before signing 
the Convention because neither of them has retroactive effects. 
Therefore, countries involved in disputes over the restitution of 
cultural properties tend to solve them by concluding bilateral 
conventions. The 1965 Agreement on Cultural Property Between 
Korea and Japan has a significant meaning in that it was a 
comprehensive attempt made between Korea and Japan to handle 
the restitution of cultural properties exported during the Japanese 
colonial period. 
Disputes over restitution of cultural properties that are not 
subject to multilateral or bilateral conventions can be solved through 
the decision of a court. However, no specific legal regulation under 
domestic laws is applicable to disputes over restitution of cultural 
properties, which means that legal principles applied to normal 
objects have been applied to disputes over cultural properties. 
However, cultural properties are basically res extra commercium, a 
concept that originated in Roman law and is acknowledged in each 
country’s cultural property protection law. Disputes over cultural 
properties require application of legal principles different from those 
used for normal objects. In other words, it is desirable for courts to 
apply the principle of lex originis instead of lex rei sitae in choosing 
governing law.105 Furthermore, when proving the ownership of a 
cultural property, it is also desirable to make a defendant prove 
legitimate acquisition of cultural properties within certain categories. 
Applying that suggestion to lawsuits presents challenges.106 
                                                
105   It is remarkable that Belgium adopted in the Codification of Private 
International Law of July 27, 2004, a modified lex originis rule regarding recovery 
of the illegally removed cultural patrimony. See Fincham, supra note 97 at 147.  
106   For example, these two problems might actually be difficult to solve: 
a concrete criterion for deciding on the country of origin of a cultural property 
and a concrete criterion to determine which cultural property can be accepted 
for shifting the burden of proof.  
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Nevertheless, if a court acknowledges the peculiarity of cultural 
properties and adopts that suggestion, international disputes over the 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Horace (65-8 B.C.), the Roman lyric poet, in Odes says: “The 
sea brought contact with strangers who could disrupt domestic life by 
exposing citizens to the bad manners and corrupt morals of 
barbarians.”1 
The Great Financial Crisis, which officially started in 
December of 2007, affected virtually all countries around the globe.2 
The collapse in international trade due to the Financial Crisis was 
“exceptional by historical standards.”3 There are many arguments 
about what caused or contributed to the Financial Crisis. Certainly it 
is difficult to point to one or several causes in a complex world of 
voluminous interconnected economic transactions. If the task is to 
avoid a financial crisis, one will inevitably be required to consider the 
past causes. However, if one accepts that financial crises are 
inevitable because of many causes, then the task becomes how to 
contain a potential future crisis—instead of trying to avoid it. If one 
of the aspirations and objectives for promoting liberalized 
international trade is world peace—countries depending on each 
other through trade are less likely to be involved in direct conflicts—
such dependency has its downside when one economic sector of one 
country collapses and pulls various world economies into a 
downward-spiral. It is no secret that a closed, isolated economy 
would be immune to international economic crises, but that economy 
will forgo all of the benefits of liberalized trade during times of 
prosperity. 
                                                
1 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, AGAINST THE TIDE 12 (1996).  
2 BUSINES CYCLE DATING COMMITTEE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF 
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, DETERMINATION OF DECEMBER 2007 PEAK IN 
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 2 (2008). 
3 Andrei A. Levchenko, Logan T. Lewis & Linda L. Tesar, Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, The Collapse of International Trade During the 2008-2009 Crisis 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16006, 2010) (“Relative to 
economic activity, the drop in trade is an order of magnitude larger than what was 
observed in the previous postwar recessions, with the exception of 2001. The 
collapse appears to be broad-based across trading partners: trade with virtually all 
parts of the world fell by double digits.”). 
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Although the days of Horace are long gone and trade may no 
longer expose citizens to “bad manners and corrupt morals,” trade in 
financial services may expose them to financial risks. The question 
then becomes how a country would reap the benefits of liberalized 
international trade and protect its citizens from the risk of potential 
financial crises. While countries may attempt reducing toxic risk 
exposure in the area of financial services, such attempts may violate 
various World Trade Organization (“WTO”) commitments. 
However, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”) 
provides an avenue for countries to claim an exception under the 
prudential carve-out clause. This exception has been long subject to 
controversy ever since the negotiations on the text began, because 
negotiators attempted to strike the right balance between free trade 
and the national right to regulate—an issue that remains unresolved. 
Part II of this Article will introduce the historical 
development of the GATS to show the complexity of the 
negotiations. 
Part III will introduce the GATS structure and summarize 
some of its parts to give relevant general background information. 
Part II will point out some of the other GATS exceptions because 
the reasoning for those exceptions will be useful for limiting the 
scope of the prudential carve-out clause, as discussed in Part V. 
Part IV will introduce the prudential carve-out clause and 
summarize a recent WTO panel report that interpreted parts of the 
clause for the first time, adopting a three-prong legal standard. One 
of the prongs of the legal standard is a requirement that measures 
must be “prudential,” meaning “preventative” or “precautionary,” as 
interpreted by the panel. 
Part V will analyze the panel report and argue that panel’s 
interpretation of “prudential” is overly broad in some sense and 
could lead to absurd regulations. To do so, Part V will follow 
previous WTO Appellate Body decisions which utilized treaty 
interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention. This Part will propose 
that “prudential” should have some determination of reasonableness 
which the panel report did not require. Further, Part V will argue that 
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the broad scope of the prudential carve-out clause is narrowed by the 
existence of other exceptions in the GATS. 
Part VI will conclude. 
II. GATS HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
The original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”) was drafted in the Second World War’s aftermath by 
delegates of many countries during 1946-47 and signed on 30 
October 1947.4 For almost a half-century since GATT entered into 
force in 1948, it did not get much attention from international 
diplomats and lawyers, except for international trade enthusiasts, 
because the main focus of the times was the Cold War.5 However, 
GATT eventually led to the birth of the World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”) in 1995.6 The Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO Agreement”) contains four Annexes, the first 
item in the Annexes (Annex 1A) is “GATT 1947”—now known as 
“GATT 1994.”7 GATT essentially governs trade in goods,8 while the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B to the WTO 
Agreement, deals with services.9 While GATT existed for over a half-
century, GATS is relatively a new agreement. Services were not 
always conceived as being internationally tradeable. This conceptual 
shift about services occurred in the early 1970s and mid-1980s—
from services as non-tradeable to services as tradeable.10  Business 
pressure was one variable which caused the conceptual change 
among countries towards the idea that services could be traded 
internationally by private enterprises.11 For example, the American 
                                                
4 RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 5-7 (3d ed. 2007). 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Id. at 8. 
7 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 
8 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-
11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
9 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter GATS].  
10  BHALA, supra note 4, at 1541-42. 
11  Id. at 1542. 
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financial service sector (e.g., American Insurance Group (AIG), 
American Express, Bank of America, Citibank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. 
Morgan, and Merrill Lynch) saw expansion opportunities to countries 
with emerging middle classes and began lobbying for removal of 
trade barriers with respect to services.12 
GATS was a product of complex 1986-93 Uruguay Round of 
negotiations and was not finalized until 1994.13 GATS negotiations 
were described as “sector-by-sector—tortuous, inch-by-inch, as it 
were.”14  One factor contributing to the difficulties encountered 
during negotiations was that because of the way services are traded, 
GATS trade liberalization provisions had to extend further into post-
border measures when compared to GATT provisions.15 Another 
contributing factor to the complexity was how commitments under 
GATS were made.16 GATS commitments are generally classified into 
general and specific, where specific commitments apply only to 
specific service sectors and sub-sectors to which a WTO member 
(“Member”) has committed to; moreover, the specific sectors and 
sub-sectors are further narrowed by one or more of four modes of 
supplies through which that service may be supplied.17 Even after the 
Uruguay Round was completed and the basic GATS text was 
finalized, significant trade liberalization commitments were made 
through Members’ schedules of specific commitments.18 
Negotiations for market access commitments in the area of 
financial services were extended to June 30, 1995 and later extended 
                                                
12 Id. at 1542-43 (“No GATT contracting party wanted services trade 
liberalization on the agenda of any new round of multilateral trade negotiation 
more than the U.S.”). 
13 Id. at 1539. 
14 BHALA, supra note 4, at 1549. 
15 Id. at 1541 (“In general, trade in services involves much more behind-
the-border regulation than does trade in goods.”). 
16 Id. at 1539. 
17 See id. at 1578-91. 
18 See id. at 1540 (citing WTO, Second Protocol to the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services, S/L/11 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Third Protocol to the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services, S/L/12 (July 24, 1995); WTO, Fourth Protocol to the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/20 (Apr. 30, 1996); WTO, Fifth Protocol to the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, S/L/45 (Dec. 3, 1997)). 
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by another month.19 Negotiations took place in the middle of the 
Asian economic crisis which could have been used by countries such 
as Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand as an excuse 
not to liberalize the trade in financial services.20 However, instead the 
Asian leaders agreed that Newly Industrialized Countries and Least 
Developed Countries would benefit from liberalization perhaps 
because it would permit cheaper financial capital flow into the 
markets of those countries.21 Then on December 12, 1997 an 
agreement on financial services commitments was made which 
covers a substantial portion of trade in banking, securities, insurance 
and financial information.22 
III. GATS SUMMARY 
GATS is composed of the Preamble, six separate parts to the 
Agreement, and followed by Annexes. One of these Annexes is the 
Annex on Financial Services. Part I of the GATS deals with the 
scope by, inter alia, defining trade in services through modes of 
supply.23 Part II relates to general commitments.24 Part III relates to 
specific commitments.25 Part IV covers negotiations, schedules of 
specific commitments, and modifications of those schedules.26 Part V 
contains institutional provisions such as the dispute settlement and 
enforcement.27 Part VI mainly contains definitions and states that the 
Annexes are an integral part of the agreement.28 Without going into 
all of the GATS details, few segments of it are important for 
purposes of this Article: the Preamble, four modes of supply, general 
commitments, specific commitments, exceptions from commitments, 
and dispute settlement. 
                                                
19 BHALA, supra note 4, at 1581. 
20 Id. at 1581-82.   
21 Id. at 1582. 
22 Id. at 1581. 
23 GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2.  
24 See generally id. art. II-XV.  
25 See generally id. art. XVI-XVIII. 
26 See generally id. art. XIX-XXI. 
27 See generally id. art. XXII-XVI. 
28 See generally id. art. XXVII-XXVII. 
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A.  GATS Preamble 
The Preamble to GATS recognizes seven important 
objectives and considerations: (1) importance of trade in services for 
the growth and development of world economy, (2) economic 
growth through expansion of trade under the conditions of 
transparency and progressive liberalization, (3) liberalization through 
successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed at promoting the 
interests of all participants while giving due respect to national policy 
objectives, (4) recognizing the general right of Members to regulate, 
and more specifically, introduce regulation on the supply of services 
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives, (5) 
development of developing countries, (6) facilitate increasing 
participation of developing countries in trade in services, (7) special 
economic situation and economic development of least-developed 
countries.29 
B.  Four Modes of Supply 
Trade in services is defined in an unusual way. Instead of 
saying what trade in services is, GATS defines the trade in services 
through how the supply of service is performed. There are four ways 
in which a service can be supplied—the four modes of supply: (1) 
“from the territory of one Member, into the territory of any other 
Member,” i.e. cross-border supply, for example providing customer 
services from one country to the customers of a company in another 
country; (2) “in the territory of one Member to the service consumer 
of any other Member,” i.e. consumption abroad, for example a 
tourist consuming the services of a guide abroad, (3) “by a service 
supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the 
territory of any other Member,” i.e. commercial presence, for 
example a branch operating abroad that provides banking services to 
consumers abroad, (4) “by a service supplier of one Member, through 
presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other 
                                                
29 See GATS, supra note 9, Preamble; cf. BHALA, supra note 4, at 1569 
(In an attempt to avoid overlapping statements, objectives are stated and organized 
in a different manner in this Article.). 
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Member,” i.e. temporary movement of natural persons, for example a 
visiting professor teaching abroad.30 
C.  General Commitments 
Commitments under GATS are categorized into general and 
specific.31 General commitments are the minimum obligations that 
apply across the board to all sectors and sub-sectors of supplied 
services.32 General commitments in GATS Part II are: the Most 
Favored Nation treatment (“MFN”) under Article II, and 
Transparency under Article III of GATS.33 MFN treatment requires 
any treatment which a Member accords to like services and service 
supplies of any other country to be immediately and unconditionally 
accorded to the other Members’ service suppliers.34 In other words, 
when two countries liberalize trade among each other and one of 
them is a Member, any favorable treatment related to service supply 
granted by the Member is automatically multilateralized for all 
Members.35 Finally, Article III contains transparency commitments 
related to “all relevant measures of general application which pertain 
to or affect the operation of [GATS].”36 
D.  Specific Commitments 
Specific commitments in GATS Part III cover mainly two 
topics: National Treatment and Market Access.37 According to GATS 
Part III, a Member may make market access and/or national 
treatment commitments in specific sectors (sub-sectors or sub-sub-
sectors) of supplied services; moreover, a Member can also specify 
                                                
30 GATS, supra note 9, art. I; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1546-48. 
31 See GATS, supra note 9, Table of Contents. 
32 See GATS, supra note 9, art. II.1, III.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4, 
at 1578. 
33 GATS, supra note 9, art. II, III. 
34 See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1579-
82. 
35 See GATS, supra note 9, art. II; see also BHALA, supra note4, at 1562-
63. 
36 GATS, supra note 9, art. III. 
37 See id. art. XVI, XVII. 
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the mode(s) of supply to which such commitment(s) are applicable 
to.38 
Once a Member makes specific market-access 
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise, 
Member may not impose: (1) “limitations on the number of service 
suppliers,” (2) “limitations on the total value of service transactions 
or assets,” (3) “limitations on total number of service operations or 
on the total quantity of service output,” (4) “limitations on the total 
number of natural persons that may be employed,” (5) measures that 
restrict or require a particular form of legal entity organization, (f) 
limitations on foreign shareholding percentage or total value of 
foreign investment.39 
Once a Member makes specific national treatment 
commitment(s), unless the specific commitment(s) provide otherwise, 
the Member must “accord to services and service suppliers of any 
other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of 
services, treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own 
like services and service suppliers.”40 
E.  Exceptions 
GATS provides many exceptions from general and specific 
commitments. The applicability of the prudential carve-out clause 
may depend on the reasoning of those exceptions, as discussed in 
Part V(A)(2), and at this point it is sufficient to be generally aware of 
the existence of those exceptions. Some of those exceptions include: 
economic integration agreements, labor market integration 
agreements, balance of payment safeguards, MFN exemptions, 
government procurement, providing advantages to adjacent 
countries, emergency safeguard measures, essential security interest, 
disclosure of information contrary to public interest, movement of 
                                                
38 Id. art. XVI.1, XVII.1; see also BHALA, supra note 4, at 1585. 
39 GATS, supra note 9, art. XVI.2.  
40 Id. art. XVII.1. 
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natural persons, administration of domestic regulations, and general 
exceptions.41 
For example GATS Article XIV, General Exceptions 
provides five types of measures which a Member may implement that 
are exempted from the Member’s general or specific commitments.42 
Of the five categories of measures, three of the categories require 
measures to be “necessary.”43 For example, subparagraph (c) in part 
permits implementation of measures “necessary to secure compliance 
with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement . . . relating to . . . the prevention of 
deceptive and fraudulent practices. . . .”44 In other words, if a 
Member is implementing a law or a regulation related to prevention 
of deceptive and fraudulent practices, and that law or regulation is 
not inconsistent with Member’s commitments under the Agreement, 
any measures that are necessary to the implementation of such law or 
regulation are also exempted from the Agreement—even  if those 
necessary measures are inconsistent with the Agreement.45 
Additionally, such measure(s) will not be exempted if arbitrary or 
discriminatory without legitimate justification(s).46 
While the scope of each of these exceptions may be a topic 
for a separate article, it may be consequential on the ultimate 
determination of whether the prudential carve-out clause applies. 
                                                
41 See generally id. art. II.2, II.3, V, VI, X, XII-XIV bis, Annex on Article 
II Exemptions. 
42 Id. art. XIV. 
43 Id. art. XIV.(a)-(c).  
44 Id. art. XIV.(c).  
45 See id; see generally Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶300-27, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services]. 
46 See GATS, supra. note 9, art. XIV; see also U.S. – Gambling and Betting 
Services, supra note 45, ¶ 339-51. 
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IV. ANNEX ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: PRUDENTIAL CARVE-OUT 
CLAUSE 
Trade in the financial service sector is also governed by the 
Annex on Financial Services (the “Annex”).47 The tension between 
trade liberalization commitments and nations’ sovereignty presents 
itself in the prudential carve-out clause contained in the Annex. 
Prudential carve-out clause provides an exception from general and 
specific GATS commitments: 
Notwithstanding any other provisions of the 
Agreement, a Member shall not be prevented from 
taking measures for prudential reasons, including for 
the protection of investors, depositors, policy holders 
or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a 
financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system. Where such 
measures do not conform with the provisions of the 
Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations 
under the Agreement.48 
This text in the GATS has attracted much attention. Many 
have claimed that the prudential exception was not clear and 
clarification was necessary, sometimes attempting to provide 
clarification.49 Also, there has been some confusion about whether 
                                                
47 GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services.  
48 Id.  
49 See generally Communication From Barbados: Unintended Consequences of 
Remedial Measures taken to correct the Global Financial Crisis: Possible Implications for WTO 
Compliance, COMMITTEE ON TRADE IN FINANCIAL SERVICES,  ¶¶ 11, 23, 
JOB/SERV/38, (Feb. 18, 2011), 
https://www.coc.org/files/BarbadosSubmission.pdf (“It would seem that the 
wording of paragraph 2 of the GATS Annex on Financial Services may need to be 
amended.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and Domestic 
Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155 (1997) (“The scope of this exemption to 
basic GATS principles is not well defined. It can therefore be expected that 
measures taken under this provision will be the subject of controversial 
interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of dispute settlement 
procedures.”); Juan A. Marchetti & Petros C. Mavroidis, What Are the Main 
Challenges for the GATS Framework? Don’t Talk About Revolution, 3 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. 
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the measure or the reason for that measure must be prudential in 
order to qualify as an exception under the clause.50 Some have stated 
that further clarification was necessary with respect to the apparent 
contradiction between the first and the second sentences, sometimes 
calling the clause a “self-cancelling loophole.”51 Others expressed 
concerns that the exception will be used for disguised protectionist 
measures.52 Some predicted that the issue will eventually appear in 
                                                
REV. 511 (2004) (“Examples of provisions the scope of which is unclear 
include: the scope of the so-called ‘prudential carve-out.’”); Dominique Servais & 
Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J. 
653, (1993) (“[T]he clause is interpreted differently according to the country.”); 
Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services and Its Relation 
with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613 (2008) (“The difficulty of the 
prudential carve out is that while the uncertainty caused by its text is clear, there 
has not been any indication or the urgent need to revise it.”); Michael S. Barr & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT. L. 
15 (2006) (“[T]he financial services accord requires market liberalization and 
national treatment, but permits countries to engage in valid ‘prudential measures’ 
that would otherwise be inconsistent with the agreement; the scope of such 
prudential measures is likely to be circumscribed by adherence to the Basel 
standards.”) (citation omitted); Gretchen Morgenson, Barriers to Change, From Wall 
St. and Geneva, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/business/wto-and-barriers-to-financial-
change.html?_r=0 (“Last October, Ecuador asked that the W.T.O. review financial 
rules so that the country could preserve its ability to create regulations that ensure 
‘the integrity and stability of the financial system.’”). 
50 E.g., Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services in the GATS and 
Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158 (1997); G-20 Pittsburgh 
Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from Public Citizen’s Global Trade 
Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures in World Trade Organization’s 
Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 10-17 (Sept. 2009).  
51 G-20 Pittsburgh Summit, Special Pittsburgh G-20 Report from 
Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, No Meaningful Safeguards for Prudential Measures 
in World Trade Organization’s Financial Service Deregulation Agreements, at 3-5 (Sept. 
2009); see also Communication from Barbados, supra note 49, ¶ 11; Alan 
Alexandroff et al , Global Trade Watch on the Prudential Car Out, International 
Economic Law and Policy Blog (Dec. 12, 2015, 11:57 PM), 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2010/05/global-trade-watch-on-the-
prudential-carve-out.html. 
52 E.g., Dominique Servais & Julie Dutry, GATS 2000: High Stakes for the 
Financial Services Sector?, 6 INT. BUS. L. J. 653, 664-65 (1993) (“It is often 
propounded that there is a real risk of the prudential clause being used by some 
countries as an mechanism to justify the upholding of certain regulations that aim, 
under the prudential veil, to protect the local financial industry by either refusing, 
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front of a WTO panel.53 While others stated that the “confrontational 
approach” within the dispute settlement system [was] unlikely.54 In 
any event, the importance of this clause has not been overstated. 
“After a decision is rendered, the losing nation will see how much (or 
how little) sovereignty has been transferred to the WTO.”55 Such a 
decision was rendered on September 30, 2015 by a WTO panel. 
A.  Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services: 
Report of the Panel 
On September 30, 2015 a WTO panel for the first time 
addressed the prudential carve-out clause in Argentina – Measures 
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services (the “Panel Report”).56 
In the Panel Report, inter alia, Argentina claimed that the 
prudential exception in paragraph 2(a) of the Annex applied to 
measures 5 (requirements for market access related to reinsurance 
services) and 6 (requirements for access to the Argentina’s capital 
market) implemented by Argentina.57 Measure 5 essentially banned 
                                                
or limiting, access to their market.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial Services 
in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 161 (1997) 
(“Individual countries could, for example, attempt to cover discriminatory 
treatment under the prudential carve-out.”). 
53 Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current 
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40 (2005) (“The operation of this 
prudential supervision ‘carve out’ and the trade liberalisation [sic] provisions of the 
Financial Services Agreement will undoubtedly come before the WTO dispute 
resolution mechanism in the near future.”); Roger Kampf, Liberalisation of Financial 
Services in the GATS and Domestic Regulation, 3 INT. TRADE L. & REG. 155, 158 
(1997) (“It can [] be expected that measures taken under this provision will be the 
subject of controversial interpretation in the future, possibly in the context of 
dispute settlement procedures.”).  
54 Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, GATS’ Prudential Carve Out in Financial Services 
and Its Relation with Prudential Regulation, 57 INT. COMP. L. Q. 613, 640 (2008) (“The 
community of international financial regulators is close-knit, and such a 
confrontational approach [bringing dispute within WTO dispute settlement system] 
does not seem likely.”) 
55 Duncan Alford, International Financial System Risks: A Current 
Assessment, 1 J. INT. BANKING L. & REG. 40, 41 (2005). 
56 Panel Report, Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, 
WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015). 
57 Id. ¶¶ 7.781, 7.808, WT/DS453/R (Sept. 30, 2015). 
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the supply of reinsurance services from countries not cooperating for 
purposes of tax transparency and the global fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing according to the criteria defined by 
the Financial Action Task Force.58 Measure 6 banned stock market 
intermediaries from transacting (e.g. public offering of negotiable 
securities, forward contracts, futures or options of any nature or 
other financial instruments or products) with persons from non-
cooperative countries.59 A country was to be considered 
“cooperative” if it: (i) “[had] signed with Argentina a tax information 
exchange agreement or an international double taxation convention 
with a broad information exchange clause, provided that the 
information [was] effectively exchanged; or (ii) [had] initiated with 
Argentina the negotiations necessary for concluding such an 
agreement and/ or convention.”60 Under measures 5 and 6 Argentina 
imposed different requirements on service suppliers depending on 
whether they were established and registered in cooperative or non-
cooperative countries.61 
Panama argued against the applicability of the prudential 
carve-out clause.62 Although the panel ultimately found for Panama 
on this issue, Panama appealed the report to the Appellate Body 
arguing that the panel erred, inter alia, in not limiting the scope of the 
prudential carve-out clause to “domestic” regulations.63 Argentina 
also appealed the Panel Report arguing, contrary to the panel’s 
finding, that the services provided from cooperative and non-
cooperative countries were not “like” services.64 While the Panel 
Report is pending an appeal, the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”) 
will not be able to adopt the Panel Report.65 The Appellate Body 
report, once issued, will be automatically adopted, receiving legal 
                                                
58 See id ¶¶ 2.23–2.34.  
59 See id. ¶¶ 2.35–2.36. 
60 Id. ¶¶ 7.907 [footnote omitted]. 
61 Id. ¶ 7.907.  
62 Id. ¶¶ 7.793–7.807. 
63 See Notification of an Appeal by Panama, Argentina – Measures Relating 
to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/7 (Oct. 30, 2015). 
64 See Notification of Another Appeal by Argentina, Argentina – Measures 
Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WT/DS453/8 (Nov. 30, 2015). 
65 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes art. 16, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU].  
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force, unless the DSB decides by unanimous consensus not to adopt 
the report.66 Customarily when DSB adopts a panel report, it is 
adopted “as modified by the Appellate Body”;67 thus, ultimately DSB 
may adopt the Appellate Body’s findings of law which were directly 
appealed. Appellate Body may even modify rulings on issues that 
were not directly appealed if the modification was necessary for 
ruling on the issues appealed. 
The Panel Report provided important guidance and if 
adopted by the DSB will serve as persuasive authority for the 
development of the international trade law as the meaning of the 
clause and its practical application became especially important in the 
context of post-recession regulations. The Panel Report adopted a 
three-prong legal standard under which the measure qualifying for 
the prudential exception must: (1) affect the supply of financial 
services, (2) be taken for prudential reasons, (3) and not be used as 
means of avoiding the Country-Member’s commitments or 
obligations.68 Consequently the Panel Report applied the adopted 
standard to the measures implemented by Argentina, as discussed in 
subsection (4). 
1. The Scope of the Annex: Measures Affecting the Supply of Financial 
Services. - The Panel Report found that the provision represents an 
exception; therefore, the burden of proof lies with the responding 
party to demonstrate that its measures are covered under the 
provision.69 As a preliminary matter, the panel report considered 
paragraph 1(a) as context for the interpretation of paragraph 2(a) of 
the Annex—the prudential carve-out clause; thus, it found that the 
party claiming the exception must demonstrate that the measure in 
question is a measure “affecting the supply of financial services.”70 
                                                
66 Id. art. 17. 
67 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the 
Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 257, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) 
[hereinafter EC – Bananas III].  
68 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶¶ 7.851, 7.796 (Although the parties did not appeal any of the three prongs of the 
adopted legal standard, Panama appealed arguing that there is a fourth prong 
requirement in the Annex that the measure must be “domestic.”) 
69 Id. ¶ 7.816. 
70 Id. ¶ 7.822 (citation omitted). 
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Having previously found that the measures in question were 
“affecting trade in services” and were in violation of the GATS, the 
Panel Report stated that if a measure affects trade in services under 
Article I:1, it must be considered to be a measure affecting the supply of 
services.71 In other words, the panel report equated the words trade 
and supply, perhaps because Article I:2 of the GATS states that “[f]or 
purposes of this Agreement, trade in services is defined as the supply 
of a service. . . .”72 
To sum it up, if a measure affects trade in services and 
violates the GATS, then the prudential exception may apply if the 
services affected by that measure are financial. According to the panel 
report affecting has a broader meaning than “regulating” or 
“governing.”73 As to what services are considered financial, the Panel 
Report stated that “paragraph 5 of the Annex on Financial Services 
defines the concept of a ‘financial service’ as ‘any service of a 
financial nature offered by a financial service supplier of a 
Member’ . . . [and] all the services subsequently listed in paragraph 5 
of the Annex are services of ‘a financial nature.’”74 
2. Measures Taken “for Prudential Reasons.” - The Panel Report 
took on the task of determining which measures are “for prudential 
reasons” by: (a) distinguishing that the reason for the measure must be 
prudential—not the measure itself, (b) analyzing the term “prudential 
reasons,” and (c) analyzing the word “for” separately.75 
                                                
71 Id. ¶ 7.851. 
72 GATS, supra note 9, art. I.2. 
73 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶ 7.854 (quoting EC – Bananas III, supra note 67, ¶ 220) (“The ordinary meaning of 
the word ‘affecting’ implies a measure that has ‘an effect on,’ which indicates a 
broad scope of application. This interpretation is further reinforced by the 
conclusions of previous panels that the term ‘affecting’ in the context of Article III 
of the GATT 1947 is wider in scope than such terms as ‘regulating’ or 
‘governing.’”) 
74 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶ 7.857. 
75 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶¶ 7.859-63. 
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a. Reasons must be prudential. - Panel Report found that the 
reasons for the measure must be prudential.76 Although Panama 
observed that other paragraphs in the Annex (paragraphs 3 and 4) 
refer to “prudential measures” and “prudential issues” and argued 
that the key term is the word “prudential”—not the “reasons,”77 the 
Panel Report emphasized that the text speaks of the reasons being 
prudential and not the measures.78 Moreover, the Panel Report stated 
that a contrary interpretation “would not give any meaning to the 
term ‘reasons’ used in that provision.”79 Finding that there is no other 
reason why to use the terms (prudential reasons and prudential 
measures) interchangeably, the panel held that the textual term—
prudential reasons—should be used instead.80 
b. Prudential means “preventative” or “precautionary.” - Next the 
Panel Report consulted dictionary definitions of “motivos coutelares” 
(prudential reasons) and held that the ordinary meaning of 
“prudential” is “preventative” or “precautionary.”81 The Panel Report 
looked into the Spanish Royal Academy’s dictionary and found that 
“motivo” (motive) means “that which moves or has efficacy or power 
to move; moving cause or reason for something” and “coutelar” 
(prudential)—“preventative, precautionary; said of a measure or rule 
intended to prevent a particular outcome or guard against that which 
might impede it.”82 Also, the Panel Report considered English and 
French dictionary definitions of equally authentic versions of the 
provision.83 The Panel Report looked into the Shorter Oxford Dictionary 
and found that the word “prudential” is defined as “[o]f, involving or 
characterized by prudence; exercising prudence, esp. in business 
affairs.”84 The Panel Report looked into the Le Petit Robert 
dictionary, but did not find a definition for “prudential,” instead the 
                                                
76 Id. ¶ 7.863. 
77 Id. ¶ 7.860 (footnote omitted). 
78 Id. ¶ 7.861. 
79 Id. ¶ 7.862. 
80 See id. ¶¶ 7.859-63. 
81 See id. ¶ 7.865. 
82 Id. (quoting DICCIONARIO DE LA LENGUA ESPAÑOLA (23rd ed. 
2014)). 
83 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.866. 
84 Id. (quoting SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (6th ed. 
2007)).  
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report looked into the word “prudence” which was defined as 
“[a]ttitude of a person who, reflecting on the significance and 
consequences of his acts, takes steps to avoid mistakes and possible 
mishaps, and refrains from anything that might be a source of 
harm.”85 Panama, Argentina, and third parties such as United States 
and Brazil agreed with the definition of “preventative” or 
“precautionary,” except Panama applied it to the word “measures” 
and further defined “precautionary” differently.86 
The Panel Report found support in the context of the clause 
which provides a non-exhaustive list of prudential reasons: “the 
protection of investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to 
whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier” or “to 
ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system.”87 According 
to the panel, these are examples of precautionary reasons.88 Then, the 
panel basically recognized that “preventative” or “precautionary” are 
also vague words and stated that the meaning and importance 
attached to prudential reasons may vary over time; however, such 
vagueness—according to the panel—is appropriate, because “WTO 
Members should have sufficient freedom to define the prudential 
reasons that underpin their measures, in accordance with their own 
scales of values.”89 The panel found support in policy objectives 
identified in previous panel reports and stated that Country-
Members, “in applying concepts equally important for society, such 
as those covered by Article XX for the GATT 1994 [general 
                                                
85 Id. (quoting DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRANÇAISE (2000)). 
86 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶¶ 7.797, 7.867 (citing Third Party Written Submission of the United States, 
Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, at 7 n.13, WT/DS/453, 
(June 4, 2014), available at 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/US%203rd%20Pty%20Sub%20Fin.pdf) 
(citation omitted). 
87 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.866; see also GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2(a).  
88 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56¶ 7.868 
89 Id. ¶ 7.871. 
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exceptions], are entitled to determine the level of protection they 
consider appropriate.”90 
The panel also found that the broad interpretation of the 
word “prudential” “corresponds to the object and purpose of the 
GATS, as set out in its own preamble, which recognizes ‘the right of 
Members to regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply 
of services within their territories in order to meet national policy 
objectives.’”91  The Panel Report concluded its analysis of the word 
“prudential” by stating that a broad interpretation is “consistent with 
the concerns of the international community regarding the nature and 
impact of the financial risks and the consequent need to preserve 
sufficient flexibility when determining the prudential reasons to 
which the regulation should respond.”92 
 c. Measures taken “for” prudential reasons require a “rational 
relationship” between the measure and its prudential objective. - Before 
interpreting what “for” means, the Panel Report compared the 
prudential exception provision to the general exceptions of Articles 
XIV of the GATS and XX of the GATT 1994 and found that the 
prudential exception provision does not require the measures to be 
“necessary.”93  Therefore, the prudential exception provision does 
not require measures to be the least trade-restrictive means for 
achieving the stated objective.94 
The panel began the interpretation of the word “for” by 
looking at its ordinary meaning.95 It looked into dictionaries in 
Spanish, English and French and found that the meaning similarly 
                                                
90 Id. ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R, (Dec. 11, 2000); Appellate Body Report, European Communities 
– Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 168, 
WT/DS135/AB/R, (Mar. 12, 2011)) (citation omitted). 
91 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶ 7.872 (quoting GATS, supra note 9, Preamble). 
92 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶ 7.875. 
93 Id. ¶ 7.884. 
94 Id. (footnote omitted) (Note that in the Panel Report used the words 
“objective” and “reason” interchangeably.).  
95 Id. ¶ 7.886. 
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denotes a causation.96 Therefore, “[a] measure taken ‘for’ prudential 
reasons would [] be a measure with prudential cause.”97  Then 
essentially the panel held that for a measure to be taken “for” 
prudential reasons, there must “be a rational relationship of cause 
and effect between the measure and the reason for it” in fact.98  “[A] 
central aspect of the rational relationship of cause and effect is the 
adequacy of the measure to the prudential reason, that is to say, 
whether the measure, through its design, structure and architecture, 
contributes to achieving the desired effect.”99 
3. The Meaning of the Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out 
Clause Remains Uninterpreted. - The panel refused to interpret the 
meaning of the “[measures] shall not be used as a means of avoiding 
the Member’s commitments or obligations under the Agreement,” 
because it had already found that the prudential exception did not 
cover the measures in question under the second prong of the legal 
test.100 
4. Panel Report’s Application of the Three-prong Legal Standard to 
Argentina’s Measures. - The Panel Report applied this three-prong 
standard to Argentina’s measures 5 and 6 and found that the 
measures were not taken for prudential reasons.101 Argentina’s 
measure 5 placed certain requirements on “non-cooperative” country 
service suppliers before they could gain access to the Argentine 
reinsurance service market.102 Measure 6 prohibited certain stock 
market transactions with entities from “non-cooperative” 
countries.103 
The Panel Report agreed that the reasons identified by 
Argentina with respect to measure 5 were prudential, namely “to 
protect the insured, to ensure the solvency of insurers and reinsurers, 
and to avoid the possible systemic risk of the insolvency and failure 
                                                
96 Id. ¶ 7.887 (citations omitted).  
97 Id. ¶ 7.888. 
98 Id. ¶ 7.889. 
99 Id. ¶ 7.911. 
100  Id. ¶ 7.945. 
101 See id. ¶¶ 7.906-7.920, 7.939-7.944. 
102 See discussion supra pp. 12-13.  
103 See id. 
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of direct insurance companies.”104 The Panel Report found that 
requesting relevant information from the regulatory authorities of 
other jurisdictions is part of those identified reasons.105 
The panel found the main issue in the conditions under 
which a country was to be considered “cooperative.”106 More 
specifically, one way a country could be considered cooperative was if 
it had “initiated with Argentina the negotiations necessary for 
concluding [an agreement with tax information exchange or an 
international double taxation convention with a broad information 
exchange clause] and/or convention.”107 The panel stated that this 
criteria does not provide a “formal mechanism for the effective 
exchange of information between Argentina and the country with 
which it [was] negotiating.”108 In other words, mere negotiations did 
not provide substantive information exchange. 
There was another problem with the criteria under which a 
country could be designated as “cooperative.” Argentina published 
the list of cooperative countries only once, at the beginning of every 
year, so countries that began negotiations after the list was published 
would have no access to the Argentine service market until the 
following year.109 In this instance, Panama was on the January 2014 
list, because it had begun negotiations in November of 2013, but 
other countries that began negotiations in 2014 were not on the list 
yet, although they were in the same situation as Panama—merely 
negotiating.110  Hence, the panel held that the entire measure did not 
have a “rational relationship of cause and effect with the identified 
prudential reasons,” because granting “cooperative” status without 
                                                
104 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶ 7.904. 
105 Id. ¶ 7.910 (“In our view, having adequate and timely information 
concerning the foreign reinsurance company is fundamental for the purpose of 
anticipating crises or systemic risks which, as we have seen, could be incubating in 
an imperceptible manner over time and suddenly erupt.”).  
106 Id. ¶ 7.913.   
107 Id. ¶ 7.912 (footnote omitted).  
108 Id. ¶ 7.916. 
109 See id. ¶ 7.918.  
110 See id. 
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actual information exchange did not bear such relationship with the 
stated prudential reason.111 
With respect to measure 6, the Panel Report found several 
reasons identified by Argentina to be prudential: “strengthen[ing] the 
mechanisms for protecting and preventing abuses against small 
investors, within the framework of the protective function of 
consumer law”112; “ensur[ing] the full effectiveness of the principles 
of investor protection, fairness, efficiency, transparency, non-
fragmentation and reduction of systemic risk”;113 and “prevention of 
money laundering and terrorist financing,” which in turn strengthen 
the integrity and stability of the financial system.114  However, the 
panel found that there was no rational relationship of cause and 
effect with the identified prudential reasons, because measure 6, 
similar to measure 5, exempted service suppliers from “cooperative” 
countries that did not actually exchange any information.115 
V. ANALYZING THE PANEL REPORT 
Even if the Appellate Body renders a decision without 
significant modifications and DSB adopts the Panel Report, the legal 
standard to be used in future disputes is still be open to arguments.116  
“In the 1996 Japan Alcoholic Beverages case, . . . . [t]he Appellate 
Body concluded adopted panel reports are not binding in a strict 
sense in a subsequent case, even if the subsequent case involves the 
same parties and basically the same facts.”117 Article IX:2 of the 
WTO Agreement provides the exclusive authority to adopt 
                                                
111 See id. ¶¶ 7.919-7.920. 
112 Id. ¶ 7.932. 
113 Id. ¶ 7.933. 
114 Id. ¶¶ 7.934-7.935 (footnotes omitted). 
115 Id. ¶¶ 7.939-7.944. 
116 See discussion supra pp. 13-14.   
117 BHALA, supra note 4, at 19; see also Appellate Body Report, Japan – 
Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, pp. 12-13, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/ AB/R, 
WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II] 
(“Generally, in international law, the essence of subsequent practice in interpreting 
a treaty has been recognized as a ‘concordant, common and consistent’ sequence of 
acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a discernable pattern 
implying the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”).   
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interpretations of the Multilateral Trade Agreements—in this case 
GATS—to the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.118 
“The fact that such an ‘exclusive authority’ in interpreting the treaty 
has been established so specifically in the WTO Agreement is reason 
enough to conclude that such authority does not exist by implication 
or by inadvertence elsewhere.”119 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body 
stated that “panel reports are important part of the GATT acquis” and 
create “legitimate expectation among WTO Members”; thus, “should 
be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.120 
The following sections will: (A) analyze the interpretation of 
“for prudential reasons,” and (B) briefly discuss the second sentence 
of the prudential carve-out clause.  
A. Interpretation of “for Prudential Reasons” 
Interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause involves a 
multi-layered inquiry. The Appellate Body’s framework for 
interpreting GATS provisions provides a valuable foundation for 
analyzing the Panel Report.121 Under Article 3.2 of the DSU, 
Country-Members recognized that the WTO dispute settlement 
system may clarify provisions of covered agreements in “accordance 
with customary rules of interpretation of public international law.”122 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(the “Vienna Convention”) are well settled in WTO case law to be 
such customary rules.123 Interpreting “measures taken for prudential 
                                                
118 Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 7, art IX.2. 
119 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, at 13.  
120 Id. at 14. 
121 See generally U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45 (The 
report provides a step-by-step framework for treaty interpretation according to 
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.). 
122 DSU, supra note 65, art. 3.2. 
123 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 159 (“[T]he task 
of interpreting any other treaty text[] involves identifying the common intention of 
Members, and is to be achieved by following the customary rules of interpretation 
of public international law, codified in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention.”); see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Countervailing Duties on 
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products from Germany, ¶¶ 61-62, 
WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002); Appellate Body Report, United States – 
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reasons,” as discussed below, requires looking into: (1) ordinary 
meaning, (2) context, (3) object and purpose, (4) other things taken 
into account with the context, and (5) supplementary means of 
interpretation.124  However, “it should be kept in mind that treaty 
interpretation is an integrated operation, where interpretive rules or 
principles must be applied as connected and mutually reinforcing 
components of a holistic exercise.”125 
1. Ordinary Meaning. - First, analyzing under Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention, the ordinary meaning of “prudential” is vague.  
“Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires a treaty to be 
interpreted ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of 
its object and purpose.’”126 Identifying the ordinary meaning of a 
term may begin with dictionary definitions; however, the Appellate 
Body in Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the 
Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 300-27, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. – Gambling and 
Betting Services], made a reservation for using dictionary definitions 
alone, because such approach is too mechanical.127 According to the 
Appellate Body, if in abstract the range of definitions of the word 
may include the definitions of the contestant parties, then the next 
proper step is to inquire into which one of the definitions is properly 
attributable to the party-respondent.128  
The Panel Report determined the ordinary meaning of 
“prudential” mainly from Spanish and French dictionaries.129 
Although the Panel Report defined the word “prudential” as 
“preventative” or “precautionary,” this does not really clarify what 
reasons may or may not be justified, because virtually any reason for 
a measure can be stated in terms of being “preventative” or 
“precautionary.” Consider a measure implemented for the reason of 
                                                
Continued Existence and application of Zeroing Methodology, ¶ 267, WT/DS350/AB/R 
(Feb. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. – Continued Zeroing].   
124 See U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45. 
125 U.S. – Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268. 
126 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 164. 
127 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 164-66. 
128 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 167. 
129 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.ii.  
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aiding a quick recovery of financial institutions after an economic 
recession: Is not that reason preventing a slow or no recovery? Thus, 
virtually any reason may be “preventative.” 
Further, according to the Panel Report, if “prudential” means 
preventative, and the text states “measures for prudential reasons” 
are basically exempted, then what will give the panel authority to not 
exempt any absurd preventative reasons a country will claim?  
Consider a Country-Member claiming that the prudential reason for a 
measure is to “prevent” all left-handed people from making any 
financial investments. According to the current interpretation of 
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary,” such a measure 
would qualify for the exception. It may seem at first that such a 
measure would not qualify under the exception, because there would 
be no rational relationship of cause and effect,130 but such a 
relationship will need to exist only between the actual measure and 
the stated reason for it, and the stated reason is preventing left-handed 
people making certain investments. Under the present definition of 
“prudential” as “preventative” or “precautionary” coupled with the 
fact that any measure may be stated in terms of preventing some 
event, the current interpretation of the word “prudential” means 
virtually any reason, including absurd “preventative” reasons. Because 
the word “prudential” practically loses its meaning, and “the 
Appellate Body has stated that ‘interpretation must give meaning and 
effect to all the terms of a treaty,’”131 a careful interpretation of the 
word “prudential” is still required. 
Dictionaries do not clarify the word. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines “prudential” as “of, belonging to, or of the nature 
of prudence; involving prudence, characterized or prescribed by 
forethought and careful deliberations” or as “matters that fall within 
the scope or province of prudence.”132 The Oxford English 
                                                
130 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii.  
131 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.840 (quoting Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated 
and Conventional Gasoline, p. 23, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) [hereinafter US – 
Gasoline]; see also Appellate Body Report, United States – Continued Dumping and 
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, ¶ 271, WT/DS217/AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 
2006) [hereinafter US Offset Act].  
132 12 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 729 (2nd ed. 1991). 
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Dictionary defines “prudence” as “ability to discern the most 
suitable, politic, or profitable course of action, esp. as regards 
conduct; practical wisdom, discretion,” or “wisdom; knowledge of or 
skill in a matter.”133 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines 
“prudential” as “of involving, or characterized by prudence; 
exercising prudence, esp. in business affairs” and defines “prudence” 
as “the quality of being prudent” or as “wisdom; knowledge of or 
skill in a matter;” or “foresight; providence.”134 It also defines 
“prudent” as “characterized by or proceeding from care in following 
the most politic and profitable course; having or showing sound 
judgment in practical affairs; circumspect, sensible” or as “wise, 
discerning, sapient.”135 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 
defines “prudential” as “of, relating to, or proceeding from 
prudence” or as “exercising prudence.”136 Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary defines “prudence” as “the ability to govern 
and discipline oneself by the use of reason,” or as “sagacity or 
shrewdness in the management of affairs,” or as “skill and good 
judgment in the use of resources,” or as “caution or circumspection 
as to danger or risk.”137 
As you can see from the English dictionary definitions, as 
opposed to French and Spanish as found by the Panel Report, 
“prudential” may have meanings different from “preventative” or 
“precautionary.” According to the dictionaries, a “prudential” reason, 
among the meaning adopted by the panel, may mean a reason 
“prescribed by forethought and careful deliberations” or a reason 
“involving, or characterized by quality of being wise” or a reason “of 
involving the quality of having or showing sound judgment” or a 
reason “relating to or proceeding from the ability to govern and 
discipline oneself by the use of reason or by skill and good judgment 
in the use of resources.” All these definitions encompass a 
requirement that whatever must be “prudential” must in some sense 
be well thought of, be wise, show sound judgment, or be reasonable.  
                                                
133 Id. at 728-29. 
134 2 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2396 (1st ed. 
1993). 
135 Id. 
136 MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1002 (11th ed. 
2005). 
137 Id. 
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Thus, a closer look into the context in which the word “prudential” 
was used is required. 
2. Context. - After inquiring into the ordinary meaning of the 
text, if a definitive conclusion cannot be reached, the next step is to 
inquire into the context in which the relevant terms are situated 
pursuant to Article 31(2) of the Vienna Convention.138 Article 31 
paragraph 2 of the Vienna Convention also provides for documents 
in addition to the text of the treaty which may be considered as 
context.139 “Documents can be characterized as context only where 
there is sufficient evidence of their constituting an ‘agreement relating 
to the treaty’ between the parties or of their ‘accept[ance by the 
parties] as an instrument related to the treaty.’”140 Thus, context 
documents may comprise of the entire GATS Agreement, including 
its preamble and annexes, schedules of specific commitments of the 
respondent-party, provisions of covered agreements other than 
GATS, and GATS schedules of other Members.141 When inquiring 
into context documents, the Appellate Body first examined “the 
immediate context in which the relevant entry [was] found.”142 
Second, the Appellate Body examined “the context provided by the 
structure of the GATS itself.”143 Third, the Appellate Body looked 
“beyond the GATS to other covered agreements” where it also 
considered other Member’s Schedules.144 
Here the main word under scrutiny—prudential—is an 
adjective, which within the most immediate textual context of the 
word qualifies another word—reasons.145 To support the panel’s 
finding, the most important context to be considered in treaty 
interpretation is the textual context in which the word was used.146 In 
                                                
138 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 168; see also U.S. – 
Continued Zeroing, supra note 123, ¶ 268. 
139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 33 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
140 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 175. 
141 See id. ¶¶ 178-187. 
142 Id. ¶ 179. 
143 Id. ¶ 180. 
144 Id. ¶ 181. 
145 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i.  
146 Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (“A treaty 
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this case it is not the measure itself that must be prudential—but the 
reasons for that measure.147 Although a prudential measure and a 
measure implemented for prudential reason are not mutually 
exclusive, and in most cases the two will likely overlap, this textual 
distinction may be material to the ultimate determination of what 
measures may be permissible under the prudential carve-out clause.148 
Oversimplifying the complexity of financial regulations, consider that 
it will be a relatively simpler task for a WTO panel to analyze whether 
the reasons for the measure are prudential versus whether the measure 
itself is prudential.  It is easier to find consensus on what is a prudential 
reason versus what measures may be implemented for those reasons, 
because for every prudential reason there are likely to be multiple 
prudential measures that could be implemented. In other words, a 
prudential measure requirement would give less discretion to the 
sovereign Country-Member as to what measures to implement, while 
under the prudential reason requirement a Country-Member will be able 
to exercise more discretion as to what measures to implement. 
Looking at the context of the entire first sentence of the 
prudential carve-out clause, the prudential carve-out provision 
provides concrete examples of prudential reasons: “protection of 
investors, depositors, policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary 
duty is owed by a financial service supplier, or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of the financial system.”149  Thus, for example, a 
prudential reason may be the protection of the depositors. In this 
example whether a particular measure does or does not protect the 
depositors at this point seems to be irrelevant. The Panel Report 
inquired into the genuineness of that prudential reason—a fact 
                                                
interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to 
be interpreted.  It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, 
that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be 
sought.”); see also Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 12 (“Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation 
for the interpretive process: interpretation must be based above all upon the text of 
the treaty.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
147 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.i. 
148 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.831 (“The meaning of the two expressions cannot be the same and, in our 
opinion, this is an important aspect to be borne in mind when interpreting this 
provision.”). 
149 GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, art. 2.a. 
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intensive inquiry—when analyzing the “for” element in the phrase 
“for prudential reasons.”150 Although the Panel Report found that 
“prudential” means “precautionary” or “preventative” by pointing 
out that the prudential reasons listed in the text are all examples of 
“precautionary” or “preventative,”151 those reasons are not any more 
“precautionary” as they are “wise” or “reasonable.”  The list of 
examples in the provision supports virtually all of the definitions of 
“prudential” stated in the dictionaries.152 Nonetheless, the non-
exhaustive list of “prudential” reasons indicates an intention to leave 
the definition of “prudential” broader than just the examples in the 
list.153 
Looking into the broader context [the entire GATS 
Agreement] may be more helpful from the perspective of identifying 
what are not “prudential reasons”, rather than what are. If another 
part of the GATS already provides an exception for some measure(s), 
the reason for providing that exception effectively cannot be a 
“prudential” reason for purposes of the prudential exception 
provision, because otherwise the former exception provision would 
be reduced to “redundancy” or “inutility.”154 The prudential 
exception provision may not serve as a catch-all provision to 
encompass those measures which fail under some element of one of 
the other exceptions. For example, economic integration agreements 
are an exception.155 The reason for exempting integration agreements 
from GATS commitments is that those agreements liberalize trade 
between at least some countries, and some liberalization is better than 
none.156  Therefore, a reason for the prudential measure under the 
                                                
150 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.iii. 
151 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶¶ 7.868-7.869. 
152 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1. 
153 Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 56, 
¶¶ 7.869-7.871. 
154 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.840 (citing US – Gasoline, supra note 130, p. 23) (footnotes omitted); see also 
US Offset Act, supra note 131, ¶ 271; Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 
12. 
155 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. V. 
156 Cf. GATS, supra note 9, art. V.4. (To qualify for the exception an 
integration agreement, “[it] shall be designed to facilitate trade between the parties 
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prudential carve-out clause may not be to liberalize local trade 
between some countries or preventing regional market barriers, 
because such a scenario is already covered. Similarly, a Country-
Member should not be able to claim that the reason for the measure 
is to address the “serious balance-of-payment and external financial 
difficulty or threat thereof,” because such a reason is already covered 
by Article XII of the GATS.157 Otherwise, for example, a Country-
Member could implement a discriminatory measure aimed to prevent a 
threat of a balance-of-payment difficulty, which is prohibited under 
Article XII(2)(a), so long as such discriminatory measure would be 
“for prudential reasons”—preventing the threat of a balance-of-
payment crisis.  To be clear, a Member is free to claim exceptions 
under various provisions of GATS simultaneously; however, under 
the prudential carve-out clause analysis, as a matter of law, some 
reasons should not be considered prudential—reasons that already 
prompted negotiators to create specific exceptions in other GATS 
provisions. 
Finally, Members’ Schedules attached to the GATS may also 
serve as context for treaty interpretation purposes.158 For example, if 
a Member’s Schedule provides an interpretation of what may be a 
“prudential reason” for the purposes of the prudential exception 
provision, then such interpretation will be used by the panels and the 
Appellate Body as context for treaty interpretation. In the present 
case, Argentina’s Schedule did not contain any reference to the 
prudential carve-out clause.159 
3. Object and Purpose. - When no clear meaning could have 
been discerned, the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting 
Services turned to the object and purpose of the GATS for further 
guidance.160 When considering the Preamble to the GATS, which is 
context, to discern the object and purpose of the prudential 
provision, the Panel Report emphasized “the right of the Members to 
                                                
to the agreement and shall not in respect of any Member outside the agreement 
raise the overall level of barriers to trade in services . . . .”). 
157 See generally GATS, supra note 9, art. XII. 
158 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 181. 
159 Argentina – Schedule of Specific Commitments, GATS/SC/4 (Apr. 15, 
1994).  
160 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 187. 
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regulate, and to introduce new regulations, on the supply of services 
within their territories in order to meet national policy objectives.”161 
The panel emphasized this objective to give Country-Members broad 
discretion in identifying what is and what is not prudential.162 
However, there must be some limits on such discretion; otherwise, 
the prudential carve-out clause will render the entire GATS 
meaningless with respect to financial services. 
GATS has other objects and purposes which weight against 
the “right of the Members to regulate.” GATS Preamble recognizes 
“the growing importance of trade in services for the growth and 
development of the world economy,” and aims “to establish . . . rules 
for trade in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under 
conditions of . . . progressive liberalization. . . .”163 Therefore, as 
much as the object and purpose of the prudential exception provision 
may be to recognize national policy objectives, it is also not to permit 
too broad of an exception, because progressive liberalization and 
expansion of trade in services are also GATS objectives.  
Consequently, if the claimed prudential reason for the measure does 
not go against the objective of liberalized trade, then the object and 
purpose of the preamble that recognizes the national policy objective 
should prevail and provide broader discretion to the implementing 
Country-Member. And inversely, if the prudential reason is facially 
trade restrictive, then the free-trade objective should be weighed 
against the national policy objective. 
4. Other Things Taken into Account Together with the Context. – 
Pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention 
the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services continued its 
analysis by taking into account any “subsequent practice 
establishing the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty.”164 Although not examined by the Appellate Body in the 
                                                
161 See Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, supra note 
56, ¶ 7.872. 
162 See id. at ¶¶ 7.870-7.873. 
163 GATS supra note 9, Preamble.   
164 U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 190 (emphasis 
added); see also id. at ¶¶ 191-192 (“[I]n order for ‘practice’ within the meaning of 
Article 31(3)(b) to be established: (i) there must be a common, consistent, 
discernible pattern of acts or pronouncements; and (ii) those acts or 
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U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, Article 31 paragraph 3 also 
requires to take into account with the context “[a]ny subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the 
treaty or the application of its provisions” and “[a]ny relevant rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties.”165 Moreover, the fourth paragraph of the Article 31 requires 
giving a special meaning to a term “if it is established that the 
parties so intended.”166 
There is no identifiable subsequent practice between the 
WTO Members which could constitute an “agreement” to be used in 
interpreting the prudential exception clause.167 Nor there is any 
special meaning that can be discerned from the text, other than 
“prudential” has an “intrinsically evolutionary nature,” because the 
list of prudential reasons in the prudential exception provision was 
written as non-exhaustive.168 
As part of the relevant rules of international law, the Panel 
Report emphasized that in the past the Appellate Body “in applying 
concepts equally important for society, such as those covered by 
Article XX of the GATT 1994 [general exceptions], [Country-
Members] are entitled to determine the level of protection they 
consider appropriate.”169 Thus, in interpreting ambiguous or vague 
terms or words such as “prudential,” the tendency should favor 
                                                
pronouncements must imply agreement on the interpretation of the relevant 
provision.”) (original emphasis) (citing Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, 
p. 13); Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117, p. 14 (Appellate Body found that 
panel reports adopted by the GATT contracting parties do not constitute 
subsequent practice within the meaning of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna 
Convention.).  
165 Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 31.3 (emphasis added).   
166 Id. at art. 31.4. 
167 Perhaps Country-Members may be able to use integration agreements 
or international cooperative enforcement agreements to affect the meaning and the 
interpretation of the prudential exception clause.   
168 See generally Argentina – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, 
supra note 56, ¶ 7.873 (citations omitted).  
169 Id. at ¶ 7.870 (citing Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶ 176, WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R).  
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giving the Country-Members deference to determine their reasons as 
they consider appropriate. 
5. Supplementary Means of Interpretation. - Finally, when the 
above steps led to an ambiguous interpretation, the Appellate Body 
U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services turned to the supplementary means 
of interpretation.170 Supplementary means of interpretation include 
“the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion.”171 This is where documents that did not meet the 
requirements to be considered as context, may nonetheless be used in 
treaty interpretation as preparatory work.172 Thus far in the analysis, 
the meaning of “prudential” remains unsatisfying. However, from 
considering other things with the context, it is evident that the word 
may have been left vague intentionally to give greater deference to 
the Country-Members to determine their level of protection.  
Nonetheless, the context of other provisions of the GATS showed 
some reasons that may not be prudential for purposes of the 
prudential exception provision.173 Thus, supplementary means of 
interpretation are important for either confirming that the vagueness 
of the word was intentional or to clarify what “prudential reasons” 
mean. 
First, all negotiations after the adoption of the Annex on the 
Financial Services related to clarifying the meaning of the prudential 
exception clause, such as the seven times the Committee on Trade in 
Financial Services debated on the prudential exception provision, are 
irrelevant and do not constitute supplementary means of 
interpretation, because they were not “preparatory work.”174 Work in 
preparation of the Annex on the Financial Services began when the 
Working Group on Financial Service including Insurance was formed 
in June of 1990.175 The Working Group held four official meetings, 
                                                
170 See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶¶ 195, 236, 
248. 
171 Vienna Convention, supra note 139, art. 32. 
172 See, e.g., U.S. – Gambling and Betting Services, supra note 45, ¶ 197. 
173 See discussion supra Part IV.A.2. 
174 The seven meeting reports of the Committee on Trade in Services can 
be found by WTO document numbers S/FIN/M/25 to 31. 
175 PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS & NILS HERGER, FINANCIAL REGULATION 
AT THE CROSSROADS, 280 (2011). 
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and among other issues, discussed the text of the prudential 
exception provision.176 
During the first meeting the Chairman of the Working Group 
offered five different approached for the prudential carve-out clause, 
the first four ranging from narrow to broad in scope: (1) an exception 
only to a qualified national treatment provision, (2) permitting all 
“reasonable” prudential and fiduciary measures, (3) variation of first 
and second options with enumerated examples of permissible 
measures, (4) unqualified right to claim the exception, and (5) 
defining precise permissible measures to reduce legal uncertainties.177 
After the discussion on the topic was concluded, the Chairman stated 
that it was not possible to draw a preliminary conclusion as to which 
approach to use and that, in his opinion, there should be “wide room 
for flexibility in order to allow for the necessary prudential 
organizational measures.”178 After the first meeting of the Working 
Group three formal proposals regarding the prudential-carve out 
clause were circulated on behalf of: the European Communities, 
United States, and Malaysia.179 
The proposal from the European Communities was 
circulated before the second meeting of the working group which 
excepted “reasonable measures to safeguard the integrity of the 
financial system, provided that these measures are not applied in a 
                                                
176 The reports of the meetings can be found in WTO documents 
MTN.GNS/FIN 1 to 4.  
177 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the 
Meeting of 11-13 June 1990, ¶ 78, MTN.GNS/FIN/1 (July 5, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100236.pdf. 
178 Id. at ¶ 95. 
179 See DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 280 (citing Working 
Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Communication from the European 
Communities, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July 10, 1990); Working Group on Financial 
Service Including Insurance, Communication from the United States, 
MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990); Working Group on Financial Service 
Including Insurance, Communication of the Delegation of Malaysia, 
MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12, 1990)).  
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manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination.”180 
The proposal from the United States was also circulated 
before the second meeting which called for “a provision which 
permits a Party to take reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons, 
for the protection of investors and depositors, or for the protection 
of persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service 
provider.”181 Additionally, United States had introduced an informal 
paper titled “Provisions regarding financial services” according to 
which “all of the proposed provisions were subject to article 9 that 
stated that nothing in this agreement shall prevent a party from 
taking reasonable actions necessary for prudential reasons.”182 During the 
second meeting the representative of the United States stated that 
“[r]easons other than prudential ones . . . most often represent the 
kind of reasons that the agreement would seek to curtail.”183 With 
respect to proposed article 9, which included the words “reasonable” 
and “necessary,” Switzerland expressed that it “might require further 
specification to increase its juridical clarity.”184 
The proposal from Malaysia, submitted before the third 
meeting, had a section titled “Domestic regulation (prudential 
regulation).”185 Under this section the prudential carve-out clause 
                                                
180 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, 
Communication from the European Communities, art. 13.1, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/1 (July 
10, 1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100245.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
181 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, 
Communication from the United States, p. 2, MTN.GNS/FIN/W2, (July 12, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92100258.pdf (emphasis 
added).  
182 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the 
Meeting of 12-13 July 1990, ¶ 46, MTN/GNS/FIN/2 (Aug. 10, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110082.pdf (emphasis 
added) [hereinafter Second Meeting] (The informal paper could not be located.). 
183 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37. 
184 Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 56. 
185 Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, 
Communication of the Delegation of Malaysia, p.6, MTN.GNS/FIN/W/3 (Sept. 12, 
1990), https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110111.pdf 
[hereinafter Communication from Malaysia] (Malaysian proposal was made on behalf 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:2 
784 
would have the broadest scope of the three formal propositions at 
the time: 
Compliance of the MFTS [Multilateral Framework on 
Trade in Services] and sectoral annotations on 
financial services should not impinge on a supervisory 
authority’s right to: (a) Exercise adequate and proper 
supervision over the foreign financial institutions 
operating in its country; (b) Implement rules and 
regulations to ensure that foreign financial institutions 
maintain sound and prudent practices and policies; (c) 
Take necessary action for the protection of depositors and 
investors; and (d) Allow flexibility to governments to 
impose measures for maintenance of stability in the 
financial system.186 
During the third meeting of the Working Group, when 
discussing this proposal, the representative of Japan stated that the 
concept of prudential measures might differ from country to 
country.187 
After these three meetings and three proposals, the Chairman 
of the Ad Hoc Working Group to the Group of Negotiations on 
Services proposed the following change: 
The “measures” referred to in Article XIV:1 [General 
Exceptions] of the Agreement shall include reasonable 
measures taken for prudential reasons to assure the 
protection of investors, depositors, policyholders or 
persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a 
                                                
South East Asian Central Banks [SEACEN] Countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Korea, the Philippines, Singapore and Myanmar.). 
186  Id. at 6-7.   
187  Working Group on Financial Service Including Insurance, Note on the 
Meeting of 13-15 September 1990, ¶ 22, MTN/GNS/FIN/3 (Oct. 16, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110180.pdf [hereinafter 
Third Meeting]. 
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financial service provider, or to ensure the integrity 
and stability of a party’s financial system.188 
By the end of 1990 at the Ministerial Conference held in 
Brussels, two versions of an annex on financial services were 
proposed.189  The prudential carve-out clause of the version 
submitted by Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland was identical to 
the Ad Hoc Working Groups Chairman’s proposal quoted above.190 
The second proposal made on behalf of the SEACEN Countries 
contained similar language with two key differences with respect to 
the prudential carve-out clause: first, the word “reasonable” was 
omitted, and second, measures for prudential reasons were not 
subject to the dispute settlement.191 
The negotiations work on the future Annex on Financial 
Services continued through 1991 under the auspices of the Group of 
Negotiations in Services.192 Canada, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland 
presented an addendum to their proposal at the Ministerial 
Conference in Brussels which added: 
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
(a) restriction on the provision of financial services by 
financial service providers of another Party or (b) 
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial 
service providers or between countries.193 
                                                
188 Report by the Chairman of the Sectoral Ad Hoc Working Group to the GNS, 
p. 10, MTN.GNS/W/110 (Nov. 6, 1990) [emphasis added], available at 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92110245.pdf. 
189 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 281 [footnote omitted]. 
190 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan, 
Sweden and Switzerland, MTN.TNC/W/50 (Dec. 2, 1990), 
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92120056.pdf. 
191 See Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Malaysia, p. 2, 
MTN.TNC/W/52 (Dec. 4, 1990), 
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW52. 
192 DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282. 
193 Trade Negotiations Committee, Communication from Canada, Japan, 
Sweden and Switzerland, p. 4, MTN/TNC/W/50/Add.2 (Oct. 15, 1991), 
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Based on these submitted proposals, negotiations led to the 
current text of the prudential carve-out clause.194 
Comparison of the negotiated and final versions of the text 
and comments made by the negotiators provides guidance for the 
interpretation of the clause. First, the negotiators considered the 
option for defining or listing all prudential actions which would be 
permitted, but did not.  Instead the clause is written in terms of 
prudential reasons; thus, leaving greater deference to the Country-
Members in implementing measures.  This confirms the finding in 
the Panel Report that the reasons must be prudential and not the 
measures. 
Second, the comparison of the latest two formal proposals 
shows that there was likely a compromise among countries whose 
positions were to have: a “reasonable” measures requirement, exclude 
from the exception particular ways in which measures could be 
applied—which is most similar to the second sentence of the current 
text, and to make the prudential carve-out clause subject to the WTO 
dispute settlement process. 
However, none of these observations speak directly as to 
what “prudential” means. There was one comment that may help 
understanding what “prudential” reasons are: “Reasons other than 
prudential ones . . . most often represent the kind of reasons that the 
agreement would seek to curtail.”195 Also, negotiators did not 
consider using the word “safeguard” which is the more common 
word used throughout the WTO Agreements used for identifying 
“preventative” measures. 
B. Second Sentence of the Prudential Carve-out Clause 
If the measure falls within the scope of the Annex, the 
Country-Member identifies a reason that is prudential, and the 
                                                
https://docs.wto.org/gattdocs/q/.%5CUR%5CTNC%5CW50A2.PDF [emphasis 
added]. 
194  See generally DELIMATSIS & HERGER, supra note 175, at 282 (“Formal 
records contain very little – if any – information about the negotiations that 
followed these submissions.”).   
195  Second Meeting, supra note 182, ¶ 37. 
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measure was implemented “for” that reason, as analyzed by the panel 
report, can anything else hinder the application of the prudential 
exception provision?  The answer “No” would render the second 
sentence of the provision meaningless; thus, the answer is necessarily 
“Yes, because of the second sentence of the provision.” Basically, the 
second sentence would disqualify an otherwise qualified exception. 
The Panel Report did not attempt to interpret the second sentence of 
the clause which states: “Where such measures do not conform with 
the provisions of the Agreement, they shall not be used as a means of 
avoiding the Member’s commitments or obligations under the 
Agreement.”196  The first part of the sentence necessarily presumes 
that there may be measures for prudential reasons conforming to the 
agreement, which may be permitted to be used as means of avoiding 
the Member’s commitments.  The second part’s “means of avoiding” 
is what future WTO panels or the Appellate Body may need to 
interpret. 
Recall that a proposal of a provision with a sentence similar 
to the final text appeared as: 
[M]easures shall not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable (a) 
restriction on the provision of financial services by 
financial service providers of another Party or (b) 
discrimination between domestic and foreign financial 
service providers or between countries.197 
If a panel finds that “means of avoiding” requires 
determining the intentions of a Member in order to weed out 
disguised discriminatory measures, then such intent may be discerned 
from the objective structure of the regulatory measure.198 
                                                
196  GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.a. 
197  See Communication from Canada, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland, supra note 
193; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.5.  
198  See, e.g., Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 117. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In summary, to answer the question of what is and what is 
not a prudential reason, generally a fact intensive multi-layered 
inquiry is required. Dictionary definitions are vague and do not 
provide any definitions for “prudential” that are any more helpful 
than if the drafters would write “measures for good reasons.” Context 
of the clause is very helpful in providing two main categories of 
reasons that are prudential: (1) “protection of investors, depositors, 
policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a 
financial service supplier”, and (2) “to ensure the integrity and 
stability of the financial system.”199  Further, context of the entire 
GATS Agreement shows that a “prudential” reason cannot be: “any” 
reason, because that would render the word “prudential” 
meaningless; merely “preventative” or “precautionary” reason, 
because all and any reasons either prevent or are precautionary 
against some event; and any of the reasons that have specific 
exemption provisions in the GATS, because that would render those 
exemption provisions meaningless. Moreover, negotiators did not 
consider using the term “safeguarding reasons,” utilizing the 
commonly used word “safeguard” to convey something 
“preventative” or “precautionary” as used throughout various WTO 
agreements; thus, another reason to conclude that “prudential” does 
not mean “preventative” or “precautionary.” 
Two main objects and purposes of WTO agreements related 
to this provision are: recognition of national policy objectives and 
progressive liberalization of international trade. If a reason for a 
measure does not go against the objective of liberalized trade in 
services or goods, then the remaining object and purpose to be 
considered is the national policy objective, providing broader 
discretion to the implementing Country-Member.  
The current interpretation of the prudential carve-out clause 
in the Panel Report gives more discretion to Country-Members, as 
some have anticipated, by finding that reasons and not measures 
must be prudential.  However, such discretion is not unqualified even 
under the current interpretation. If the “reasonableness” requirement 
                                                
199  See GATS, supra note 9, Annex on Financial Services, § 2.  
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was negotiated away during the Uruguay Round, and in return the 
clause was made subject to the WTO dispute settlement process, 
ironically, “rationality” made its way back into the text through 
panel’s interpretation of the word “for” when it was left to, as critics 
would say, the “runaway jurists.”  
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In August 2007, seventeen-month-old1 Andrew was abducted 
to Mexico from his hometown of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.2  At the 
time of his abduction, Andrew’s parents were involved in divorce 
proceedings and had a temporary custody agreement granting 
                                                
1   Sources differ as to whether Andrew was seventeen or nineteen 
months old at the time of his abduction.  Compare Trevor Richardson, My Journey 
Continues (Mar. 1, 2008), 
http://mexicoabduction.blogspot.com/2008_03_01_archive.html (Trevor’s blog 
stating that Andrew was seventeen months old at the time of his abduction), with 
Trevor Richardson, Bring Andrew Home-Int’l Child Abduction to Mexico, YOUTUBE 
(Sep. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Bring Andrew Home], 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bl_SJ1CVOdM (A news segment posted on 
Trevor’s YouTube channel stating that Andrew was nineteen months old).  
2   Felony Warrant For Mother Who Abducted Her Child, Andrew Richardson, In 
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Andrew’s father, Trevor, visitation.3  When Trevor arrived at 
Andrew’s daycare to pick him up, he was informed that his son had 
not shown up for a week.4  Andrew was soon found in Querétaro, 
Mexico, living with his mother, Mariana,5 a Mexican national.6  
Mariana was charged in the U.S. with two felonies for abduction,7 
and Trevor was granted sole legal custody of Andrew.8  Upon 
arriving in Mexico, however, Mariana had told authorities that she 
fled the U.S. because Trevor was abusive to her and Andrew.9  
Although the U.S. determined these allegations were false,10 Trevor 
remains unable to secure the return of his son to the U.S. in 
accordance with his custody rights.11 
Sadly, Andrew and Trevor’s story is not uncommon.  Each 
year, more than one thousand international parental child abductions 
from the U.S. to other countries are reported.12  Since 2006, Congress 
has reported that this number has “increased substantially,”13 since 
advancements in international transportation and communication 
have resulted in an increase in travel and immigration.14  In fact, it is 
estimated that more than 11,000 American children15 currently live 
                                                
3   Trevor Richardson, History, BRING ANDREW HOME, 
http://www.bringandrewhome.com/andrew_feb_7_002.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 
2014). 
4   Id. 
5   Id. 
6   Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1. 
7   Id. 
8   My Journey Continues, supra note 1. 
9   Bring Andrew Home, supra note 1. 
10   Id. 
11   My Journey Continues, supra note 1. 
12   H.R. 3212, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/3212/text. 
13   H.R. 1951, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013), available at 
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/1951/text; see also H.R. 3240, 
111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/F?c111:1:./temp/~c111TqDdHb:e1569: (stating that the number of 
international parental child abductions increased by sixty percent from 2006 to 
2008, and by forty percent in 2008 alone). 
14   Priscilla Steward, Access Rights: A Necessary Corollary to Custody Rights 
Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, 21 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 308, 315 (1997). 
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abroad as a result of international parental child abduction.16  
Statistically, only half of these children will be returned to the U.S.17 
International parental child abduction frequently causes 
severe psychological and emotional damage to both the child and 
left-behind parent.18  Often, the child is taken from a stable, healthy 
environment, and relocated to an unfamiliar environment in which he 
or she must meet new people, learn a new language, and understand 
and assimilate into a different culture.19  Worse still, taking parents 
sometimes force their children to alter their appearance or change 
their name,20 and may tell their children the left-behind parent is 
dead, does not want them, or is not trying to get them back.21  
Abducted children often experience “anxiety, eating problems, 
nightmares, mood swings, sleep disturbances, aggressive behavior, 
resentment, and fearfulness,” and these problems may persist 
through adulthood.22 
                                                
15   Another source estimated that there are more than 200,000 cases of 
international child abduction per year, which would significantly increase the 
number of American children who are believed to be living abroad as a result of 
international parental child abduction.  A Parent’s Worst Nightmare: The Heartbreak of 
Int’l Child Abduction: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 108th Cong. 110 
(2004) (statement of the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Board, National 
Center for Missing & Exploited Children), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa94505.000/hfa94505_0f.htm. 
16   Michael Walsh & Susan Savard, Int’l Child Abduction and the Hague 
Convention, 6 BARRY L. REV. 29, 29 (2006). 
17   H.R. 3212, supra note 12. 
18   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 10 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Compliance 
Report], available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2010Co
mplianceReport.pdf. 
19   Caitlin Bannon, The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction: The Need for Mechanisms to Address Noncompliance, 31 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 129, 134 (2011). 
20   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on the 




21   Id. 
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Similarly, left-behind parents frequently experience 
psychological, emotional, and financial problems while attempting to 
secure the return of their children.23  Left-behind parents often feel 
“helplessness and the sense they do not know where to start in the 
process of recovering their child.”24  A lack of financial resources 
exacerbates these emotions, since the left-behind parent may be 
restricted in traveling abroad, retaining an attorney, hiring translators 
and interpreters, and proceeding with the case.25 
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction (the “Hague Convention” or the “Convention”) 
was enacted to ensure that victims of international parental child 
abduction are returned to their custodial parent.26  The text of the 
Convention, however, does not set forth standards or procedures to 
implement the Convention.27  Consequently, many countries have 
failed to comply because of internal difficulties with enforcement.28 
This comment will examine the problem of noncompliance, 
with a focus on children abducted between the U.S. and Mexico.  
Part II provides a general overview of the Convention and examines 
its objectives and operation between contracting states.  Part III 
assesses the problems of the Convention, particularly its lack of an 
enforcement mechanism.  Part IV describes the differences between 
the U.S. and Mexico’s legal systems, with an emphasis on custody 
rights.  Part V explains the history of the Convention in the U.S. and 
Mexico, focuses on each country’s compliance efforts, and provides 
an overview of recent compliance efforts in Latin America.  Finally, 
Part VI explores potential solutions for addressing noncompliance, 
including creating Hague Convention courts and providing adequate 
resources to left-behind parents and Central Authorities. 
                                                
22   Id. 
23   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 11. 
24   2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 7. 
25   Id. 
26   The Convention on the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, opened 
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 98 [hereinafter Abduction Convention], 
available at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=24. 
27   Elisa Perez-Vera, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law, Explanatory 
Report 430 (1981) [hereinafter Perez-Vera Report], available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf. 
28   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
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II.  THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 
On October 24, 1980, twenty-nine Member States of the 
Hague Conference unanimously adopted the Convention, which was 
signed the following day.29  Currently, more than eighty countries are 
party to the Convention, including the U.S. and Mexico.30  The 
Convention’s primary goal is for countries to work together to 
“protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their 
wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure 
their prompt return to the State of habitual residence31.”32  The 
Convention also seeks to ensure that rights of custody and access are 
returned to the “status quo” that existed before the child was 
abducted.33  Finally, the Convention seeks to deter abducting parents 
from engaging in international forum shopping to find a country in 
which they believe they can obtain a favorable custody agreement.34 
A. Objectives of the Hague Convention 
The Hague Convention states two primary objectives:35 (1) 
“to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State,”36 and (2) “to ensure that rights of 
                                                
29   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 426. 
30   Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.statusprint&cid=24 (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2014), now available at 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.  
31   Neither the Hague Convention nor ICARA define a child’s state of 
habitual residence.  In Abbott, however, the Supreme Court explained that a child’s 
state of habitual residence is “fixed by the custody arrangement,” so the child 
should be returned to the country of his or her custodial parent.  Abbott v. Abbott, 
560 U.S. 1, 33 (2010). 
32   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at Preamble. 
33   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
34   Id.; Walsh & Savard, supra note 16, at 30. 
35   Both of the Convention’s objectives assume that the return of the 
child to the state of habitual residence is in his or her best interest.  Although the 
Convention does not explicitly refer to the child’s best interest, contracting states 
consider them to be of utmost importance when determining custody and access 
rights.  Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 431. 
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custody and access under the law of one Contracting State are 
effectively represented in the other Contracting States.”37  A taking 
parent’s duty to return a child is triggered only when the child’s 
removal or retention is deemed wrongful under the Convention.38  
Removal or retention is considered wrongful where it is (1) in breach 
of custody rights in the state in which the child was habitually 
resident immediately prior to his or her removal or retention, and (2) 
when the left-behind parent was actually exercising those custody 
rights at the time of the removal or retention.39 
The Convention defines custody rights as “relating to the care 
of . . . the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s 
place of residence.”40  Custody rights differ from access rights, which 
are the “rights to take a child for a limited period of time to a place 
other than the child’s habitual residence.”41  Custody rights may arise 
by law, or by a judicial or administrative decision or agreement that 
has legal effect under the law of the child’s state of habitual 
residence.42 
B. The Role of the Central Authority 
To execute the mandates of the Hague Convention, 
contracting states are required to assign a Central Authority.43  The 
primary role of the Central Authority is to return abducted children 
by encouraging cooperation between officials in each state and 
among other contracting states.44  In addition, Central Authorities 
must assist in locating the child, attempt to facilitate a voluntary 
return of the child, and, if necessary, initiate legal proceedings for the 
                                                
36    A contracting state is “any country which is a party to the 
Convention.”  22 C.F.R. § 94.1 (2013). 
37     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 1. 
38     Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 444. 
39     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 3. 
40     Id. at art. 5(a). 
41     Id. at art. 5(b). 
42     Id. at art. 3. 
43     Id. at art. 6. 
44     Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 7. 
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child’s return.45  In the U.S., the designated Central Authority is the 
Office of Children’s Issues within the U.S. Department of State.46  In 
Mexico, the Central Authority is the Secretaría de Relaciones 
Exteriores.47 
C. Filing a Hague Convention Application 
For assistance in returning an abducted child, left-behind 
parents who believe their child has been wrongfully removed or 
retained must apply to a Central Authority.48  The Central Authority 
then must act “without delay” to transmit the application to its 
pertinent counterpart Central Authority,49 which must “take[] all 
appropriate measures” to locate the child and secure his or her 
prompt return.50 
A left-behind parent must satisfy three threshold 
requirements before filing a valid Hague Convention application.  
First, the child’s country of habitual residence and country of 
abduction must both be signatories to the Convention.51  Second, the 
child must have been removed from the state of habitual residence in 
breach of custody or access rights authorized in that state.52  Third, 
the child must be younger than sixteen years of age.53  Even if the 
child is abducted or an application for the child’s return is initiated 
                                                
45   Id.; Outline: Hague Child Abduction Convention, HAGUE CONF. ON 
PRIVATE INT’L LAW (July 2012), http://www.hcch.net/upload/outline28e.pdf. 
46   Authorities, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=authorities.details&aid=133 (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2014). 
47   Int’l Parental Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/mexico.html (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
48   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 8; Perez-Vera Report, 
supra note 27, at 455 (stating that the applicant may apply to whichever Central 
Authority it deems most appropriate). 
49   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 9. 
50   Id. at art. 10. 
51   Id. at art. 35.  
52   Id. at art. 3. 
53   Id. at art. 4. 
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before the child turns sixteen years old, the Convention ceases to 
apply as soon as the child reaches this age.54 
If all three requirements are satisfied and the child is 
successfully located, the appropriate Central Authority must assist the 
left-behind parent to initiate court proceedings in the country in 
which the child is located.55  In these proceedings, the court should 
not consider the merits of the underlying custody dispute.56  Instead, 
the court’s sole focus is to determine whether the child was 
wrongfully removed according to custody rights in the child’s state of 
habitual residence and to return those children it determines to have 
been wrongfully removed.57  If the parents desire to modify their 
custody agreement, they must contact the appropriate authorities in 
the child’s state of habitual residence once the child has been 
returned.58 
D. Defenses to the Hague Convention 
To protect the child’s best interests, the Hague Convention 
does not require the prompt return of abducted children under five 
circumstances.59  First, there is no obligation to return a child if more 
than one year has elapsed from when the child was wrongfully 
removed or retained to when the left-behind parent made a request 
for the child’s return, as long as the child has settled in to his or her 
new environment.60  Second, there is no duty to return a child if the 
parent with custodial rights was not exercising those rights at the time 
of the child’s removal or retention.61  Third, if the left-behind parent 
consented or acquiesced in the child’s removal or retention, the 
                                                
54   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 4. 
55   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 455. 
56   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 16-19. 
57   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
58   Id. at 430. 
59   The first three defenses listed must be proved by a preponderance of 
the evidence, and the last two must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.  
Nat’l Report Int’l Child Custody, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/International_Child_Abducti
on_Remedies_Act.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2015). 
60   Abduction Convention, supra note 26, at art. 12. 
61   Id. at art. 13(a). 
2016 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5:2 
798 
taking parent is not required to return the child.62  Fourth, there is no 
obligation to return a child if the abducting country determines that 
doing so would pose a “grave risk” or place the child in an otherwise 
“intolerable situation.”63  Finally, a taking parent is not required to 
return a child if doing so would go against the requesting state’s 
fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.64 
III. PROBLEMS OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
Prior to the Hague Convention, a left-behind parent would 
have little to no legal remedy to ensure his or her child’s rightful 
return.65  The Department of State could not enforce an American 
custody agreement outside of the U.S.,66 since custody rights 
authorized in the U.S. could not be enforced in other countries.67  In 
addition, courts in the U.S. were reluctant to enforce a left-behind 
parent’s custody rights, since the abducted child was no longer 
located within the U.S.68 
The Convention has not achieved its laudable goals.  The 
Convention was designed to ensure that wrongfully removed children 
would be returned in accordance with custody rights ordered in the 
child’s state of habitual residence (and effectively return the situation 
                                                
62   Id. 
63   Id. at art. 13(b). 
64   Id. at art. 20. 
65   Tai Vivatvaraphol, Back to Basics: Determining a Child’s Habitual Residence 
in Int’l Child Abduction Cases Under the Hague Convention, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3325, 
3332-33 (2009); see also Susan Mackie, Procedural Problems in the Adjudication of Int’l 
Parental child Abduction Cases, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 445, 448 (1996) (stating 
that before the Convention, taking parents would obtain a favorable custody 
agreement in the abducting country, precluding the left-behind parent from 
establishing his or her custody rights). 
66   Int’l Child Abduction, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Jan. 1995), available at 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/children/9501.html. 
67   Vivatvaraphol, supra note 65, at 3332. 
68   Id. 
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to the “status quo”69); however, the Convention is not performing as 
it was originally intended.70 
The Convention’s primary issue is that its text does not 
contain an enforcement mechanism for “ensuring that Contracting 
States fulfill their obligations or for dealing with those Contracting 
States that fail to do so.”71  As a result, enforcement of the 
Convention hinges solely on the cooperation and willingness of 
contracting states.72  If contracting states do not comply, there are no 
consequences or repercussions.73  Left-behind parents report that 
even when their children are abducted to countries that are 
signatories to the Convention, most of these countries “routinely 
reject the responsibility that comes with participation in [the 
Convention]” and the U.S. “fail[s] to respond to their pleas for 
help.”74 
As a result of the lack of an enforcement mechanism, 
numerous parties to the Convention are considered noncompliant.75  
The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA),76 enacted 
in the U.S. to enforce the Convention, requires the Department of 
State to release an annual compliance report.77  Reports include 
detailed country-by-country international child abduction statistics, 
summaries of unresolved cases, address issues contracting states are 
having with compliance, and describe efforts to encourage parties to 
the Convention to use nongovernmental organizations to assist left-
behind parents seeking the return of their children.78  Compliance 
                                                
69   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 429. 
70   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
 
71   Id. 
72   Id. (quoting Paul R. Beaumont & Peter E. McEleavy, The Hague 
Convention on Int’l Child Abduction 242 (P.B. Carter ed., 1999). 
73   Id. 
74   H.R. Con. Res. 293, 106th Cong. (2000). 
75   Bannon, supra note 19, at 153. 
76   See discussion infra, at Part V.B. 
77   42 U.S.C. § 11611(a) (1988). 
78   Id. 
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reports also list all countries the Department of State determines are 
having difficulties enforcing the Convention.79 
When evaluating a contracting state’s compliance, the 
Department of State evaluates three areas: Central Authority 
performance, judicial performance, and law enforcement 
performance.80  First, the Department of State evaluates how quickly 
a country’s Central Authority processes Convention applications, its 
willingness to help left-behind parents find competent legal 
assistance, and its responsiveness to inquiries made by the U.S. 
Central Authority (USCA) and left-behind parents.81  Next, the 
Department evaluates judicial performance, including how quickly 
the country’s courts process Convention applications and appeals, 
whether the courts correctly apply the Convention’s legal procedures, 
and how effective courts are in enforcing decisions.82  Finally, the 
Department reviews law enforcement performance by examining 
whether law enforcement officials are successful in expeditiously 
locating abducted children and taking parents, and enforcing court 
orders issued under the Convention.83 
Based on contracting states’ performance, they may be 
labeled by the Department of State as either “Countries Not 
Compliant with the Convention” or “Countries Demonstrating 
Patterns of Noncompliance with the Convention.”84  A “Countr[y] 
Not Compliant with the Convention” designation signals the country 
is not competent in all performance areas.85  A “Countr[y] 
Demonstrating Patterns of Noncompliance” designation indicates 
the country is not competent in one or two of the three performance 
                                                
79   Id. 
80   2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 6. 
 
81   Id. at 12. 
82   Id. 
83   Id. 
84   U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliant with the Hague Convention on the 




85   Id. 
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areas.86  Mexico has earned both of these designations in recent 
years.87  In addition, a country is considered compliant if it is 
competent in all three areas, although the Department of State 
considers even one unresolved case to possibly “reflect broader 
problems of concern with the country’s compliance.”88 
IV.  DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE 
U.S. 
Mexico and the U.S. possess different legal systems, and 
different philosophies regarding custody and parental rights.89  In 
deciding Hague Convention return cases, the law of the child’s state 
of habitual residence governs the validity of the claim.90  This law 
must be construed broadly to “embrac[e] both written and customary 
rules of law91 . . . and the interpretations placed upon them by case-
law.”92  This has led to misunderstandings in enforcing custody 
agreements, and makes it difficult for the U.S. and Mexico to 
uniformly enforce the Hague Convention.  Ultimately, this conflict 
contributes to the Department of State’s determination that Mexico 
is noncompliant.93 
                                                
86   Id. 
87   See U.S. Dep’t of State, Report on Compliance with the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction 15 (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter 2007 Compliance 
Report], available at 
http://travel.state.gov/content/dam/childabduction/complianceReports/2007chil
d_abduction_Compliance_Report.pdf; 2008 Compliance Report, supra note 83, at 16; 
2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 
22. 
88   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 15. 
89   Mexico’s legal system derives from civil law, so judges look primarily 
at the Code when deciding legal issues.  The U.S.’ legal system derives from 
common law, so judges decide legal issues based on statutes and precedent.  
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, U.S./Mexico Cross-Border Child Abduction – the Need for 
Cooperation, 29 N.M. L. REV. 289, 294 (1999). 
90   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445. 
91   An example of a customary rule of law is the concept of patria 
potestas in Mexico. See discussion infra, at Part IV.A. 
92   Perez-Vera Report, supra note 27, at 445. 
93   2010 Compliance Report, supra note 18, at 22.  
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A. Custody Rights in Mexico 
In Mexico, the concept of patria potestad,94 translated to 
parental authority, is applied to the legal relationship between 
children and their parents.95  Exercising parental authority involves a 
duty of care and custody to the minor child.96  As Mexican courts 
apply this concept, custody of a child involves special care, attention, 
and love.97  Further, “[c]ustody cannot be understood separately from 
the physical supervision of the children, because that connection is a 
means to protect them, raise them . . . and provide for them.”98  
Parental authority is distinct from the physical custody of a child or 
an arrangement of visitation rights, however, because parental 
authority is inherent in the relationship between children and their 
parents.99 
Historically, parental authority referred to paternal power, so 
“a father had a near absolute right to his children, whom he viewed 
as chattel.”100  This natural right was viewed as so strong that courts 
were virtually “powerless” to interfere.101  Over time, however, 
Mexican courts began to subordinate the concept of parental 
authority to the best interests of the child.102 
Today, parental authority in Mexico is largely governed by the 
Civil Code,103 and “has evolved from an absolute power into a legal 
power.”104  Parental authority has slowly transformed into a joint 
                                                
94   “Patria potestad” is Spanish for “parental authority.”  Patricia Begné, 
Symposium on Comparative Custody Law: North American Parental Authority and Child 
Custody in Mexico, 39 FAM. L.Q. 527, 527 (2005). 
95   Id. 
96   Id. at 533. 
97   Id. at 534. 
 
98   Id. 
99   Whallon v. Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 453 (1st Cir. 2000). 
100   Kathryn Mercer, A Content Analysis of Judicial Decision-Making – How 
Judges use the Primary Caretaker Standard to Make a Custody Determination, 5 WM. & 
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responsibility between the father and mother.105  In divorce cases, 
both parents continue to exercise parental authority over the child,106 
unless this authority is legally terminated.107  Since Mexican family law 
courts are instructed to consider the best interests of the child in 
deciding custody arrangements,108 children are commonly placed with 
their mothers following a divorce.109  Only one to five of every one 
hundred fathers are awarded custody of their children.110 In fact, 
mothers are automatically awarded custody of children under age 
seven (and sometimes up to age twelve, depending on the state), 
unless the father proves that the mother poses a significant danger to 
the child’s development.111 
B. Custody Rights in the U.S. 
Similar to Mexico, the U.S. historically awarded custody rights 
to fathers, since children were considered the father’s property.112  In 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, states increasingly awarded 
custody based on the best interests of the child.113  As a result, 
mothers were often awarded custody of their children, especially in 
the case of young children.114 
Recently, the “maternal presumption” has lessened, and the 
legislature considers joint custody and uses a primary caretaker 
standard to determine the child’s best interests.115  Joint custody 
assumes that allowing a child to maintain relationships with both 
                                                
105   Sedillo Lopez, supra note 89, at 297. 
106   Id. 
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110   Aline Juárez Nieto, Patria Potestad, Donde la Biología Juega en Contra de 
los Varones, CNN MEXICO (July 11, 2012, 3:32 PM), 
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parents is in the child’s best interests.116  The primary caretaker 
standard presumes that it is in the child’s best interest to live with 
whichever parent has provided continuous care.117  Despite 
movements toward these new standards, mothers are still awarded 
custody of their children more frequently than fathers.118  For 
example, in 2012, only 18.3 percent of custodial parents were 
fathers.119 
V.  HISTORY OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND 
MEXICO 
Mexico is the most popular destination for children abducted 
from the U.S., and vice versa.120  For example, in 2009, the USCA 
was involved with 558 cases in which American children were 
abducted to Mexico.121  Japan had the second largest number of 
active cases with thirty-eight.122  This phenomenon likely results from 
Mexico’s proximity to, and historical and cultural connections with, 
the U.S.123 Today, there are roughly 11.7 million individuals living in 
the U.S. who were born in Mexico, and Mexico-U.S. migration is the 
largest bi-national migration flow in the world.124 
                                                
116   J. SHOSHANNA EHRLICH, FAMILY LAW FOR PARALEGALS 211 (4th 
ed. 1008). 
117   Mercer, supra note 100, at 47. 
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A. Mexico’s Compliance with the Hague Convention 
In recent years, the Department of State has found that 
Mexico has struggled to fulfill its obligations under the Hague 
Convention.125  For three consecutive years, Mexico was designated 
as a country exhibiting “patterns of noncompliance” because the 
Mexican Central Authority (MCA) was ineffective at locating 
abducted children and taking parents within Mexico.126  For example, 
in 2009, there were forty-seven cases of children abducted from the 
U.S. to Mexico, and the children were only located in thirteen of 
these cases.127 
In 2010, Mexico was labeled as “not compliant.”128  The 
USCA reported it “experienced serious difficulties” working with the 
MCA, causing left-behind parents to endure “costly inconvenience” 
and “significant delays” in processing return applications.129  For 
example, the USCA requested the MCA’s assistance in locating 
children involved in thirty-eight unresolved cases that had been 
pending for more than eighteen months, but the MCA failed to 
locate them “[i]n many of the cases.”130 
Three factors contribute to Mexico’s difficulties enforcing the 
Hague Convention.  First, Mexico has not enacted legislation, like 
ICARA in the U.S., to effectively implement the Convention.131  
Instead, this responsibility is reserved to the states.132  As a result, 
Congress unanimously adopted a resolution urging Mexico and other 
noncompliant countries “to ensure their compliance with the Hague 
                                                
125   See 2007 Compliance Report, supra note 87, at 15; 2008 Compliance Report, 
supra note 84, at 16; 2009 Compliance Report, supra note 20, at 21; 2010 Compliance 
Report, supra note 18, at 22. 
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Convention by enacting effective implementing legislation and 
educating their judicial and law enforcement authorities.”133  Mexico, 
however, continues to enforce the Convention according to 
independent state law.134 
Second, Mexico does not have sufficient resources to locate 
abducted children and taking parents, or to educate officials and 
judges about the Convention’s procedures.135  For example, some 
Mexican judges continue to adjudicate cases arising under the 
Convention based on procedures found in state civil codes136 and the 
merits of the underlying custody dispute, which is inconsistent with 
the Convention.137  Instead, judges are supposed to assume the 
existing custody agreement from the child’s state of habitual 
residence is valid, and must return the child based on this 
agreement.138  Recently, Congress encouraged Mexico and other 
noncompliant countries to “further educate its central authority and 
local law enforcement authorities regarding the Hague 
Convention . . . and the need for immediate action when a parent of 
an abducted child seeks their assistance.”139 
Third, taking parents may file an “amparo,” a special appeal in 
which the taking parent claims that the government has violated a 
constitutional right.140  When an amparo is filed, the case is put on 
hold until a ruling on the amparo has been made.141  A ruling on an 
amparo may be appealed multiple times, resulting in costly delays to 
the left-behind parent.142 
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In an attempt to solve these problems, in 2008, the U.S. 
Embassy in Mexico City began working with the MCA “to persuade 
the Mexican branch of Interpol to apply more resources and effort to 
locate abducted children, and to educate the judiciary in an effort to 
increase understanding of the Convention.”143  Further, the MCA 
began working with the Agencia Federal de Investigación (AFI) in an 
effort to more efficiently locate abducted children.144  Finally, the 
MCA has also claimed that it has undertaken legislative initiatives to 
restrict the use of amparos in Hague return cases.145 
For the past three years, the Department of State has noted 
the MCA has made significant improvements in its enforcement of 
the Convention.146  Unfortunately, the MCA and Mexican law 
enforcement continue to experience difficulties locating abducted 
children because of inadequate staffing and other resources.147  
Mexican courts are also exceptionally slow in processing Hague 
return applications,148 and judges continue to adjudicate Hague return 
cases inconsistently.149  As a result, the number of unresolved return 
applications is increasing.150 
B. The U.S.’ Compliance with the Hague Convention 
Congress enacted ICARA to give effect to the Hague 
Convention in the U.S.151  The Act gives the Convention the force of 
law in the U.S., and imposes consequences, such as contempt, if the 
Convention is not complied with.152  ICARA and the Convention 
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serve “to deter international child abduction and to provide a 
mechanism for the prompt return of abducted children.”153 
Parts of ICARA, however, hinder operation of the 
Convention. For example, ICARA grants state and federal courts 
concurrent jurisdiction over all claims arising under the 
Convention.154  It is recommended that Hague Convention return 
cases be filed in federal court because “[f]ederal judges are 
considered . . . better equipped to [rule according to the Convention] 
as opposed to state court judges, who are accustomed to making best 
interests of the child determinations and who may be more inclined 
to do so in Hague Convention cases.”155  Consequently, a left-behind 
parent may engage in forum-shopping to obtain the most favorable 
venue to pursue his or her Hague return case, resulting in additional 
costs and delays.156 
The Department of States’ three most recent compliance 
reports do not include statistics analyzing the U.S.’ handling of 
incoming Hague Convention cases.157  Nonetheless, in 2009, there 
were 324 newly filed Convention applications involving 454 children 
that were abducted into the U.S.158  Of these 454 children, the U.S. 
only returned 154 of them to their country of habitual residence.159  
120 of these children were abducted from Mexico, and only fifty-
three were returned.160  Although the U.S. does not evaluate its own 
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performance, these numbers suggest that, despite ICARA, the U.S. 
also experiences difficulties enforcing the Convention. 
C.  Latin American Efforts to Promote Compliance with the 
Hague Convention 
In 2004, judges and Central Authorities from seventeen Latin 
American countries, Spain, and the U.S. met to discuss ways to 
improve regional operation of the Hague Convention.161  Officials 
concluded that cooperation with the Convention would require 
“[r]egular international meetings and contacts among Judges and 
Central Authorities for the purpose of exchanging information, ideas 
and good practice.”162  At follow-up meetings, officials recommended 
and developed “regional model law of procedure” to “facilitate 
national implementation of the [Convention].”163 
In 2011, officials from Latin American countries and 
organizations, Spain, and the U.S. met “to discuss how to improve, 
among the countries represented, the operation of the 
[Convention] . . . and to provide information on the implementation 
of the [Convention].”164  The meeting proposed to develop a 
“practical handbook” to assist judges in Hague proceedings, 
recommended limiting grounds for appeals to streamline 
proceedings, and emphasized the importance of communication 
between Central Authorities and judges.165  In theory, educating all 
                                                
161   The Latin American Judges’ Seminar on the 1980 Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of Int’l Child Abduction, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, available 
at http://www.hcch.net/upload/monterrey2.pdf (last visited Feb. 2, 2014). 
162   Officials also made other conclusions and recommendations, 
including establishing national training programs from judges, central authority, 
personnel, and attorneys.  Id. 
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judges in every contracting state and encouraging communication 
between Central Authorities is a viable solution.  Streamlining these 
efforts and providing resources to facilitate the return of children will 
best serve the Convention’s goals. 
VI.  SOLUTIONS FOR ADDRESSING NONCOMPLIANCE BETWEEN THE 
U.S. AND MEXICO 
Compliance with the Hague Convention is critical for 
protecting abducted children.166  The Convention is often considered 
a “one-way street” for Americans.167  Left-behind parents from 
noncompliant countries benefit from the “almost certain” guarantee 
that children abducted into the U.S. will be returned, while American 
parents lack these same guarantees.168  In truth, the U.S. also has a 
meager track record for returning children.  Consequently, the 
Convention remains an empty promise for many left-behind parents.  
The U.S. and Mexico (and other contracting states) must ensure that 
abducted children are promptly returned to their custodial parent. 
A.  Educating Judges About Hague Return Cases 
Despite efforts to educate judges about Hague return cases, 
these cases are often decided inconsistently within a country and 
between countries.169  Judges are told to rule based on a broad 
interpretation of law, which includes the customary laws of the 
child’s state of habitual residence.170  Many judges also determine 
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family law issues according to the best interests of the child, but this 
may be inconsistent with the existing custody agreement.171 
Educating each judge in the U.S. and Mexico about the 
Hague Convention is a daunting task, particularly because many of 
these judges will never be assigned a Hague return case.  Ideally, 
providing a dedicated group of judges or courts would alleviate the 
problems associated with an inconsistent judiciary.  In the U.S., 
Congress may use its Article I powers “[t]o constitute tribunals 
inferior to the Supreme Court.”172  In Mexico, each state’s Congress 
has the power to create federal administrative courts.173  A court 
dedicated to Hague return cases would allow judges to become 
intimately familiar with the Convention and case law from other 
countries.174  As a result, Hague Convention return cases would be 
adjudicated consistently with the objectives of the Convention. 
B. Providing Adequate Financial Resources to Left-Behind Parents 
The U.S. does not provide adequate resources to left-behind 
parents.  The U.S. made a reservation175 to Article 26 of the Hague 
Convention.  Although making a reservation to Article 26 has not 
posed significant problems to other countries, it is a major source of 
delays in the U.S.176  The U.S. places the burden of paying for legal 
proceedings and attorneys solely on the left-behind parent, unless 
                                                
171   Silberman, supra note 168, at 1057. 
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Mexican Admin. Courts, CIDE (Dec. 2010), available at 
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these costs are covered by legal aid or assumed by pro bono 
attorneys.177  The legal aid system in the U.S., however, is under-
funded,178 and the availability of pro bono attorneys is decreasing, 
especially for family law-related claims.179 
The expenses of a Hague Convention return case extend 
beyond the legal proceedings.180  Despite the U.S. legal aid system’s 
lack of funds, the U.S. should be required to assist indigent left-
behind parents in these proceedings, since this benefits the abducted 
child and minimizes the time the child spends in an unfamiliar 
environment.  The United Kingdom, for example, has been 
successful in requiring its legal aid system to cover all legal costs to 
the extent it can bear.181  The U.S. could also require taking parents to 
cover the left-behind parents’ legal expenses, but this may not be 
feasible depending on the taking parent’s financial situation. 
C.  Providing Adequate Resources to Central Authorities 
Mexico does not provide adequate resources to the MCA to 
locate abducted children and taking parents.182  Although the MCA 
works with Interpol and AFI, the Authority still lacks the manpower 
and funds necessary to be effective, especially when the left-behind 
parent does not know the child’s exact location.183  Mexico’s lack of 
resources makes cooperation with the U.S. paramount. 
The USCA should limit using its resources to educate 
Mexican judges, the MCA, and law enforcement on Hague return 
cases.  Although the Department of State has noted recent 
improvements,184 the bulk of the MCA’s problems no longer result 
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from a lack of information.  Instead, the USCA should expend its 
resources in the form of manpower to assist the MCA and Mexican 
law enforcement in locating abducted children in Mexico. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Hague Convention lacks an enforcement mechanism to 
ensure that abducted children are promptly returned.  In many 
countries, the Convention is an empty promise for left-behind 
parents.  Although the U.S. enacted ICARA to implement the 
Convention, the U.S. has an unacceptable track record in returning 
abducted children.  The U.S. and Mexico must work together to 
ensure that children are promptly located and returned.  
Consequently, the U.S. and Mexico should create courts with judges 
dedicated to Hague Convention return cases to ensure consistency 
and accuracy in decisions.  The U.S. must provide financial assistance 
to left-behind parents, and Mexico and the U.S. must provide 
resources to the MCA to locate abducted children and taking parents.  
Under the current framework, the Convention fails to protect 
thousands of children and families every year.  We can do better.  
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The SS Gairsoppa was doomed when the vessel left Calcutta, 
India in December of 1940 and sailed in the treacherous Atlantic Seas 
during World War II.1 Unknown to the sailors navigating the vessel 
on that day, the salvage of the sunken ship in 2011 would set 
precedent to navigate the equally unforgiving waters of maritime 
salvage law. Amongst a virtual sea of conflicting international 
common law principles, international conventions, and national laws, 
the salvage of the SS Gairsoppa provides a model for contracted 
historical salvage for other states to follow. 
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (“Odyssey”), a Florida-
based salvage firm well-experienced in salvage operations and salvage 
litigations, conducted the salvage of the SS Gairsoppa. Working co-
operatively with the United Kingdom government, Odyssey entered 
into a contracted salvage of the SS Gairsoppa that ensured salvage of 
the vessel, and established clear ownership rights of the salvaged 
property. Contracting historical salvage not only promotes the 
exploration and recovery of sunken vessels and artifacts by providing 
clear economic incentives for governments and salvors alike, but 
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equally serves to minimize the litigation risk associated with historical 
salvages. 
This article surveys the current international salvage law 
regimes, and analyzes the economic incentives provided by the 
current laws. Part II traces the history of the SS Gairsoppa and 
chronicles the service of the vessel, its eventual sinking, and the 
contracted salvage agreement that led to the vessel’s recovery. Part 
III details the applicable laws governing international historic salvages 
including traditional international law, and international treaties. Part 
III also analyzes the economic incentives of the current legal regime. 
Part IV discusses the alternative of contracted historical salvage 
operations and the advantages, both legal and economic, for states to 
enter into contracted salvage. 
II. FROM BATTLE TO RESURRECTION 
The SS Gairsoppa was one of many vessels sunk in the 
Atlantic during World War II, but it could reshape more than just the 
ocean floor. The vessel transported an extraordinary amount of silver 
on its final journey, and the vessel’s salvage now provides a path for 
many states to follow in recovering their lost treasures. This section 
details the life of the SS Gairsoppa to provide insight into the ship’s 
interaction with international law. The section also provides an 
overview of the contracted salvage that should serve as a model for 
other states with historic shipwrecks. 
A. Life of the SS Gairsoppa 
The SS Gairsoppa began its career for the British India Steam 
Navigation Company Ltd. in 1919 as a commercial vessel.2 British 
India Steam Navigation Company finished construction of the 
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vessel.3 The vessel sailed the commercial waters of China, Australia, 
India, and East Africa for the next twenty years.4 
In the years leading up to the Second World War, the U.K. 
Director of Sea Transport of the Admiralty approached the British 
India Steam Navigation Company attempting to enlist passenger 
ships to join the British Fleet.5 The SS Gairsoppa was in war service by 
1940, along with all 103 British India Company ships.6  By the end of 
the war, fifty-one of these 103 ships were destroyed.7 
The SS Gairsoppa’s final voyage started in Calcutta, India in 
December 1940, where the vessel was loaded with what was thought 
to be £500,0008(about $1,980,200)9 of silver ingots along with tons of 
other general cargo.10 The Gairsoppa joined the merchant convoy SL 
64 off the coast of West Africa, and headed to Liverpool.11 The 
convoy slowed to 8 knots (9.2 mph)12 due to the poor condition of 
the ships, and was unable to connect with escort warships as the 
convoy entered dangerous Atlantic waters off of the western coast of 
Africa.13 Matters became bleaker as the Gairsoppa reached northern 
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WIKIPEDIA, 
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latitudes. The vessel lost touch with the convoy due to high wind 
speeds, ocean swells, and insufficient fuel.14 
On February 17, 1941, German Captain Ernst Mengersen’s 
U-boat, which was responsible for sinking over 70,000 tons of cargo 
during the war, torpedoed the Gairsoppa.15 The torpedo triggered an 
explosion which destroyed communications, and with no distress call 
sent, the Gairsoppa sank into the North Atlantic and became a grave 
for all the men on board except for one.16 
B. Contract for Salvage 
The British House of Commons originally tendered the 
salvage of the Gairsoppa in 1989 after adopting a policy of publically 
offering salvage contracts for government-owned wrecks and 
cargoes.17 The policy attempted to obtain the best return on 
investment for the taxpayers financing the salvages, but failed to 
receive adequate interest.18 The initial tendering only received one bid 
from Deepwater Recovery and Exploration, which was not 
pursued.19 
The salvage was revisited in January of 2010, when the 
United Kingdom Government Department for Transport awarded 
the salvage contract to Odyssey.20 The competitive process used blind 
bids received by the Government to establish how much of the 
known, insured silver would be retained by the salvage companies as 
                                                
14   Id. 
15   Id. 
16   Id. 
17   Parliamentary Business – Publications & Records: Written Answers November 
15, 1989 Column 257, PARLIAMENT.UK, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm198889/cmhansrd/1989-11-
15/Writtens-2.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
18   Id. 
19   Id. 
20  UK Government Awards Exclusive Salvage Contract to Odyssey Marine 
Exploration for Recovery of SS Gairsoppa Silver Cargo, ODYSSEY MARINE 
EXPLORATION, http://shipwreck.net/pr195.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) 
[hereinafter Exclusive Salvage Contract]. 
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compensation.21 The Government received three bids, and accepted 
Odyssey’s bid.22 
The contract for the salvage was based on “standard 
commercial practices,” and called for: 
Odyssey [to] assume the risk, expense, and 
responsibility for the search, cargo recovery, 
documentation, and marketing of the cargo. If the 
salvage is successful, Odyssey will be compensated 
with a salvage award which consists of a majority of 
the net value of the recovered cargo after deduction 
of expenses of search and salvage.23 
The contract allowed Odyssey to retain 80% of the salvaged 
silver’s value after recouping exploration costs.24 Simply put, the 
United Kingdom would subtract the exploration cost from the total 
value of the salvaged silver, and then retain only 20% of that figure. 
This contract was extremely lucrative for Odyssey; based on the 
estimated value of the insured silver, Odyssey stood to earn forty-five 
million dollars. 
Odyssey expected the exploration to take ninety days,25 but it 
proved more difficult when the Gairsoppa was not found within the 
original search location.26 Odyssey located the Gairsoppa in 201127 
approximately 4700 meters (approximately three miles) below sea 
level in international waters nearly 300 miles off the coast of 
                                                
21   Id. 
              22   Parliamentary Business – Publications & Records: Written Answers October 
31, 2011 Column 419W, PARLIAMENT.UK, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm111031/text
/111031w0002.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
23   Exclusive Salvage Contract, supra note 20. 
24  SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION, 
http://www.shipwreck.net/ssgairsoppaoperationaloverview.php (last visited Oct. 
17, 2013) [hereinafter SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview].  
25   Exclusive Salvage Contract, supra note 20. 
26   SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24. 
27   Kerry Sanders & Lauren Sullivan, $77M Sunken Treasure Found at 
Bottom of Atlantic, TODAY NEWS, (July 23, 2013, 11:48 AM), 
http://www.today.com/news/77m-sunken-treasure-found-bottom-atlantic-
6C10714149. 
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Ireland.28 While finding the vessel was a major hurdle, it did not 
ensure that the precious silver cargo would be located.29 In fact, 
Odyssey did not recover the first bar of silver until the following year, 
on July 18, 2012.30 The summer 2012 operations yielded 1,218 bars of 
silver (approximately 48 tons); the summer 2013 operations yielded 
an additional 1,574 bars (approximately 61 tons).31 In total, the 
salvage operation recovered 99% of the insured silver aboard the 
Gairsoppa, which amounted to 110 tons of silver (approximately 3.2 
million troy ounces).32 
Odyssey turned over the salvaged silver to JBR Recovery 
Limited, a leading European broker, for sale.33 The estimated value 
was seventy-seven million dollars, and the cost of exploration was 
twenty million dollars.34 Out of the fifty-seven million dollar net total, 
Odyssey will receive about 45.6 million dollars and the United 
Kingdom will receive the remaining 11.4 million dollars worth of 
silver. 
III. COMPARISON OF CONTROLLING LAW 
A. Traditional Maritime Law of Salvage and Finds 
International common law tradition maintains two controlling 
doctrines that concern historic shipwreck salvage: salvage law and the 
law of finds. Salvaging a historic shipwreck, or any vessel in distress, 
requires technical expertise to conquer the high level of risk and 
danger involved.35 Generally, the primary motivation of salvage 
operations is the compensation received for the task, which normally 
                                                
28   SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24. 
29   Sanders, supra note 27.  
30   SS Gairsoppa Operational Overview, supra note 24. 
31   Id. 
32   Id. 
33   Id. 
34   Sanders, supra note 27. 
35   CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF 
CULTURAL HERITAGE, 307-08 (2010) [hereinafter International Law].  
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is a percentage of the salvaged property’s value.36 The common law 
of salvage incentivizes individuals to assume the risk associated with 
the operations in order to rescue ships, their cargo, and their sailors.37 
Salvage law applies to ships that have been abandoned, 
derelict, or shipwrecked.38 Salvage operations must demonstrate four 
conditions: (1) the property must be in marine peril;39 (2) the salvor 
must attempt the operation voluntarily; (3) the operation must be in 
the interest of the owner; and (4) the salvor must be at least partially 
successful in recovering the property.40 While the salvor may be 
completely or partially motivated by the salvage reward, the salvor 
may not be under any duty to rescue the salvage vessel.41 
Under salvage law, it is presumed that the owner has not 
abandoned his interest in the vessel or its cargo.42 Without 
abandonment, the salvor cannot gain title over the recovered 
property and is only entitled to the salvage reward.43 To receive the 
salvage reward, the salvor must file a motion with the controlling 
admiralty/maritime court.44 Most often the reward is a percentage 
basis of the property recovered. The percentage awarded varies 
depending on the salvage operation’s level of risk, cost, and skill.45 If 
the owner refuses or is unable to pay the reward, the salvor can 
receive a maritime lien on the property.46 
On the other hand, if the vessel or property is abandoned, the 
law of finds controls.47 A majority of historic shipwrecks are 
                                                
36   Id. 
37   Id. at 288. 
38   Id. at 300. 
39   The term “marine peril” is ordinarily understood to mean that a 
vessel is at risk of sinking, losing its cargo, or otherwise in danger from rough seas 
or other forces which might compromise its seaworthiness. International Law, supra 
note 35, at 300. 
40   Id. 
41   Id. at 304. 
42   Id. at 309. 
43   Id. 
44   International Law, supra note 35, at 307. 
45   Id. at 309. 
46   Id. at 311-12.  
47   Id. at 310. 
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presumed abandoned.48 A key exception of sovereign immunity 
applies to vessels like warships.49 The law of finds allows for the 
salvor to retain full title over the salvaged property.50 The salvor is 
entitled to the property based on the assumption that “the property 
involved either was never owned or was abandoned.”51 
Courts decide whether salvage law or the law of finds 
applies.52 The determination is fact specific, but courts tend to apply 
the law of finds to historic shipwrecks.53 This tendency results from 
the fact that the majority of wrecks go unsalvaged for decades if not 
centuries, regardless of the owners actual intent to abandon the 
wreck.54 
B. International Salvage Law Conventions 
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. - The United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”)55 aimed at 
addressing navigational rights, territorial sea limits, economic 
jurisdiction, legal status of resources on the seabed, passage of ships, 
conservation and management of living marine resources, protection 
of the marine environment, a marine research regime, and setting a 
binding procedure for dispute settlement between States.56 UNCLOS 
addresses historical shipwrecks in articles 149 and 303.57 It is not 
                                                
48   Id. 
49   See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 397 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS] art. 42(5), 236 
(recognizing that sovereign vessels like warships are entitled to immunity from the 
conventions laws, this is a traditional principle of international law). 
50   Id. at 310. 
51   Valentina Sara Wadi, Investing in Culture: Underwater Cultural Heritage and 
International Investment Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 853, 870 (2009) (citing 
Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
52   Wadi, supra note 51, at 870 - 71. 
53   Id. at 871. 
54   Id. 
55   UNCLOS, supra note 49.  
56   The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective), 
OCEANS & LAW OF THE SEA UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_per
spective.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter UNCLOS Historical Perspective]. 
57   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 149, 303.  
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surprising given the major concerns of UNCLOS that the 
Convention only tangentially addresses historical shipwrecks. 
However, these articles do represent substantive international law 
that has been applied to historical salvage sites.58 
Article 149 is included within Part XI of UNCLOS titled 
“The Area,”59 and primarily addresses the deep-sea mining rights in 
customary international waters.60 The article reads: 
All objects of an archaeological and historical nature 
found in the Area shall be preserved or disposed of 
for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular 
regard being paid to the preferential rights of the State 
or country of origin, or the State of cultural origin, or 
the State of historical and archaeological origin.61 
The article encompasses historical shipwrecks without 
mentioning the term in its broad phrase “all objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature.” Many commenters have 
criticized the language as over-inclusive, and a “political tactic” by 
states that wished to advance the recognition of general cultural 
heritage rights.62 Regardless of the reason for the article’s inclusion, 
subsequent interpretations have yielded disparate meanings. 
One of the main issues left unresolved by Article 149 is how 
to “preserve[] or dispose[] of” historical objects.63 The ambiguity of 
the phrase and lack of clarification leaves salvors no clear guidance. 
Preserving an object has been interpreted as meaning both leaving 
                                                
58   Craig Forest, Historic Wreck Salvage: An International Perspective, 33 TUL. 
MAR. L. J. 347, 368 (2009).  
59   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at Part XI. 
60   See generally id. at Part XI (which details, through the multiple articles 
in the section, the duties owned to States concerning resources in the area. The 
convention defines “area” to mean “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” in article 1). 
61   Id. at art. 149. 
62   Anastasia Strati, THE PROTECTION OF THE UNDERWATER CULTURAL 
HERITAGE: AN EMERGING OBJECTIVE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA 
310 (1995). 
63   Forest, supra note 58, at 369. 
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the item “in situ,”64 and, conversely, placing the object in a museum 
for display.65 
Another issue with interpreting the article is what 
“preferential rights” should be given to which State.66 UNCLOS 
refers to rights of “State or country of origin,” as well as, “State of 
cultural origin” and “State of historical and archaeological origin.”67 
While analogous in many situations, UNCLOS never explicitly 
defines the terms. Further, UNCLOS’s negotiations used the terms as 
synonyms, but all were left in the article, implying differing meanings 
to the terms.68 
Article 303 furthers the protections for underwater cultural 
heritage and is included in Part XVI of UNCLOS titled “General 
Provisions,”69 and Part XVI addresses general rights applicable to all 
zones discussed in UNCLOS. Article 303 provides: 
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature found at sea and 
shall cooperate for this purpose. 
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the 
coastal State may, in applying article 33, presume that 
their removal from the seabed in the zone referred to 
in that article without its approval would result in an 
infringement within its territory or territorial sea of 
the laws and regulations referred to in that article. 
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of 
identifiable owners, the law of salvage or other rules 
                                                
64   In situ is a Latin phrase meaning in the natural or original position or 
place. In situ Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/insitu (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). In the context of the 
Convention, it refers to leaving a shipwreck in its present resting place on the ocean 
floor. 
65   Id. 
66   Id.  
67   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 149. 
68   Forest, supra note 58, at 369. 
69   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303, Part XVI. 
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of admiralty, or laws and practices with respect to 
cultural exchanges. 
4. This article is without prejudice to other 
international agreements and rules of international 
law regarding the protection of objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature.70 
At first glance, Article 303 seems to restate the general duty 
of the State “to protect objects of an archaeological and historical 
nature found at sea.”71 Article 303, Sections 2 and 3 set the 
controlling law for historical salvage. Under Article 303(2), States 
with any historical wrecks found within the contiguous zone have full 
jurisdictional control over the salvage.72 In Article 303(3), UNCLOS 
seems to concede that traditional laws of salvage apply.73 UNCLOS 
did not intend this to be the case, as demonstrated by the language of 
303(4). The Article carves out a provision to “harmonize the rules of 
the law of the sea” with the “emerging law of archaeology and 
cultural heritage.”74 This exception to Article 303’s applicability paved 
the way for both the International Maritime Organization (“IMO”), 
1989 International Convention on Salvage Law, and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”), Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention (“UCH”), 
which are comprehensive conventions on historical salvage law.75 
UNCLOS was never intended to be controlling law for 
historical salvages, and Articles 149 and 303 are unsurprisingly 
vague.76 However, the treaty is substantive international law and 
created a clear carve out for controlling salvage law treaties. 
2. IMO 1989 International Convention on Salvage Law. - The main 
purpose of general salvage law is to “encourag[e] the rescue of 
                                                
70   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303. 
71   Id. 
72   Id.; see also UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 33 (contiguous zone can 
extend twenty-four miles from the state’s coastal baselines that determine its 
territorial sea). 
73   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303. 
74   Forest, supra note 58, at 370. 
75   Id.  
76   Id.  
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endangered property at sea, and, importantly, protect[] the marine 
environment from pollution [of] ships.”77 In 1989, the IMO passed a 
comprehensive convention to update international salvage law.78 The 
IMO convention replaced the law of salvage adopted in Brussels 
1910, which centered around the “no cure, no pay”79 principle.80 The 
IMO convention incentivizes environmental protection during 
salvage where the “no cure, no pay” regime did not, by providing a 
“special compensation” award for minimizing damage to the 
environment.81 
The IMO convention does not define “vessel” to include or 
exclude historical shipwrecks, but historic shipwrecks and their cargo 
are included within its definition of “property.”82 The definition is 
broad and applies to “any property in danger” that is “not 
permanently and intentionally attached to the shoreline and includes 
freight at risk.”83 
While not apparent from the text’s plain meaning, the 
expansive definition of property was understood by the drafters to 
include historical salvage. During the negotiations surrounding the 
convention, the German diplomat attempted to introduce an 
amendment that would have directly addressed sunken ships.84 
Conversely, the Argentinean diplomat proposed an amendment that 
                                                
77   Id. 
78   International Convention on Salvage, Apr. 4, 1989, 1953 U.N.T.S. 
165 (1989) [hereinafter IMO]. 
79   “No cure, no pay” is a principle that requires a “useful result” for a 
salvage award; in the absence of a useful result, there is no payment. A “useful 
result” is when property of value is saved. Property includes the vessel, cargo, or 
life. See Nicholas J. Gaskell, The 1989 Salvage Convention and the Lloyd’s Open Form 
(LOF) Salvage Agreement 1990, 16 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 49-50 (1991). 
80   International Convention on Salvage, INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/Internation
al-Convention-on-Salvage.aspx (last visited Oct. 24, 2013). 
81   Id. 
82   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1 (The convention defines vessel to mean: 
any ship or craft, or any structure capable of navigation; and defines property to 
mean: any property not permanently and intentionally attached to the shoreline and 
includes freight at risk). 
83   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1. 
84   Gaskell, supra note 79, at 35 (1991). 
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would have excluded sunken vessels from the convention.85 Without 
the adoption of either amendment, historical shipwrecks or any 
sunken vessel became property under Article 1(c).86 Further, Article 
30(1)(d) permits States to exempt “maritime cultural property of 
prehistoric, archaeological or historic interest” from the convention’s 
provisions.87 The reservation’s implication is clear: if member States 
do not explicitly state the convention does not apply to its historical 
sunken shipwrecks, then the convention will apply to any salvage 
operations on these wrecks.88 
Before the IMO convention came into force, U.S. courts 
often held general maritime salvage law applied to historic 
shipwrecks.89 The distinction between general maritime law and the 
IMO convention is important because general maritime law does not 
apply to abandoned shipwrecks.90 Prior to the IMO convention, 
abandoned shipwrecks were controlled by the “harsh, primitive, and 
inflexible” common law of finds, which expressed “the ancient and 
honorable principle of ‘finders, keepers.’”91 The IMO convention 
makes no distinctions for “abandoned” property. Thus, the law of 
finds never applies in jurisdictions employing the IMO convention.92 
Without the exclusion, the application of the IMO to historic 
shipwrecks falls well within the requirements of “any property in 
                                                
85   Id. at 35-36.  
86   Id. at 36-37. 
87   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 30; Martin Davies, Whatever Happened to the 
Salvage Convention 1989?, 39 J. MAR. L. & COM. 463, 483 (2008). 
88   Davies, supra note 87, at 483. 
89   See Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned 
Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1978); and Cobb Coin Co., Inc. v. 
Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing vessel, 549 F.Supp. 540 (S.D. Fla. 
1982)(holding that historical vessels being salvaged are governed by the “general 
maritime law of salvage applied to the retrieval of property from shipwrecks”). 
90   Davies, supra note 87, at 483. 
91   An abandoned shipwreck is any wreck that has not been salvaged 
within a certain common law period of time. The time period ranges depending on 
the jurisdiction of the wreck and any controlling national or international laws. See 
Hener v. U.S., 525 F.Supp. 350, 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding general maritime 
salvage law was “harsh, primitive and inflexible”); Martha’s Vineyard Scuba 
Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Steam Vessel, 833 
F.2d 1059, 1065 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding the basic operating values of common 
salvage law to be “finders, keepers”). 
92   Davies, supra note 87, at 483. 
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danger” that is “not permanently and intentionally attached to the 
shoreline and includes freight at risk.”93 
Due to its language, the IMO convention includes historic 
salvage operations; the application of the IMO convention to historic 
vessels poses problems. Even if courts would favor the application of 
the IMO convention over the common law of finds, the purpose of 
the IMO convention is to provide the salvor with payment from the 
owner of the salvaged property.94 Without knowledge of the owner 
of the historic shipwreck, the IMO convention does not provide 
clear authority on ownership of the property.95 The IMO convention 
in Article 12(1) provides that a successful salvage operation “give[s] 
the right to reward,”96 but the IMO convention does not detail the 
procedure to follow if the owner is unknown. The IMO convention 
does not state the reward must be monetary, and one could argue 
that payment could be the salvaged property, but there is no clear 
authority to establish that argument.97 
While the IMO convention does not provide clear 
international law for historic shipwrecks, it does provide differing 
incentives from UNCLOS. The IMO convention introduced major 
reform to international salvage law, especially considering the 
incentives for protection of the marine environment.98 Due to the 
problematic language of the IMO convention regarding historic 
vessels, it has not seen widespread adoption by States as governing 
law for historic wrecks.99 
3. UNESCO UCH Convention. - The thirty-first United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(“UNESCO”) adopted the Convention on the Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage100 (“UCH Convention”) in November 
                                                
93   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 1. 
94   Davies, supra note 87, at 484. 
95   Id. 
96   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 12(1). 
97   Davies, supra note 87, at 484. 
98   Forest, supra note 58, at 371. 
99   Id. 
100   Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
Nov. 2, 2001, UNESCO Doc.31C/Resolution 24 (2002) [hereinafter “UCH 
Convention”]. 
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2001.101 The UCH Convention attempts to provide protection to 
States with underwater cultural heritage (“UCH”)102 by clarifying the 
ambiguity surrounding the legal status of historic shipwrecks.103 The 
protection, preservation, and proper display of UCH advance 
UNESCO’s core value of educating the world public.104 
The UCH Convention built upon UNCLOS to develop a 
comprehensive convention to govern historic shipwreck salvage and 
protection.105 The UCH Convention began as an International Law 
Association’s (“ILA”)106 draft convention in 1994.107 The draft 
convention included an annex, which set out the benchmark 
standards for underwater archaeology, and prohibited the 
commercialization of historic shipwreck salvage operations.108 The 
draft convention went as far as to prohibit the application of salvage 
law to historic shipwrecks.109 The draft convention was submitted to 
UNESCO for adoption, where the inclusion of salvage law and non-
commercialization clauses were heavily debated.110 
The preamble of the UCH Convention explicitly 
acknowledges “the importance of underwater cultural heritage as an 
                                                
101   Protecting Underwater Heritage From Treasure Hunters, UNESCO 
GENERAL CONFERENCE, 
http://www.unesco.org/confgen/press_rel/291001_subaqua.shtml (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2013) [hereinafter “Protecting UCH”]. 
102   UCH is a term created by the drafters of the Convention. Generally, 
under the Convention, UCH “encompasses all traces of human existence that lie or 
were lying under water and have a cultural or historical character.” Safeguarding the 
Underwater Cultural Heritage, UNESCO, 
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/themes/underwater-cultural-
heritage/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
103   Protecting UCH, supra note 101. 
104   About the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/underwater-cultural-
heritage/2001-convention/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) [hereinafter “About UCH”]. 
105   Forest, supra note 58, at 372. 
106   Founded in 1873, the International Law Association is a private non-
governmental organization of persons interested in international law. About Us, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/about_us/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
107   Forest, supra note 58, at 372. 
108   Id. at 373. 
109   Id. 
110   Id. 
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integral part of the cultural heritage of humanity” and admits the 
UCH is “deeply concerned by the increasing commercial exploitation 
of underwater cultural heritage, and in particular by certain activities 
aimed at the sale, acquisition or barter of underwater cultural 
heritage.”111 Further, “the public’s right to enjoy the educational and 
recreational benefits of responsible nonintrusive access to in situ 
underwater cultural heritage” was a major factor.112 Lastly, the UCH 
Convention expresses concern with the current legal framework of 
historic salvage by acknowledging “the need to codify and 
progressively develop rules relating to the protection and 
preservation of underwater cultural heritage in conformity with 
international law and practice.”113 
Opposition to UCH convention’s application of salvage law 
to historic shipwrecks is best summarized by the commentary to the 
ILA draft convention114: 
[T]he law of salvage relates solely to the recovery of 
items endangered by the sea; it has no application to 
saving relics on land. For underwater cultural heritage, 
the danger has passed; either a vessel has sunk or an 
object has been lost overboard. Indeed, the heritage 
may be in greater danger from salvage operations than 
from being allowed to remain where it is. . .The major 
problem is that salvage is motivated by economic 
considerations; the salvor is often seeking items of 
value as fast as possible rather than undertaking the 
painstaking excavation and treatment of all aspects of 
the site that is necessary to preserve its historic 
value.115 
                                                
111   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1. 
112   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1. 
113   Id. 
114   Forest, supra note 58, at 373. 
115   Id., citing Patrick J. O’Keefe & James A.R. Nafziger, The Draft 
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, 25 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L 
L. 391, 404 (1994). 
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This argument is reiterated by many commenters116 and was 
stated multiple times in the negotiations of the convention.117 The 
UCH convention codifies this argument in “Article 4 – Relationship 
to law of salvage and law of finds”118 stating that “activity relating to 
[UCH] shall not be subject to the law of finds.”119 
The broad prohibition against salvage law application is 
subject to an exception. The exception stems from developed States 
expressing concerns over the limiting of sovereign power of States to 
engage in commercial and cultural transactions.120 Salvage law can be 
applied when “authorized by the competent authorities” to the extent 
salvage law conforms to the UCH Convention and “ensures [the] 
recovery of the [UCH] achieves its maximum protection.”121 
                                                
116   See Forest, supra note 58, at 373; O’Keefe, supra note 116, at 404; 
Strati, supra note 63 at 300; Luigi Migliorino, In Situ Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage Under International Treaties and National Legislation, 10 INT’L J. 
MARINE & COASTAL L. 486 (1995); Janet Blake, The Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 819-43 (1996); Bruce E. Alexander, 
Treasure Salvage Beyond the Territorial Sea: An Assessment and Recommendations, 20 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 7-8 (1989). 
117   Forest, supra note 58, at 373, citing Roberta Garabello, The 
Negotiating History of the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater 
Cultural Heritage, in The Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage: Before 
and After the 2001 UNESCO Convention, 89, 123-3, (Roberta Garabello & Tullio 
Scovazzi eds., 2003). 
118   Article 4 reads:  
“Relationship to law of salvage and law of finds 
 
Any activity relating to underwater cultural heritage to which this 
Convention applies  
shall not be subject to the law of salvage or law of finds, unless 
it:  
(a) is authorized by the competent authorities, and  
(b) is in full conformity with this Convention, and  
(c) ensures that any recovery of the underwater cultural heritage 
achieves its maximum protection.”  
 
UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4. 
119   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4. 
120   Garabello, supra note 117, at 123-25. 
121   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 4. 
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The prohibition against applying salvage law to UCH 
supports the UCH Convention’s main purpose of banning 
commercial exploitation of UCH.122 The Annex of the UCH 
Convention describes commercial exploitation as “fundamentally 
incompatible with the protection and proper management of 
underwater cultural heritage.”123 The Annex allows for the recovery 
and deposition of UCH by “professional archaeological services” for 
the purpose of a “research project.”124 Further, the UCH convention 
states that in situ preservation is the preferred option when a 
historical shipwreck is discovered.125 In situ not only preserves 
archaeological investigation that can occur before the site is 
disturbed,126 but also serves to freeze commercial incentives for 
salvage. Commercial salvors often seek items of value as fast as 
possible rather than undertaking the painstaking excavation and 
treatment of all aspects of the site that is necessary to preserve its 
historic value.127 
The scope and jurisdiction of the UCH Convention are quite 
broad. The definition of UCH, according to the convention, includes 
“all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or 
archaeological character which have been partially or totally 
underwater, periodically or continuously, for at least 100 years.”128 
Hundred-year-old, historic shipwrecks are included in this 
definition.129 The jurisdiction of the UCH convention is slightly more 
limited than UNCLOS or the IMO convention. The jurisdiction 
extends to all international waters, which are also controlled by 
UNCLOS or the IMO convention, but allows coastal States complete 
                                                
122   Id. at art. 2(7). 
123   Id. at Annex, I. General Principles, R. 2. 
124   Id. 
125   Id. at art. 2 para. 5. 
126   Forest, supra note 58, at 368. 
127   Jeremy Neil, Note & Case Comment, Sifting Through the Wreckage: An 
Analysis and Proposed Resolution Concerning the Disposition of Historic Shipwrecks Located in 
International Waters, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 895, 911 (2010/2011). 
128   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1 para. 1(a). 
129   The definition continues to outline specific items intended to fall 
under the UCH Convention’s protection: “vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any 
part thereof, their cargo or other contents, together with their archaeological and 
natural context.” UCH Convention, supra note 100, at 1 para. 1(a)(ii). 
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sovereignty within territorial waters as outlined by UNCLOS or the 
IMO convention.130 
C. Economic Incentives 
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. - The main 
problem plaguing the development of salvage law is the struggle 
between providing economic incentives to motivate would-be 
salvors, and preserving the archeological value of historic 
shipwrecks.131 UNCLOS, in broad terms, imposes duties on would-be 
salvors to “protect objects of an archaeological and historical 
nature,”132 and gain the approval of the “coastal State” for removal of 
objects.133 Even within the comprehensive framework of UNCLOS, 
salvors must remain cognizant of the interaction of traditional salvage 
law and the law of finds.134 Due to the lack of treaty language 
regarding historic shipwrecks, UNCLOS’s economic incentives flow 
from traditional salvage law and, more importantly, the law of 
finds.135 The law of finds allows for full possession of the wreck once 
the salvager makes an affirmative effort to take possession of the 
wreck.136 
While providing salvors with title to salvaged objects, the law 
of finds provides limited economic incentives.137 The incentive to 
salvage historic shipwrecks under UNCLOS and the law of finds is 
limited to the estimated value of items aboard the vessels, but this 
fails to recognize any intrinsic value of the wrecks.138 The majority of 
national governments and archaeologists expressly disfavor the 
application of the law of finds, and salvage law, generally, to historic 
shipwrecks.139 The disfavor stems from the law’s nature to overlook 
                                                
130   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 7, para. 1. 
131   Paul Hallwood & Thomas J. Miceli, Murky Waters: The Law and 
Economics of Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 285, 295 (2006). 
132   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303(1) (emphasis added). 
133   Id. at art. 303(2). 
134   Id. at art. 303(3). 
135   Hallwood, supra note 131, at 295, 293. 
136   Id. at 293. 
137   Id. 
138   Id. 
139   Neil, supra note 127, at 904. 
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the archaeological value contained in the shipwreck and surrounding 
area.140 It is not unusual for salvors of historic shipwrecks to be 
referred to as pirates, looters, and thieves for their role in removing 
artifacts from sites merely for profit without regard for their historic 
significance.141 
The primary economic driver for the salvage of historic 
shipwrecks under UNCLOS is the value of items aboard the vessels 
due to the law of finds providing title.142 Salvors under UNCLOS 
must “protect” the items they salvage from historic shipwrecks.143 
However, many archaeologists would argue that removing items 
from their current location on the seafloor is not protecting them.144 
The fact that the items are submerged, and removed from the 
presence of oxygen slows the deterioration process.145 Even the most 
careful salvages disturb the delicate ecosystems of historic shipwreck 
sites and threaten the site’s archaeological value.146 
On the other hand salvors argue that without the salvage of 
historic shipwrecks, sites offer little value and are in danger of 
complete destruction from other human activity and natural 
disasters.147 Salvors defend their position by stating that human 
actions, like fishing trawlers and plastic waste,148 combined with 
natural disasters, like hurricanes and earthquakes, effectively destroy 
the archaeological content of these sites and cause the loss of 
                                                
140   Id. 
141   See, e.g., David J. Bederman, The UNESCO Draft Convention on 
Underwater Cultural Heritage: A Critique and Counter-Proposal, 30 J. MAR. L. & COM. 
331, 343 (observing that the International Law Association views salvors as 
“looters” and “destroyers of our past”). 
142   Hallwood, supra note 131, at 295, 293. 
143   UNCLOS, supra note 49, at art. 303(1). 
144   Ole Varmer, The Case Against the “Salvage” of Cultural Heritage, 30 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 279, 280 (1999). 
145   Varmer, supra note 144, at 280. 
146   Id. at 280-81. 
147   Neil, supra note 127, at 905. 
148   Cahal Milmo, Why is There a Storm Brewing Over the Right to Plunder 
Shipwrecks?, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), June 9, 2009, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/why-is-there-a-storm-
brewing-over-the-right-to-plunder-shipwrecks-1700207.html. 
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countless artifacts.149 Further, many commercial salvage companies 
employ a team of archaeologists to maintain high compliance 
standards during the salvage.150 For example, Odyssey employs a 
team of archaeologists whose goals are to maintain compliance with 
community standards, preserve the history associated with recovered 
cultural relics, and fully document all artifacts that are recovered 
before they are passed on to museums and collectors.151 
2. IMO 1989 International Convention on Salvage Law. - As 
discussed above, the IMO convention was not explicitly written to 
control the salvage of historic shipwrecks. However, the UCH 
convention excludes any sunken vessels less than one hundred years 
old.152 This carves out an area of historic vessels that have been on 
the seafloor for less than one hundred years. This means that the 
recovery of vessels from WWII is not controlled by the UCH 
convention, but instead by the IMO convention. The incentives to 
salvage these vessels, like the SS Gairsoppa, operate similar to 
restitution.153 
Restitution operates under the assumption that a person 
enriched by the actions of another should be liable to pay for the 
enrichment.154 This restitutionary payment is the driver for the 
salvage reward recognized under the IMO convention, in that the 
salvage must have a “useful result”155 to be entitled to the reward.156 
Additionally, the restitutionary value of the reward is enhanced by 
several other motivators. Courts routinely increase the salvage 
                                                
149   Chris Southerly et al., N.C. OFFICE OF STATE ARCHEOLOGY, FALL 
2006 RECOVERY PLAN FOR NORTH CAROLINA ARCHAEOLOGY SHIPWRECK SITE 
31CR314, 1 (2006). 
150   See, e.g., A Commitment to Archaeology, ODYSSEY MARINE 
EXPLORATION, http://www.shipwreck.net/archaeology.php (last visited Dec. 24, 
2013) (provides the specific steps Odyssey undertakes to protect the artifacts it 
recovers). 
151   Id. 
152   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 1 para. 1(a). 
153   See Catherine Swan, The Restitutionary and Economic Analyses of Salvage 
Law, 23 A & NZ MAR. L. J. 99, 104-06 (2008) (details the history of salvage law and 
its shared restitutionary goals). 
154   Swan, supra note 153, at 105-06. 
155   See supra note 79 (defines a “useful result” to be when property of 
value is saved. Property includes the vessel, cargo, or life.)  
156   Swan, supra note 153, at 106. 
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rewards for maintaining salvage vessels on standby,157 and 
successfully protecting the environment.158 
The IMO convention’s salvage rewards differ from a purely 
restitutionary reward for services rendered.159 The reward serves three 
main purposes: compensation for the work done, reimbursement for 
the expenses incurred, and a reward to promote the public policy of 
salvage.160 The reward’s purpose does not align with a restitutionary 
model, and is quite often a purely discretionary amount determined 
by the court.161 
The salvage reward can also be compared to a model of 
contingent payment.162 The contingent model, elaborated on by 
William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, predates the adoption of 
the IMO convention. The model states that as the probability for 
successful recovery increases, the ensuing reward should decrease.163 
This is reflected in the criteria used to determine the salvage rewards 
listed in Article 13 of the IMO convention.164 As the degree of 
success rises in the salvage, the weight of the factors decreases, and 
so does the salvage reward. Thus, while the IMO convention’s 
salvage reward is primarily a restitutionary payment on its face, the 
factors used to determine the reward align with a contingent payment 
model. 
                                                
157   Id. 
158   IMO, supra note 78. 
159   Swan, supra note 153, at 106. 
160   Id. 
161   Id. 
162   William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, ‘Salvors, Finders, Good 
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers’, 7 J. L. STUD. 83, 100-103 (1978). 
163   Landes, supra note 162, at 101. 
164   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 13 (the criteria include the salved value of 
the vessel and other property, the skill and efforts of the salvors in preventing or 
minimizing damage to the environment, the measure of success obtained by the 
salvor, the nature and degree of the danger, the skill and efforts of the salvors in 
salving the vessel, other property and life, the time used and expenses and losses 
incurred by the salvors, the risk of liability and other risks run by the salvors or 
their equipment, the promptness of the services rendered, the availability and use 
of vessels or other equipment intended for salvage operations, and finally, the state 
of readiness and efficiency of the salvor’s equipment and the value thereof). 
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The contingent payment model is reinforced by the “special 
compensation”165 given to salvors that protect the environment in 
their salvage operations. The reward serves to promote 
environmental protection in salvage operations, measures that were 
routinely overlooked by previous regimes.166 This type of payment 
does not fit into a restitutionary model, and instead serves to 
promote public policy, in accordance with a contingent fee model.167 
The payment reflects the balancing of proper economic incentives 
against the increased cost of preventing environment damage during 
salvage operations.168 
3. UNESCO UCH Convention. - The UCH convention 
features an almost complete lack of economic incentives. Unlike the 
salvage title gained under traditional maritime law and UNCLOS, or 
the salvage reward given under the IMO convention, the UCH 
convention’s main provisions serve to ban the “commercial 
exploitation”169 of historic shipwrecks. According to the convention, 
the “commercial exploitation” of UCH is “deeply concerning” 
especially considering the sale, acquisition or barter of UCH.170 By 
declining to provide economic incentives for historic salvage, the 
UCH seemingly abridges any reason to independently conduct these 
types of operations. 
The adoption of the UCH convention did not stop the search 
for and salvage of historic vessels, but simply shifted the cost burden 
from commercial salvors to the States’ with UCH sites.171 The UCH 
convention requires that state parties “cooperate in the protection of 
underwater cultural heritage,”172 “preserve underwater cultural 
                                                
165   IMO, supra note 78, at art. 14 (“special compensation” is provided 
when a salvage is carried out in such a way to protect the environment. The 
compensation is equal 30% of the expenses incurred by the salvor). 
166   Forest, supra note 58, at 371. 
167   Swan, supra note 153, at 109. 
168   Id. 
169   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 2(7). 
170   Id. at 1. (“Deeply concerned by the increasing commercial 
exploitation of underwater cultural  
heritage, and in particular by certain activities aimed at the sale, acquisition or barter 
of underwater cultural heritage.”) 
171   Neil, supra note 127, at 911. 
172   UCH Convention, supra note 100, at art. 2(2) 
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heritage for the benefit of humanity,”173 and “take all appropriate 
measures in conformity with this Convention and with international 
law that are necessary to protect underwater cultural heritage.”174 
These requirements assume States will regulate and control the 
historic salvage market. Further, with the elimination of independent 
economic incentives, the States now face the burden of motivating 
commercial salvage companies to find and recover historic 
shipwrecks. 
The State controlled salvage market has seen a number of 
such arrangements.175 Interstate agreements have been reached over 
the CSS Alabama (France and United States), HMS Birkenhead (United 
Kingdom and South Africa), HMS Erebus (United Kingdom and 
Canada), HMS Terror (United Kingdom and Canada), Estonia 
(Estonia, Finland, and Sweden), and the most notable historic 
salvage, Titanic (United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and 
France).176 Odyssey has entered into several salvage agreements with 
the United Kingdom which include the SS Gairsoppa, SS Mantola, 
HMS Victory, and HMS Sussex.177 These agreements will undoubtedly 
continue to increase as the market for commercial salvage adjusts. 
IV. RECOMMENDATION FOR COUNTRIES WITH HISTORICAL SALVAGE 
SITES 
The contracted salvage of the SS Gairsoppa should serve as a 
model for states with historic shipwrecks. States with known sites or 
states aware of vessels lost at sea should seek to enter into contracted 
agreements for the exploration and salvage of these vessels. By 
contracting the salvage of these vessels, states maintain significant 
control over their cultural heritage while promoting the necessary 
economic incentives for salvage operations. As outlined in the UCH 
convention, these historic shipwrecks contain valuable insight into 
historically significant events, as well as extraordinarily valuable 
                                                
173   Id. 
174   Id.; Neil, supra note 127, at 911. 
175   Hallwood, supra note 131, at 296. 
176   Id. 
177   Shipwrecks, ODYSSEY MARINE EXPLORATION, 
http://www.shipwreck.net/shipwrecks.php (last visited Dec. 24, 2013). 
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metals and precious stones. The international legal regime shifted the 
burden of incentivizing historic salvage to the state. Demonstrated by 
the agreements between Odyssey and the United Kingdom, 
contracted salvage motivates commercial salvage companies to 
undertake these operations while protecting the archaeological value 
of the sites. 
The terms of the agreement need to be carefully considered 
in order to properly protect the interests of both the country and the 
commercial salvage company.178 The agreements should call for a 
project plan that details the complete operation. The plan should 
provide the government with detailed information of equipment, 
people, techniques, and conservation methods to be used. The 
agreement should detail the period for acceptance of the plan, and 
any needed termination terms. Following approval, the commercial 
salvage company should post a deposit sufficient to cover 
governmental expenses to serve as collateral in case of insufficient 
performance of the agreement. Additionally, the government may 
want to include a term detailing how monitoring of the operation will 
be accomplished, whether by government officials or company 
certified reports. 
The most important terms of the agreement are the 
compensation parameters. As in the SS Gairsoppa’s salvage, a profit 
sharing model should be employed. By sharing a percentage of 
overall profits, the government incentives the commercial salvage 
company to maximize gain during the operation. The agreement 
should detail the exact percentages, as well as the calculations to 
determine the profit. 
Additionally, contracted salvage avoids the uncertainty that 
litigation involves. By having the state and salvage company negotiate 
for their interest, contracted salvage can find the optimal solution; 
whereas, litigation often falls short. Litigation involves uncertainty in 
                                                
178   My recommendation is modeled after the successful agreements 
utilized by the United Kingdom and Odyssey; See Partnering Agreement 
Memorandum Concerning the Shipwreck of the HMS Sussex, Between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland & 
Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. (Sept. 27, 2002), available at 
http://shipwreck.net/pam (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
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the controlling law, substantial legal fees, delayed timing to reach a 
decision, and unforeseeable results. Contracted salvage streamlines 
the process by establishing a binding agreement for the interested 
parties, and mitigates the litigation uncertainty. Salvage contracts 
normally include dispute resolution terms. The terms often include 
arbitration clauses that completely remove litigation risk. 
States employing contracted salvage recognize the need to 
provide adequate economic incentives for salvage operations while 
protecting their UCH. These agreements foster commercial salvage 
companies’ participation, while safeguarding the archaeological 
interests in historic shipwrecks. Contracted historic salvage therefore 
provides states with preferable results when the current international 
regime obfuscates desired outcomes. 
 
